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The present study investigated how holding gender stereotypes and having a 
false belief theory of mind impacts children’s understanding of intentionality when 
evaluating morally relevant stories. Children 3 – 4, 5 – 6, and 7 – 8-years-of-age (N = 
127) were interviewed about the intentions of a potential transgressor in two 
hypothetical stories. Both stories involved a child accidentally (or on purpose) putting 
another child’s toy into their own backpack. One of the stories utilized the taking of a 
toy that was gender stereotype consistent (a girl taking a doll) while the other story 
involved a gender stereotype inconsistent toy (a boy taking a doll or a girl t king a 
truck). A false belief theory of mind task as well as gender stereotype knowledge, 
tolerance, and flexibility tasks were administered to each participant.  
  
Results revealed that children over-attributed negative intentions and endorsed 
more punishment in the story with the counter-stereotypic toy than in the story with 
the stereotype consistent toy, indicating that stereotypes were impacting the 
children’s decisions concerning intentionality. Additionally, across scenarios, older 
children as well as children able to pass the false belief theory of mind task, endorsed 
less punishment and indicated less negative intentions than their counterparts, 
demonstrating that as children get older and more cognitively advanced they are 
better able to see the ambiguity of a morally relevant scenario, despite gend r 
stereotypes, in order to attribute less negative intentions. Furthermore, children who 
were aware of gender stereotypes and children who were tolerant of others playing
with any toy regardless of the associated gender stereotype also endorsed less 
punishment and indicated less negative intentions than their counterparts.  
The present study therefore shows how children may erroneously focus on 
stereotypic knowledge when making attributions of intentionality.  This is important 
as over-attributing negative intentions can lead to peer rejection and exclusion. 
Understanding when and how contextual variables such as gender stereotypes as well 
as when and how having a false belief theory of mind impacts attributions of 
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Chapter 1: Theoretical Rationale 
Introduction 
Children’s moral judgments and reasoning have an undeniable and critical 
impact on their social development from a very early age.  Children form concepts of 
fairness and equality as early as 2 ½-years-of-age, and are able to apply these 
conceptions to their social experiences.  These concepts of fairness and equality, 
which are rudimentary to moral reasoning, combine with conceptions of authority, 
tradition, social norms, and personal preferences to constitute organized systems of a 
child’s overall social knowledge that are cultivated from children’s experiences i  
their social world (Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1983, 1998).  These systems of social 
knowledge are used by children to reason about or make judgments in their social 
world.  Concurrently, children’s organization and use of these systems of social 
knowledge facilitate our understanding of their social reasoning process.  
The social cognitive domain model, a theoretical model of social reasoning, 
allows for researchers to explore attribution of intentionality and decision making 
about familiar events, and then evaluate what children are reasoning about when 
making those decisions.  More specifically, it uniquely permits researchers to 
investigate when children are taking stereotypes into account when making a decision 
about intentionality.  This is critically important in gaining an understanding of the 
ontogeny, formation and the developmental trajectories of prejudice (the tendency to 
attribute negative characteristics to outgroup members), stereotyping (making 




discrimination (differential treatment based on biased beliefs about one’s group 
membership) (Killen, Richardson, & Kelly, 2010). 
Social Cognitive Domain Model 
The Social Cognitive Domain Model is a model of social reasoning that has 
identified three conceptually distinct domains of social reasoning used by individuals 
from early childhood to adulthood; moral (fairness, justice, equality), social 
conventional (authority, tradition, social norms), and psychological (personal).  The 
social domain model proposes that individuals apply different forms of reasoning to a 
range of situations (Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1983, 1998).  The model distinctively 
maintains that individuals utilize one of these domains when understanding and 
making decisions about their social worlds, including decisions made in intergroup 
situations (Horn, 2003; Killen, Richardson, & Kelly, 2010; Smetana, 2006). 
  Additionally, the social cognitive domain model contends that individuals 
may apply reasons from one domain (moral, social conventional, or psychological) or 
more than one domain (e.g., both moral and personal) to a given situation, and that 
the judgments made may include interpretations of specific features of the situation 
(Killen, McGlothlin, & Lee-Kim, 2002a). When individuals apply reasons from one 
domain alone, it is considered straightforward.  For example, nearly all children will 
say that hitting is wrong, and use moral reasoning concerning harm for others as their 
justifications (Killen, McGlothlin, & Lee-Kim, 2002b). In contrast, when a situat on 
is complex and individuals combine multiple domains, moral, social conventional, or 
personal, it is considered multifaceted.  Reasoning about issues such as stereotypes 




reasons related to fairness (moral) or accepted because of a need for a group to
function optimally (social conventional) or because  of a personal choice 
(psychological).  It is proposed that when individuals evaluate complex, multifaceted 
acts and issues, they weigh different considerations and give priority to one 
perspective, or form of reasoning, over another.   
The social cognitive domain model additionally proposes that social reasoning 
varies by context and that in a given situation individuals have to assess the multiple 
dimensions often present in a context in order to make an evaluation.  The model 
therefore stipulates that it is critical for researchers to analyze exp rimental situations 
in terms of both the components of the context as well as the predictions about how 
individuals will analyze it.  The model provides guidance with the explication of 
moral components (e.g., issues of fairness, justice, or rights), societal components 
(e.g. customs and cultural expectations), and personal components (e.g., personal 
choice, privacy, intimate relationships), with the addition of informational 
assumptions (judgments about reality, the nature of learning, etc), which invariably 
enter into the evaluations of social contexts (Killen, McGlothlin, et al., 
2002a).Cultivating a stronger understanding of the ontogeny and development of 
moral reasoning is essential to understanding children’s social development in 
general, and more specifically it is critical to understanding the judgments and 
decisions that children are making, and the reasoning behind these decisions.  
As early as 3, children can distinguish moral and conventional issues from 
personal ones in both the home and at preschool (Killen & Smetana, 1999; Nucci & 




apply moral criteria to events entailing physical harm (hitting or hurting) (Smetana, 
1981), and eventually move on to include psychological harm (Smetana, 1993) as 
well. In middle childhood, children’s understanding of the moral domain expands 
from one of concrete harm and others’ welfare to a more complex understanding of 
fairness defined in terms of equality and equal treatment (Helwig, 1990; Nucci, 
2001). During pre-adolescence, conceptions of fairness expand even further to 
envelop more and more complex social situations concurrently involving both moral 
issues and non-moral issues in the social conventional and personal domains.  
Additionally, at this time, adolescents begin to, among other things, prioritize issues 
of group functioning, over other moral and social concerns (Horn, 2003; Killen, Lee-
Kim, McGlothlin, & Stangor, 2002). Knowing more about how children and 
adolescents are using the innumerable possible contextual considerations when 
reasoning about social and moral issues will deepen our understanding of moral and 
social reasoning. 
Study Rationale 
Morality, Intentionality, and Theory of Mind 
Central to, and inextricable from the moral reasoning about an action or 
behavior, is the intentionality that motivated the action. This is because behaviors 
alone do not reveal the moral status of an action; it is necessary to know what the 
actor intended to do, and whether the intentions were positive or negative towards 
another individual. In fact, the morality of a behavior or action is often judged by the 
intentions of the actor (Leslie, Knobe, & Cohen, 2006).  To fully understand 




their social interactions and conflicts, it is critical to understand how children’s ability 
to interpret intentionality impacts their moral judgments and justifications (Wainryb 
& Brehl, 2006). The study of intentionality is central to the study of theory of mind, 
or the understanding that others have beliefs, intentions, and desires different from 
one’s own (Astington, Harris, & Olson, 1988; Leslie, Knobe, & Cohen, 2006).  
There is a tremendous amount of research delving into the myriad intricacies 
of the field of theory of mind research starting in early infancy going up to and 
beyond middle childhood (Wellman & Liu, 2004; Woodward & Needham, 2009). 
Wellman and Liu (2004) define theory of mind as children’s understanding of other 
people’s mental states (pp. 523) and consolidated the wealth of theory of mind 
knowledge into an age related progression of the different types of theory of mind 
understandings such as the understanding of desires versus beliefs and ignorance 
versus false beliefs.  A central task developed in the 1980s is referred to as the “f lse 
belief task” which assesses children’s ability to utilize their knowledge of an ther 
person’s belief states to predict his or her subsequent actions when those beliefs differ 
from reality and from the child’s own knowledge (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). For 
example, a box that has pictures of chocolates on the outside is shown to a 
participant. The participant is asked what they believe is on the inside, and nearly all 
children state chocolates. The box is then opened to show that it in fact has pencils on 
the inside, not chocolates. The box is then closed and the child is asked what another 
child, who has never opened nor seen the box, will think is inside.  Typically, 
children younger than 4-years-of-age fail this task as they predict the person’s actions 




than the person’s false belief. Children begin to pass this task around 5-years-of-age, 
distinguishing between what is reality, and the false belief that the child who has not 
seen the inside of the box will have, thereby displaying an understanding of false 
belief theory of mind  (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001).  
Other researchers, such as Karpinski and Scullin (2009), have delved into the 
relationships between theory of mind and other cognitive capacities such as executiv  
functioning, and their effects on social processes such as the ability to influence a 
preschooler during an interview.  These very different arenas of theory of mind 
research add greatly to the field in their own ways, and can also add to our general
understanding of theory of mind and its effects on social decision making, such as the 
decisions around intentionality.  Despite this extensive surge of research on theory of 
mind, there is surprisingly little research integrating theory of mind and morality (for 
exceptions see: Helwig, Zelazo, & Wilson, 2001; Killen, Mulvey, Richardson, 
Jampol, & Woodward, under review; Leslie, et al., 2006; Wainryb & Brehl, 2006; 
Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996). 
Intentionality is a sphere where theory of mind and moral judgment can meet 
(Leslie, et al., 2006).  Intentions though, cannot be known by the action alone, unless 
explicitly stated by the actor. Intentions must be inferred from contextual information 
such as the time, place, objects, other involved individuals, information about the 
actor such as beliefs, desires, stereotypes, past behaviors, in addition to the 
information about the action itself (Malle, Moses, & Baldwin, 2001). The contextual 




Historically, the founder of the field of developmental psychology, Jean 
Piaget, a Swiss psychologist, observed  that the moral reasoning of the developing 
child began to reflect an understanding of  intentions around 10 years of age (Piaget, 
1932/1965), while more recent research indicates that children can do this much 
earlier (Smetana, 1995; Turiel, 1983).  In fact, some researchers have been able to 
determine that children as young as 14 – 18 months of age can differentially imitate, 
and thereby differentiate, intentional and accidental actions (Carpenter, Akhtar, & 
Tomasello, 1998). Recently, researchers studying morality and theory of mind have 
converged on demonstrating when theory of mind competence is related to moral 
judgment, and how moral judgment can be influenced by a lack of theory of mind 
ability (Baird & Astington, 2004; Lagattuta, 2005; Leslie, et al., 2006; Wainryb & 
Brehl, 2006).  Killen and colleagues have been able to determine that while children 
can discern intentionality in a standard false belief theory of mind task by 4- to 5-
years-of-age, children have a harder time discerning intentionality in a morally 
relevant hypothetical scenario (Killen et al., under review).  
Challenges within the Theory of Mind Research 
The field of theory of mind research is so vast and varied, that utilizing it to 
inform research about morality and intentionality is challenging. Primarily, of the few 
studies that do connect morality and theory of mind research, very few have a 
standardized methodology of examining morality, and even fewer examine morality 
and theory of mind within the same task. This makes it difficult for comparisons to be 
made across the various studies, and allows for only correlational relationships 




determine how theory of mind competence bears on moral judgments. Furthermore, 
the vast majority of theory of mind measures provide either very limited or no 
contextual information. In the prototypical theory of mind false belief measure, (e.g., 
Mark is using markers on the art table. Mark goes outside. Another person comes in 
the room and puts the markers in a cabinet. When Mark comes back inside where will 
he look for the markers?), no social information is provided. The individual taking the 
task does not know who the markers belong to, is not expected to have any emotional 
reaction to the markers, does not know why the markers were moved, and does not 
know the relationship between the two individuals.  The missing social information 
would likely be utilized by the children taking the theory of mind task in formulating 
their decisions concerning the outcome of events. In fact, research by Killen and 
colleagues has shown that contextual information in hypothetical scenarios, such as
relationships of the actors in the scenario, the social group that a person belongs to, 
the intergroup nature of a scenario, or the skin color of an actor in the scenario are all 
used to make decisions concerning the actors in the scenario (Horn, Killen, & 
Stangor, 1999; Killen, Kelly, Richardson, & Jampol, in press; McGlothlin & Killen, 
2006). 
Killen and colleagues addressed many of these concerns when conducting a 
study that embedded a false belief theory of mind task within a morally relevant and 
standardized scenario (Killen, et al., under review). The authors interviewed children 
from 4- to 8-years-of-age about a series of tasks, one prototypical moral 
transgression, (e.g., a child gets pushed off a swing by another child who wants to use 




box when no one else is in the room), and a problem that embedded a theory of mind 
belief in a morally relevant hypothetical scenario, a morally relevant theory of mind 
task.  
In the morally relevant theory of mind task, the participants were read a 
vignette involving a child who is helping the teacher clean up the classroom while the 
rest of the class is outside at recess, and accidentally throws away another child’s 
special cupcake.  This vignette is referred to as the “accidental transgressor 
paradigm”, and provides a great deal of social information.  The relationship between 
the actors is known, the object of interest is a cupcake, which is able to evoke a much 
stronger emotional reaction and connection then markers, and there is an identified 
victim, the child whose cupcake is thrown away.  Additionally, this scenario is still an 
extension of the theory of mind paradigm.  Killen and colleagues measured children’s 
false belief theory of mind, moral judgments, and morally relevant theory of mind 
with children, including an attribution of intentions of the potential transgressors’ 
actions (“do you think [the potential transgressor] did something all right or not all 
right?”), the acceptability of punishing the potential transgressor for his/her actions 
(“do you think [the potential transgressor] should get in trouble?”).  
In the prototypical false belief theory of mind task, the participants are asked
predict what a child will expect to find inside a crayon box if a child did not see the 
crackers put into the crayon box. In contrast, in the morally relevant theory of mind 
task developed by Killen and colleagues (2009), the participants were asked to preict 
what the actor who is cleaning up the room will expect to find inside the paper bag if 




questions typically seen in a theory of mind task as the participants were asked to 
make evaluations, judgments, and justifications of intentionality, punishment 
acceptability, and attribution of emotions (Killen, Mulvey, et al., in press).   
The main findings from this study were that children without false belief 
theory of mind competency were more likely to attribute negative intentions and 
found it more acceptable to punish children in the morally relevant hypothetical 
scenario than children with theory of mind, and that children attributed negative 
emotions and intentions to the accidental transgressor up until 8 – years-of-age 
(Killen, Mulvey, et al., in press).  This study made it clear for the first time, that 
integrating moral judgment and false belief theory of mind poses challenges to 
children.  One possible outcome of this error in judgment is over-attributing negative 
intentions to other children, which has been found to result in peer rejection and 
exclusion (Crick & Dodge, 1994).  Over-attributing negative intentions occurs when 
an accidental transgressor, for example, is assumed to have negatively motivated 
intentions. 
This study by Killen and colleagues opens a door into what is impacting a 
child’s ability to make an attribution of intentionality.  It is clear that while a 4- or 5-
year-old can correctly distinguish intentionality in a straightforward scenario 
involving no emotional valence or moral concerns, the addition of a moral premise 
adds a layer of complexity to the scenario that makes it more difficult to correctly 
decipher intentionality.  What is not known is what other aspects of a scenario may 
also contribute to increasing difficulty or greater ease in the ability to discern 




toy, instead of an object which elicits no emotional reaction, to a scenario aimed t 
examining a child’s ability to attribute intentionality will allow for a more thorough 
investigation of the impact of those contextual features. 
Killen and colleagues found that the fundamental determinations of 
intentionality, a core aspect of moral and social reasoning, is affected by the
introduction of a moral premise to a straightforward false belief theory of mind
scenario, which falls into line with previous social domain research indicating that 
when children and adolescents encounter complex scenarios, they use more reasoning 
about rules, conventions, and group norms, or social conventional reasoning  (Killen, 
Mulvey, et al., in press).  These new data add a wealth of information concerning 
what children are taking into account when deciding if someone did something on 
purpose, or when making an attribution of intentionality, and additionally these data 
inform us that these determinations of intentionality are context dependent.  There is a 
paucity of research evaluating what other aspects of the context, (social relat onships, 
relationships between the objects of interest and the actors, the personal 
characteristics of the actors), are affecting the decisions surrounding attribution of 
intentionality. In the current study, morality and theory of mind will be assessed in 
the context of situations involving gender stereotypic expectations. Before describing 
the design of the study, the literature on stereotype knowledge and intergroup 
attitudes will be reviewed. 
Morality and Intergroup Attitudes 
There has been a great deal of previous social domain research indicating that 




decisions (Horn, 2003; Killen, Sinno, & Margie, 2007; Smetana, 2006).  It is 
important to explore whether this impact of intergroup interactions, attitudes, and 
stereotypes will impact decisions surrounding attributions of intentionality, which 
was a central goal of the present study.    
Social Domain theorists have been researching the contextual information that 
impacts moral reasoning for several decades (for reviews see: Killen, et al., 2010; 
Smetana, 2006), and have found that intergroup attitudes strongly impact an 
individual’s use of moral reasoning (see Killen, Richardson, & Kelly, 2010 for 
examples). Intergroup research has been ongoing for decades.  Sherif (1966) defined 
intergroup behavior as, “Whenever individuals belonging to one group interact, 
collectively or individually, with another group or its members in terms of their group 
identification, we have an instance of intergroup behavior” (pp. 12). In order for there 
to be groups in this intergroup behavior however, it is necessary that there is an 
external recognition that the group exists as well as an internal sense of awareness of 
group membership, an awareness that the group membership has a value associated to 
it, and some emotional investment in that awareness (Tajfel, 1981). Intergroup 
attitudes, therefore, are the evaluations and emotional investment that individuals 
apply to their own group as well as to other groups.   
When including intergroup categories in assessments of straightforward moral 
transgression, research has shown that the vast majority of children and adolescents 
view it as wrong and unfair (Killen, Margie, & Sinno, 2006).  For example, Horn 
(2003) demonstrated that adolescents evaluated the denial of resources to individuals  




and colleagues additionally found that nearly 95% of children and adolescents 
rejected gender and racial exclusion in the context of denying educational access to 
others (Killen, Lee-Kim, et al., 2002). At the same time, Horn and Killen noted that in 
more complex, multifaceted situations, stereotypical expectations and increased 
reliance on group functioning, with age, functioned as the basis for exclusion and 
supplanted moral concerns for fairness (Horn, 2003; Killen, Lee-Kim, et al., 2002). 
Intergroup Attitudes and Attribution of Intentions 
Knowing that children and adolescent’s reasoning about intergroup 
interactions changes with age and with the complexity of the context, it is expectd 
that intergroup interactions might also impact a child’ or adolescent’s attribution of 
intentionality.  One way to explore the impact of intergroup attitudes on children’s 
interpretation of intentionality is by creating tasks in which children have to judge the 
intentionality of another child in a scenario that invokes stereotypic associations or 
stereotype knowledge.  We know that children and adolescents have been shown to 
have stereotypes that become more entrenched with age (Stangor & Schaller, 1996), 
and children and younger adolescents have been shown to make accusations based on 
stereotypic assumptions with less available information than older adolescents, who 
reserve judgment until more evidence is presented (Horn, et al., 1999; Killen, et al., in 
press). These children and adolescents may use this stereotypic information to make 
inaccurate attributions of intentions based on stereotypes.  Gaining a better 
understanding of the ages that this occurs, and the contextual scenarios that encourage 
this misattribution of intentions will inevitably broaden our understanding of 




Gender is one of the most salient intergroup categories in society today, 
especially for children, and thus would be a robust intergroup category to use in our 
examination of the impact of intergroup attitudes on interpretations of intentionality. 
As has been demonstrated by extensive research on gender development, gender 
identity and gender labeling is pervasive (Liben & Bigler, 2002).   Gender 
stereotypes, or knowledge representations or beliefs about sex-related behavior and 
characteristics (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1979), serve to organize thought and guide 
action (Martin & Halverson, 1981; Weisner & Wilson-Mitchell, 1990). Yet, in the 
context of situations involving fairness, children and adolescents often view gender 
stereotypes as wrong because they lead to unfair and unequal treatment of others 
(Killen & Stangor, 2001), such as when boys are excluded from girl type activities 
like ballet or when girls are excluded from boy-type activities like football. These are 
often evaluated as unfair and discriminatory (Killen & Stangor, 2001). 
  While children and adolescents view gender exclusion in peer contexts as 
wrong,  children as young as 18 months have acquired an understanding of the social 
differentiation of the genders, such that they associate hearts, softness, a d the color 
pink with females, and bears, roughness, and the color blue with males (Eichstedt, 
Serbin, Poulin-Dubois, & Sen, 2002). Children as young as 3 have been found to have 
gender stereotypes and have been also been found to rate masculine items as more 
desirable than feminine items (Eichstedt, et al., 2002; Killen & Stangor, 2001).  
Furthermore, children as young as 4 can hold stereotypes and base initial judgments 
of ambiguous social situations on stereotypic knowledge (Killen, Pisacane, Lee-Kim, 




gender stereotypes will impact how children discern and reason about intentionality 
in every day social interactions.  
Studying this convergence of morality, theory of mind, and intergroup 
relations, is an important line of research as it impacts a child’s moral reasoning, their 
understanding of intentionality, and the impact of intergroup stereotypes on the 
process.  It is crucial to have an understanding of how children are making 
attributions of intentions, and what contextual information is being used to make 
these attributions, which is the goal of the current study.  
Current Study Design and Hypotheses 
There are three theories being further explored in the current study, social 
domain theory, gender stereotype theory, and false belief theory of mind.  As 
illustrated earlier, one of the three components of social cognitive domain theory is 
moral development, and a central feature of many of the everyday moral questions 
and dilemmas individuals encounter on regular basis concerns intentionality.  When 
examining the morality of everyday decisions such as whether to attribute blam to 
someone who has potentially made a transgression, attributions of intentionality are 
made. Additionally, as explicated earlier, attributions of intentionality are central to 
the study of false belief theory of mind, as the study of theory of mind explores 
children’s understanding of other’s belief states (Wellman & Liu, 2004). More 
specifically, the false belief task assesses children’s ability to utilize their knowledge 
of another person’s belief states to predict his or her subsequent actions when those 
beliefs differ from reality and from the child’s own knowledge (Wimmer & Perner, 




predict another person’s belief state, a skill that is essential to predicting another 
person’s intentions.  
Studying children’s capacity to pass the false belief theory of mind task, and 
understanding how and when that capacity impacts their ability to make attributions 
of intentionality in morally relevant scenarios will facilitate our understanding of 
moral development, as it will begin to elucidate when a child can tell if someone has 
done something intentionally or not. Understanding when a child can make that 
determination will help us to understand the ontogeny of that very central aspect of 
moral development, as well as what cognitive capacities are necessary for it to occur. 
It is important to keep in mind though, that intentions cannot be known by the action 
alone, unless explicitly stated by the actor. Intentions must be inferred from 
contextual information such as the time, place, objects, other involved individuals, 
information about the actor such as beliefs, desires, stereotypes, past behaviors, in 
addition to the information about the action itself (Malle, Moses, & Baldwin, 2001). 
The contextual information therefore can play a critical role in the determination of 
intentionality, and has to be considered when attempting to determine the ontogeny of 
this ability. The child has to be able to not only determine intentionality, but has to be 
able to take in the contextual information that informs that determination. Varying the 
contextual information, such as the stereotype consistency of the object of interest in 
a morally relevant scenario, will help us to understand what aspects of the context are 
being attended to and are impacting the determination of intentionality. All of these
things together will facilitate our ability to determine the ontogeny of the skill of 




In addition to the current study furthering the field of moral development by 
providing a means of discerning the ontogeny of attributing intentions, the field of 
false belief theory of mind will be furthered as well. The current study will embed a 
false belief theory of mind task into a morally relevant scenario, thereby giving it 
context and social relevance, as typical everyday scenarios in which a child would be 
making determinations of other people’s belief states would occur. This will allow for 
a more thorough understanding of the age at which a child can pass the false belief 
theory of mind task when it is in a more real to life scenario, thereby pushing the field 
of false belief theory of mind forward. 
To date, no research has examined the impact of intergroup attitudes on moral 
judgments in the context of situations involving false belief theory of mind 
competencies.  It is proposed, however, that this line of research will push the field of
moral development forward and reveal new information about the ontogeny of moral 
reasoning and the emergence of intergroup attitudes.  It is also possible that this 
research will find children’s attributing of intentionality in ambiguous situations to be 
impacted by the stereotypes they hold, thereby laying the foundation for children to 
assign blame to another because they are consistent with a stereotype, or assign 
innocence because they are not consistent with a stereotype, rather than withholding 
judgment due to the ambiguity of the scenario.  
As seen through the previously discussed research of Killen and colleagues, 
the social-cognitive domain model provides a useful heuristic for investigating these 
issues.  It allows for an in depth critical analysis of the evaluations, judgments, and 




which will allow for a more thorough understanding of children’s attribution of 
intentionality and thus their moral reasoning.  This proposal will use the social-
cognitive domain model to examine how intergroup attitudes, such as gender 
stereotypes, interact with a child’s false belief theory of mind to impact children’s 
social evaluations, judgments, and reasoning about intentionality so as to further our 
understanding, as well as the field of moral development.   
Drawing on the findings from Killen (Killen et al., in press) the present study 
was designed to measure when and how children integrate three types of knowledge 
in an everyday peer exchange at school: 1) moral reasoning (is an act all right or not 
all right?); 2) intentionality of others (does the act require knowledge of another’s 
mental state?) and 3) gender stereotypes (do stereotypes contribute to judgments 
about intentionality or morality?).  In order to test these different types of judgments, 
children were presented with a task that was modified from previous research (Killen
et al., in press), in which they were asked to evaluate an accidental transgressor that 
“destroyed” a desired object. In the present study, children evaluated an accidental 
transgressor that “misplaced” a desired object that was either consistent or 
inconsistent with gender stereotypic expectations.  In this way, intergroup attit des 
will be introduced into the “accidental transgressor” paradigm.  The goal is to 
investigate whether knowledge and use of stereotypic expectations regarding 
ownership of toys (dolls, trucks) is related to judgments of intentionality and moral
judgment.  For example, do children attribute negative intentions in ambiguous 






The emergence of both gender stereotypes and theory of mind arise between 
the ages of 3 and 8 years of age.  It has been found that children develop a theory of 
mind by the age of 4, and continue to make refinements to the ability throughout early 
childhood (Wellman & Lui, 2004).  Additionally, children have been found to 
recognize, use, and make decisions using gender stereotypes as early as 3 (Killen et 
al., 2001).  For these reasons, participants will be ages 3-4, 5-6, and 7-8 years of age.  
Participants will first be interviewed with two of four possible morality and
theory of mind scenarios in an intergroup context, the Intergroup Attitudes 
Attributions of Intentions Task (see Table 1 for task design).  Each partici nt will be 
administered a gender consistent scenario, in which both the gender of the agent of 
the scenario and the gender of the potential victim are consistent with the gender 
stereotype of the object of interest that is “misplaced” (e.g., two girls and a doll, or 
two boys and a truck).  The gender of the participant will be matched to the gender of 
the actors in the gender consistent scenarios.  Each participant will also be 
administered a gender inconsistent scenario, in which the gender of the agent of the 
scenario is different from the gender of the potential victim, and the object of interest 
that is “misplaced” is inconsistent in gender stereotype with the agent of the scenario.  
Half of the participants will be administered a gender inconsistent scenario i  which 
the agent of the scenario is male and the object of interest is of low status (doll).  The 
other half of the participants will be administered a gender inconsistent scenario in 
which the agent of the scenario is female and the object of interest is of high status 




ingroup/outgroup identification, participants’ identification with the agent, as well as 
identification with the object (toy).  
The scenario used to measure children’s judgments for a “gender stereotypic 
inconsistent act” is the following:  
“This is Tina and this is Mark (show pictures). They are children in this 
classroom who like playing with dolls and trucks and balls. Tina and Mark 
have backpacks that look the same, except Tina’s has a T on the front and 
Mark’s has an M on the front.  This is Tina’s (show T backpack) and this is 
Mark’s (show M backpack).  They are playing with their toys at school when 
the teacher asks them to get their backpacks ready to go home before they go 
outside for recess.  Tina picks up her doll (show doll) and puts it next to the 
pile of backpacks near the door (place next to backpacks), where her backpack 
and Mark’s backpack are sitting.  Then, she goes outside for recess (show 
Tina leaving).  Mark stays inside to help the teacher clean up the classroom.  
Mark sees Tina’s doll and puts it into this backpack (show M backpack, and 
slide doll behind it). Can you show me which backpack the doll is in now?  (If 
incorrect, retell/clarify).” 
 
In this scenario, one child, Mark, is the classroom helper and potential transgressor, 
and he puts another child’s toy into his own backpack.  This act does not represent a 
stereotype as boys do not stereotypically play with dolls, and in fact is considered 
stereotype inconsistent.  In the other stereotype inconsistent scenario, the classroom 
helper and potential transgressor is a female, and the toy that she puts into her own 
backpack is a truck.  This is stereotype inconsistent, as girls do not stereotypically 
play with trucks.  In the stereotype consistent scenarios, the classroom helper and 
potential transgressor puts another child of the same gender’s stereotypically 
consistent toy into their own backpack (a girl putting a doll into her backpack, and a 
boy putting a truck into his backpack).  These scenarios are considered gender 
consistent as the gender of the potential transgressor matches the gender stereotype of 




The participants will be asked to make judgments and justifications 
concerning the intentions of the agent in the scenario, the acceptability of punishing 
the agent, potential for friendship between the agent and the victim, as well as the 
emotional state of the victim.  The task will also include embedded theory of mind 
assessments of false belief, location change, and second order false belief. 
In addition to evaluating morality and theory of mind in an intergroup context, 
participants will complete a distinct False Belief Theory of Mind Competency Task 
with a standard false belief, false contents task as well as a standard false belief 
location change task.  The participants will also be administered a Gender Stereotyp  
Knowledge, Tolerance, and Flexibility Task including gender stereotypic, counter-
stereotypic, and neutral toys.  These tasks will be assessed as participant variables in 
order to relate them to the attribution of intentions judgments and justifications. 
Hypotheses 
The overall goal of this study is to assess children’s moral judgments, 
including attributions of intentionality, with respect to the child’s false belief th ory 
of mind competence and their gender stereotype knowledge and flexibility in an 
intergroup task created for this study.   
Attributions of Intentionality and Gender Stereotype Knowledge, Tolerance, 
and Flexibility. In accord with previous research by Killen and colleagues, Liben and 
Bigler, as well as Freeman (Freeman, 2007; Killen, et al., 2001; Liben & Bigler, 
2002) indicating that children as young as 3 hold gender stereotypes, and that children 
use those stereotypes when making decisions about toy preference and social 




low flexibility of gender stereotypes will indicate more negative int ntions and more 
punishment acceptability in the gender consistent scenario than in the gender 
inconsistent scenario, as children with a high knowledge, low tolerance, and/or low 
flexibility of gender stereotypes will have a harder time believing that a child would 
desire to have a  counter-stereotypic toy, indicating that gender stereotypes are 
impacting the attribution of intentionality. 
Attributions of Intentionality and False Belief Theory of Mind. It is expected 
that, in concordance with Killen and colleagues previous study on Morality and 
Theory of Mind children’s false belief theory of mind competence will impact the 
attributions of intentions and judgments of punishment acceptability such that 
children with a false belief theory of mind competence will indicate less negativ  
intentions and less punishment acceptability than children without false belief theory
of mind (Killen, Mulvey, et al., 2009).  Furthermore, it is expected that children with 
a false belief theory of mind competence will use more moral justifications indicating 
issues of lack of negative intentions due to the accidental nature as well as prosocial 
issues referring to helping the teacher and being cooperative. 
False Belief Theory of Mind.  It is expected that overall, fewer children will 
have a false belief theory of mind competence within the Intergroup Attitudes 
Attribution of Intentions Task, than with the independent measurement of false belief 
theory of mind competence (Killen, Mulvey, et al., in press).  Furthermore it is 
expected that the embedded theory of mind competence will be affected by the age of 




knowledge, tolerance, or flexibility of stereotypes for the gender inconsiste t 
scenario. 
Age of Participant.  It is expected that children will attribute less negative 
intentions and indicate less punishment acceptability with age as they will better  
able to see the possible accidental nature of the transgression (Killen, Kelly, & 
Richardson, in press; Killen, Mulvey, et al., in press).  Killen and colleagues have 
found in previous studies that with age, children and adolescence are more able to see 
the complexity and ambiguity of situations, and therefore less likely to indicate  
negative intentions (Killen, Kelly, & Richardson, in press; Killen, Mulvey, et al., in 
press). 
Gender of Participant.  In line with what Killen and colleagues have found in 
previous studies, it is expected that female participants will be less likely to indicate 
negative intentions and indicate less punishment acceptability than will the male 
participants, as the females, due to female’s greater social experience of being 
excluded from participating in activities and from using toys due to their gender than 
males (Killen, Henning, Kelly, Crystal, & Ruck, 2007; Killen, Kelly, Richardson, 
Crystal, & Ruck, 2009; Killen, et al., 2001). 
Expected Contribution to the Field 
Children’s reasoning about and judgments concerning moral decisions is 
crucially important to their social development.  Children are making social decisions 
everyday that are influenced by their moral reasoning and by their ability to infer 
intentionality (Killen, Richardson, & Kelly, 2010).  Researching the contextual 




what role gender stereotypes and false belief theory of mind competence ar  playing 
in a child’s ability to reason about intentionality will further our ability to understand 
moral reasoning and the factors that are impacting that reasoning process.  
Additionally, gaining a better understanding of the ages that correspond with the 
effects of having gender stereotypes and a theory of mind competency, as well  th  
contextual scenarios that encourage possible misattribution of intentions will 
inevitably broaden our understanding of the intergroup biases of children, as well as 
how to help ameliorate theses biases.  
Understanding the role of false belief theory of mind in moral decision 
making will deepen our understanding of the cognitive competencies, such as those 
necessary to have a indicate a false belief theory of mind, which are necessary to 
make moral decisions such as those concerning intentionality.  Additionally, 
understanding whether having gender stereotypes impact those  moral decisions being 
made will further our understanding of the influence of gender stereotypes, and will 
enable the creation of interventions that address the comprehensive effect of 
stereotypes.  Furthermore, this research will address if stereotypic expe tations are 
related to children’s attributions of intentions and moral judgments.  Children who 
have stereotypic expectations may unknowingly be using these expectations as a 
reason to assume that a child did not intentionally do something in an ambiguous 
situation when the action does not conform to a stereotype, and by contrast assign 
blame to someone when the ambiguous act does conform to stereotypes.  For 
example, when Horn, Killen, and Stangor (1999) examined ambiguous scenarios with 




at a party; scenario 2, someone broke into the school’s computer system), the 
participants used stereotypic expectations to assign blame. The participants were 
more likely to accuse the “jocks” than the “techies” of breaking the sound equipment 
at the party, and were more likely to accuse the “techies” than the “jocks” of breaking 
into the computer system.  Even though both scenarios were ambiguous, as are the 
ones in the proposed study, the participants used stereotypic expectations to assign 
blame.  
 To date, no research has examined the impact of intergroup attitudes and 
theory of mind competencies on moral judgments.  Despite the lack of research in this 
area, it is clear that further research will push the field of moral developmnt forward 
and reveal the new information about the ontogeny of moral reasoning and the 
emergence of intergroup attitudes. In sum, this proposal seeks to further both the 
understanding and the interactions of moral reasoning, theory of mind, and gender 
stereotypes in general, and more specifically how having a theory of mind and 
holding gender stereotypes impacts children’s ability to make decisions about 
intentionality, and what contextual information is impacting these decisions so as to 







Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
In this literature review I will assess the current state of moral developm nt 
research with regards to understanding the role of attribution of intentionality on 
decision making, as well as other contextual factors impacting decision makig 
around intentionality.  I will examine this literature through the lens of the Social 
Domain Model.  I will begin with a review the fundamentals of the Social Domain 
Theory so as to lay a foundation for the theory guiding my research plan.  I will then 
review theory of mind research concerning intentionality as well as the research at the 
intersection of moral development and theory of mind so as to understand the role 
theory of mind plays in decision making concerning intentionality.  Subsequently, in 
order to identify the important research questions that need to be addressed research 
in the area of attribution of intentions, intergroup relations, and the link of moral 
reasoning and theory of mind the morality and intergroup relations will be thoroughly 
examined, with a specific focus on the impact of gender stereotypes, preferences, and 
ingroup/outgroup relationships on cognitive functioning, decision making, and moral 
reasoning.  Finally I will lay out a future line of research which takes ll of these 
literatures into consideration with the goal of furthering the understanding of the 
field, and filling the holes in current state of the research.  
Social Cognitive Domain Model 
As indicated above, the social cognitive domain model allows for researchers 




then evaluate what children are reasoning about when making those decisions.  More 
specifically, it uniquely permits researchers to investigate when children are taking 
stereotypes into account when making a decision about intentionality.  This is 
critically important in gaining an understanding of the ontogeny, formation and the 
developmental trajectories of prejudice (the tendency to attribute negative 
characteristics to outgroup members), stereotyping (making judgments about an 
individual’s traits or behaviors based on group membership), and discrimination 
(differential treatment based on biased beliefs about one’s group membership) 
(Killen, Richardson, & Kelly, 2010). 
 As discussed earlier, social domain theory  provides a basis for investigating 
different forms of reasoning about complex social issues, and research using this 
model has empirically demonstrated that individuals use three distinct domains of 
social reasoning; moral, social conventional, and psychological (personal), and that 
individuals utilize one or more of these domains when understanding and making 
decisions about their social worlds, including those decisions made in intergroup 
situations (Horn, 2003; Killen, Sinno, et al., 2007; Smetana, 2006).  Understanding 
these three domains of social reasoning allows for a thorough examination of the 
reasoning behind everyday social situations.  The moral domain pertains to issue’s of 
others’ welfare (harm), justice (comparative treatment and distribution), and rights 
(Nucci, 1978; Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1983, 1998). 
Individuals judge moral rules to be generalizable and unalterable, and 
consequently judge moral transgressions as wrong even in the absence of rules and 




adolescents are reasoning about intergroup interactions and judge an action, such as 
the denying of access to school based solely on race, to be wrong, they use moral 
reasons to justify that judgment (Killen, Lee-Kim, et al., 2002).  
Additionally, the social cognitive domain model addresses the social 
conventional domain, which pertains to issues involving rules, norms, and 
conventions that coordinate social interactions of individuals within social systems 
(Horn, 2003).  Individuals judge social conventional rules to be both relative to the 
social context and alterable, and consequently judge social conventional 
transgressions to be contingent upon the presence of rules and subordinate to 
authority dictates (Smetana, 1983).Social conventions ensure smooth group 
functioning and promote group identity.  
Finally, the social cognitive domain model includes a psychological or 
personal domain which pertains to knowledge of interpersonal relationships, the 
understanding of individuals as psychological systems, and issues in which 
individuals have personal jurisdiction such as choice of friends, choice of occupation, 
and privacy (Horn, 2003).  The psychological or personal domain appeals to 
individual preferences or prerogatives, and is therefore not regulated by rules or 
judgments about transgressions (Killen, Lee-Kim, McGlothlin, & Stangor, 2002).  
This indicates that built into the model is an understanding of the importance of 
context.  If a rule is wrong regardless of the timing, the people involved, the location, 
or any of the specifics of the situation, it transcends all context.  In the social 
conventional domain, individuals’ judge rules to be both relative to the social context 




contingent on the presence of rules and subordinate to authority dictates (Smetana, 
1983).  The psychological or personal domain appeals to individual preferences or 
prerogatives, and is therefore not regulated by rules or judgments about transgressions 
(Killen et al., 2002).  The social conventional and psychological domains therefore 
allow for context to be a deciding factor when decisions and judgments are being 
made. 
Additionally, the social cognitive domain model allows for the application of 
reasons from one domain (moral or social conventional) or more than one domain 
(both moral and personal) to a given situation, and acknowledges that the judgments 
made may include interpretations of specific features of the situation (Killen et al, 
2002).  When individuals evaluate complex acts and issues, it is assumed that they 
weigh different considerations and give priority to one perspective or form of 
reasoning over another, and can vary by physical and situational context. Individuals 
have to assess the multiple dimensions often present in a context in order to make an 
evaluation.  With this understanding, it becomes obvious how critical it is for 
researchers to analyze experimental situations in terms of both the components of the 
context as well as the predictions of how individuals will analyze it.   
Previous intergroup research utilizing the social cognitive domain theory has 
shown that when children and adolescents are reasoning about an intergroup 
interaction and judge an action, such as the denying of access to a music club or 
friendship based solely on race or gender, as fair, social conventional reasons of 
sustaining group identity and group functioning and/or reasons of personal preference 




everyday scenarios so that the use of a stereotype in one scenario over another can be 
seen to influence a decision concerning intentionality.  It is in this exploration of the
social reasoning used within the manipulated scenarios that the importance of a 
stereotype in directing an answer can be seen and explored.  Additionally a critical 
examination of everyday situations that children potentially experience can allow us 
to examine which situations, and which contextual variables in certain situations, are 
elemental to the use of moral reasoning versus the use of social conventional or 
personal reasoning when making decisions about intergroup interactions. An 
extensive line of research has shown that individuals from as early as two years of 
age differentiate events along these domain distinctions (for reviews, see: Sm tana, 
1995; Tisak, 1995; Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987).   
Furthermore, having a thorough understanding of how and when the cognitive 
competence of false belief theory of mind is coming into account and impacting a 
child’s ability to make attributions of intentionality in morally relevant scenarios will 
allow us to further understand the developmental progression of moral reasoning, as 
well as to understand what cognitive capacities are compulsory to having fully 
represented social and moral decision making concerning intentionality. 
In the current literature, what has not been examined in a thorough or critical 
manner are the contextual factors that are interacting with a child’s ability to attribute 
intentionality, such as if highly a stereotypical object is introduced, would that affec
how a child reason’s about the intentions of someone taking that object if it did not 
belong to them.  Are children who hold stereotypes less able to make an accurate 




Additionally, the question of the role of theory of mind competence in the 
developmental progression of moral reasoning and more specifically the attribution of 
intentionality in morally relevant scenarios has not been thoroughly investigated.  Are 
children with a theory of mind competence able to attribute intentionality even if they 
hold gender stereotypes and a stereotypical object is the object of interest?  
Examining these questions is necessary for a more comprehensive understanding of 
moral development and moral reasoning. 
Moral Development Research 
 The idea that children construe their own understanding of reality led to the 
conclusion that people behave and respond in accord with their own interpretations of 
their experiences, rather than the experiences themselves (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; 
Piaget, 1952; Wainryb, 2004). This has spurred research in the role of subjective 
interpretations in people’s social behavior, social interactions, and social adjustment.  
In the early 1990s, Wainryb and colleagues began to systematically document the 
different aspects of the interpretive process that go into making moral judgments 
(Wainryb, 2000; 2004; Wainryb & Brehl, 2006). 
 Warneken and Tomasello (2009) hold that one such aspect of making moral 
judgments is altruism, and have found that children as young as 14- to 18-months-of-
age will help others, irrespective of any reward. Specifically, they found that achild 
of this age can observe an actor who is unable to achieve a goal and act altruisticly 
to help the actor achieve that goal, even when there is no immediate benefit for the 
child (Warneken & Tomasello, 2009).  Additionally, Tomasello and colleagues have 




behaviors in terms of their underlying goals and intentions (Tomasello, Carpenter, 
Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005) and furthermore, can distinguish purposeful from 
accidental actions (by imitating twice as many intentional actions by adults, indicated 
by the adult exclaiming, “There!”, than accidental ones, indicated by the adult 
exclaiming, “Whoops!”, indicative of the children differentiating the two) (Carpenter, 
et al., 1998). These findings are complimented by the work of Nichols, Svetlova, and 
Brownell who found 18- to 30-month-olds able to help instrumentally in an action-
based task (2010).  Taken together, these findings provide evidence that children are 
reasoning about moral decisions and actions from a very early age. 
 In addition to altruistically helping others from a very early age, researchers 
have found that by 2-years-of-age, children will respond with empathic concern for 
others’ distress, (Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, Wagner, & Chapman, 1992) help 
adults who have dropped or misplaced things and comfort those in distress, 
(Liszkowski, Carpenter, Striano, & Tomasello, 2006; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006) 
instrumentally cooperate with adults and peers, (Brownell, Ramani, & Zerwas, 2006; 
Warneken, Chen, & Tomasello, 2006) as well as voluntarily share valued and desired 
resources, such as food, when there is no cost to them (Brownell, Svetlova, & 
Nichols, 2009). All of these behaviors can be interpreted as precursors to moral 
reasoning and decision making, and seem to occur to the benefit of the physical well-
being of others, but are happening before theory of mind competencies and thorough 
understandings of other people’s mental states come in-line.  Moral decisions 
concerning other people’s intentions build upon these skills, but there is a lack of 




that they are as it is very difficult for these children to verbalize their justifications 
and reasoning.  Information concerning the reasoning process behind these decisions, 
such as information discerned through the social domain research’s focus on 
justifications and reasoning would add to the understanding of what aspects of the 
context are taken into account when making the decision. 
Social Cognitive Domain Theory and Moral Development 
In the social cognitive domain literature, morality is seen as one of the elements of 
children’s developing social knowledge concerned with justice, welfare, and rights
(Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1983; 1998).  These moral issues coexist with concerns for 
authority, tradition, social conventional issues of norms, privacy, and personal 
preferences (Smetana, 2006). Children form concepts of fairness and quality as young 
as 2 ½ - years-of-age (Smetana, 1985). The social cognitive domain model holds that 
these systems of social knowledge arise from children’s experiences in the social 
environment (Turiel, 1983; 1998).  Thus, differing social experiences can 
differentially impact the social decisions that children are making, and their 
interpretation of intentionality.  If a child is surrounded by friends and family that 
adhere to strict gender-stereotypical roles, the child can bring that informati n into 
mind when making decisions about intentionality, and possibly perceive a boy taking 
a doll as accidental, as the boys that he encounters do not ever play with dolls, and 
therefore boys do not like dolls, and would not take one on purpose. 
 When children are making decisions about the seriousness of a transgression, 
moral transgressions of all kinds are seen as more serious, more deserving of 




conventional transgressions (Smetana, 2006). Therefore, if a child believes that 
someone stole something on purpose, issues of fairness and justice would arise, and 
this act would be judged to be more deserving of punishment than if the action was 
accidental.  Additionally, children have been found to apply concepts of welfare to 
situations entailing physical harm at an earlier age than situations involving 
psychological harm, most likely because physical harm is concrete and observable, 
while psychological harm is abstract and a child must understand someone else’s 
mental state (have a theory of mind) to fully understand psychological harm 
(Smetana, Schlagman, & Adams, 1993). These findings illustrate the importance of 
theory of mind competence in a child’s ability to understand the full complexity of a 
social scenario, such as one involving someone else’s desires and expectations, as 
well as the importance of theory of mind competence in a child’s ability to attribute 
intentionality. 
Theory of Mind and Social Decision Making 
Even though the link between moral development and theory of mind research 
has only been recently explored in the research (see for exceptions see: Helwig,
Zelazo, & Wilson, 2001; Killen, Mulvey, Richardson, Jampol, & Woodward, in 
press; Leslie, Knobe, & Cohen, 2006; Wainryb & Brehl, 2006; Zelazo, Helwig, & 
Lau, 1996),  understanding how a child’s cognitive capacities impact their moral 
judgments and justifications is crucial to understanding the developmental 
progression of moral reasoning (Wainryb & Brehl, 2006), and their social decision 




social decision making in general will facilitate predictions about theory of mind and 
moral decision making.  
Wellman and Liu (2004) define Theory of Mind as children’s understanding 
of other people’s mental states (pp. 523).  Theory of Mind has been rigorously 
researched for decades with the majority of the research examining young children’s 
understandings of intentions, emotions, desires, beliefs, false beliefs, and knowledge, 
but focusing on one single cognitive process at a time (Wellman & Liu, 2004).  One 
of the most recurrently used tasks in the literature, the false belief task, assesses 
children’s ability to use a person’s belief states to predict his or subsequent actio s 
when those beliefs differ from reality and from the child’s own knowledge (Wimmer 
& Perner, 1983).   
Theory of Mind and Beliefs 
The majority of the research into theory of mind competencies holds that prior 
to the age of 4- to 5-years-of-age, children do not fully understand that beliefs are 
representations of reality or that different people may have or construe differing 
representations of, or beliefs about, the same reality (for a review, see Wellman, 
Cross, & Watson, 2001). It appears that young children are relying on the assumption 
that perception is the sole basis for belief, with a one-to-one mapping between what 
one sees or hears and what one knows (Pillow & Mash, 1999). Additionally, 3-year-
olds find it difficult to comprehend that someone might not know something that they 
know to be true (Leslie, 2000), and also find it difficult to report even their own 




Beginning around 4- to 5-years-of-age, children first begin to develop an 
understanding that people may have access to different information and may end up 
with different beliefs. By the age of 7- to 8-years-of-age children begin to 
comprehend that individuals perceive experiences and the mind then selects, 
transforms, and organizes that perceptual information (Wellman, et al., 2001). 
Consequently, 7- to 8-year-olds are able to appreciate, for the first time, that people 
may have equal access to all the relevant information but still form differing beliefs.  
Furthermore, it is at the same time that children begin to become aware that prior 
thoughts or emotions can inform current beliefs and interpretations of experience 
(Wellman, et al., 2001). Children’s burgeoning understanding of others 
interpretations and construal’s of observed experiences also informs their 
understandings of intentionality.  
Theory of Mind and Intentionality  
Children begin their journey of understanding intentionality at 12- to 18-
months-of-age when it has been shown that children can distinguish purposeful 
actions from accidental ones (Carpenter, et al., 1998). As previously mentioned, 
Tomasello and colleagues determined that 12- to 18-month-old children could 
distinguish intentional actions from accidental ones by imitating twice as many
intentional actions by adults, as indicated by an adult exclaiming, “There!”, than 
accidental ones, indicated by an adult exclaiming, “Whoops!”, (Carpenter, et al., 
1998). Six months later, by the age of two,  Wellman and Woolley found that children 
could conceive of other children and adults as active agents with actions that were 




person’s desire (1990). 
 In a great deal of research, information concerning intentions is often 
confounded with information regarding consequences (Wainryb & Brehl, 2006). 
When this information is not confounded, but rather given explicitly, 5- to 6-year-olds 
judge intentional acts as more wrong than accidental ones (Shultz, Wright, & 
Schleifer, 1986; Wellman & Liu, 2004).  In fact, when not asked to weigh intentions 
against consequences, 3-year-olds can distinguish between deliberate and accident l 
breaches (Harris & Nunez, 1996; Núñez & Harris, 1998; Siegal & Peterson, 1998).  
Young children’s early understandings of intentions and motives are not as complete 
or concrete as the understandings of older children (Jones & Nelson-Le Gall, 1995; 
Karniol, 1987; Nelson-le Gall, 1985).  Children between 3- and 4-years-of-age still 
inaccurately report their own intentions to match the actual outcomes of their own 
actions (Phillips, Baron-Cohen, & Rutter, 1998; Schult, 2002).  Furthermore, in 
studies that do not clearly differentiate the cause of an action, children equate
intentions with outcome and confuse fulfilled desire with unfulfilled intentions 
(Schult, 2002).  In fact, young children are likely to assume that if something happens 
it is because someone intended it to, even when provided with information to the 
contrary (Kalish, 2006).  
Theory of Mind – Developmental Progression 
Wellman and Liu (2004), in an attempt to consolidate the wealth of theory of 
mind knowledge into an age related progression from one theory of mind 
understanding to another, did a meta-analysis of research comparing different types of 




belief. Wellman and Liu (2004) were able to provide evidence for a consistent 
developmental progression from one theory of mind task to another, whereby if they 
passed a later task, they would be able to pass the earlier tasks as well.  Wellman and 
Liu (2004) found that children were able to understand other children’s desires before 
other children’s beliefs, understanding that two people can have different desires for 
the same object before they become aware that two people can have different beliefs 
about the same object.  This finding provides evidence that a child could understand 
that a girl could want to play with a doll, or that a girl could want to play with a truck 
before they pass the standard false belief theory of mind task. This would mean that  
child who passes the false belief theory of mind task should be able to make that 
distinction. It is possible though, the addition of an object that has emotional, 
stereotypical, and social significance could alter that progression, making it harder for 
a child to see that another child has desires different from their own. 
Theory of Mind and Social Reasoning 
The search to understand the role of theory of mind in social reasoning has 
lead researchers in many directions.  Karpinski and Scullin (2009) researched theory 
of mind with relation to executive functioning, higher-level action control, and 
suggestibility with preschoolers. Karpinski and Scullin (2009) interviewed 80 
preschoolers (3- to 5-years-of-age), and found that, when controlling for age, children 
with better executive functioning were overall less suggestible when being 
interviewed, and older children with a more developed theory of mind were less 
suggestible.  More specifically, they found that executive functioning is more relevant 




and theory of mind is more relevant in a child’s ability to resist suggestibility in a 
pressured interview (Karpinski & Scullin, 2009).  Taken together, this implies that the 
social understanding and decision making can be impacted separately by their 
executive functioning as well as their theory of mind. It is possible then that having a 
person trying to sway a decision or a social understanding could be cognitively 
similar to having a previously held belief, understanding, or stereotype affecting a 
decision or social understanding, and the impact of theory of mind and possibly the 
impact of executive functioning on that should also be examined. 
In order to directly examine the effect of theory of mind and stereotyped 
belief about desirability on decision making, Terwogt and Rieffe (2003) interviewed 
29 4-year-olds and 29 5-year-olds about the desirability of four different toys, a doll, 
a toy tea set, a toy plane, and a toy car, which they determined in a pilot study to be 
stereotypically female and male.  The children were then read a story in which the 
protagonist expressed his or her preference for one toy over another (Terwogt & 
Rieffe, 2003).  
Terwogt and Rieffe (2003) found that both age groups were able to use the 
desires of the protagonist as a basis for their answer, and also were able to predict that 
the protagonist would be happy if the outcome was consistent with the expressed 
desire and unhappy if the outcome was inconsistent with their expressed desires.  
Additionally, the researchers found that the number of correct answers was 
significantly lower in inconsistent scenario (a female desired a stereotypically male 
toy, or a male desired a stereotypically female toy) (Terwogt & Rieffe, 2003). 




child’s personal toy preference and did not differ by gender, indicating that the 
children were not biased by their own desires, but by their beliefs or possibly their 
stereotypes about what is desirable for boys and for girls (Terwogt & Rieffe, 2003).  
When the researchers looked exclusively at which toy the child desired, the male 
participants chose stereotype consistent toys 83% of the time, while the femal
participants chose stereotype consistent toys only 45% of the time (Terwogt & Rieffe, 
2003).   
This study is informative in many ways. First, it provides evidence that 
overall, preschool age children are able to make decisions about a person’s 
preferences based on expressed information about their desires.  Second, it shows that 
those predictions about preference are negatively affected by counter-stereotypic 
information about the desire for toys, but not children's’ own toy desires or 
preferences.  This could be because children have a harder time recalling informaton 
that is counter-stereotypic (a female doctor) than stereotype consistent (a f male 
teacher) (Liben & Bigler, 2002; Ruble & Martin, 1998). These findings also indicate 
that a child’s decision about another child’s intentions to take a toy that is counter-
stereotypic can be affected by stereotypic beliefs about boys and girls preferenc s for 
toys.  It is unclear, though, whether having a theory of mind competence would 
improve the ability of a child to resist the held stereotypes about male and female toy 
preferences, as the study by Karpinski and Scullin (2009) might suggest. 
Furthermore, Terwogt and Rieffe’s finding that the male children weremor  
likely to choose stereotype-consistent (83% of the time) toys than were the femal  




to all children than the female-stereotyped toys (2003).  This could also impact a 
child’s decision about intentionality, as a child might be more willing to believe that a 
female desired to have, and therefore took, a male-stereotyped toy than a male 
desiring to have and therefore taking a female-stereotyped toy.  It is unclear though, 
how this could impact a child’s decision about the appropriateness of taking the toy, 
or how theory of mind may impact these decisions. 
Theory of mind researchers have not only explored stereotypes and 
desirability, but have also separately made headway into issues of fairness, a 
cornerstone of moral reasoning research.  Takagishi and colleagues played a modified 
version of the Ultimatum Game with preschoolers (with a mean age of 7 years) and 
also administered a false belief location change theory of mind task (Takagishi, 
Kameshima, Schug, Koizumi, & Yamagishi, 2010). The Ultimatum Game was set up 
so that one child was given candies by the experimenter, and then that child was able 
to divide the candies between him- or her-self and a second child.  The second child 
could either accept or reject the offer of candies made by the first child.  If the second 
child accepted the offer, then both children can kept the candies, but if the second 
child rejected the offer, no one got any candy.  A purely economic model would 
expect that the second child should accept anything over zero, and the first child 
should offer as little as possible, but researchers have found that these results differ 
across cultures (Henrich et al., 2005), with the modal offer made of 50/50 and a mean 
offer of 60/40 (Camerer, 2003) cross-culturally.   
The researchers in this study found that children who had acquired a false 




children who had not acquired a false belief theory of mind (Takagishi et al., 2010).  
The researchers take this to mean that the ability to infer the mental states of o hers is 
important to fairness-related behavior (Takagishi et al., 2010).  This research provides 
evidence that having a theory of mind competence effects social decision making in 
children, and decisions that children come across regularly in their daily lives about 
sharing and the distribution of resources, all part of moral decision making.  What is 
not clear is how this competence would affect other typical moral decisions made by 
children in their everyday lives such as the attribution of intentions.  
Morality and Theory of Mind Research 
There has been only a limited amount of research connecting morality and 
theory of mind (for exceptions see: Helwig, Zelazo, & Wilson, 2001; Killen, Mulvey, 
Richardson, Jampol, & Woodward, in press; Leslie, 2006; Leslie, Knobe, & Cohen, 
2006; Wainryb & Brehl, 2006; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996).  Within the research 
that has connected the two areas of research, there are several limitations.  First, many 
of the studies do not use the same or even similar measures of moral judgment, which 
makes it difficult to examine the effects across studies. Furthermore, very few studies 
examine morality and theory of mind within the same task, which limits the ability to 
determine how theory of mind competence bears on moral judgments, and instead 
allows for only correlational relationships between the two concepts.  Additionally, 
most theory of mind methodologies provide very limited social or contextual 
information.  For example, in the prototypic theory of mind false belief location 
change task, (i.e., Crackers have been moved from one container into another, one 




Will a child who did not see the crackers get moved look in the previous location or 
the correct one?).  In this prototypic example, no social information is provided 
regarding ownership of the objects, the intentions of the person who moved the 
object, the relationship between the child who was present for the location change and 
the child who was not (e.g., friends, strangers).  It is clear from previous research, 
such as that conducted by McGlothlin and Killen (2006) and Killen, Kelly, 
Richardson, and Jampol (2010), that showing contextual information such as the 
color of a child’s skin, the intergroup nature of an interaction, or the social group a 
child is affiliated with (Horn, et al., 1999) influences decisions that children and 
adolescents make,  illustrating that the context of a scenario, such as the gender or 
ethnicity of the actors in it, is very important for a child or adolescent when 
evaluating the facts, and children can weigh information differently based on the
context (for a review see Killen, Richardson, & Kelly, 2010).  
What we can discern then is that there are several holes in the research that 
explores the intersection of morality and theory of mind.  A few researchers have 
conducted studies that address some of the previously mentioned concerns.  Helwig 
and colleagues utilized a prototypical moral scenario, but made the intentions of the 
actors in those scenarios clear, which would not be typical in an everyday scenario. 
Moral Judgments in Normal and Noncanonical Scenarios 
Helwig and colleagues have explored children’s judgments of both 
psychological and physical harm in both normal and noncanonical situations, and 
have found that children as young as 3 were able to judge the infliction of physical or 




noncanonical (Helwig, et al., 2001; Zelazo, et al., 1996). What was intriguing about 
these studies on 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds is that the younger children tended to take 
outcome only into account when making a punishment decision (if outcome is 
negative then punish), while the older children were more likely to use an intention 
rule or a conjunction rule (if outcome is negative and intention is negative, then 
punish).  This indicates that the younger children have a harder time integrating the 
intention information with the morally relevant information, which was supported by 
the findings of Killen, Mulvey, and colleagues (in press) when they examined fals  
belief theory of mind tasks embedded in morally relevant scenarios.  
While these studies go far in elucidating the process of integrating intention 
information and outcome information when making moral judgments, they explicitly 
identify the reaction to the action as well as the intention of the actor.  The 
identification of the intention of the actor is therefore not in question, it is whether 
this information was used in order to make the moral judgment or not. If the intention 
of the actor was left ambiguous, the participant would have to use the contextual 
information to discern intentionality, and then use this information to make a moral 
judgment, which is much more akin to what children do on a daily basis.  Most 
children do not make their intentions clear before taking action, and therefore an 
important social skill developed at this age is correctly discerning the positive or 
negative connotation of intention in an action. Furthermore, it is impossible to note 
the impact the relevant contextual information such as the time, place, objects, other 
involved individuals, information about the actor, past behaviors, or information 




scenarios when the intentions are not explicitly made known, on the attribution of 
intentions or the moral judgments.  As stated earlier, misattributing intentions in 
social situations can lead a child to have a harder time making friends, and can lead to 
exclusion and rejecting, (Crick & Dodge, 1996), so fully understanding how children 
make this connection between action and intentionality in a morally relevant scenario, 
and the information that they use to make this connection, is of critical importance to 
understanding a child’s moral reasoning and social interactions. 
The Importance of Factual Information and Beliefs when Making Moral 
Judgments 
Wainryb and colleagues have also made important contributions to the 
literature connecting moral reasoning and theory of mind (Wainryb & Brehl, 2006).  
In a series of studies, Wainryb and colleagues manipulated information concerning 
the beliefs (upon which the characters presumably based their behavior) in 
hypothetical scenarios, and evaluated children’s judgments of act acceptability 
(Wainryb & Brehl, 2006).  One such example was a scenario in which a teacher who 
gave more snacks to the girls did so because she either believed that girls need more 
food than boys or believed that it is all right to be nicer to girls and not as nice to boys 
(Wainryb & Brehl, 2006).  In this series of studies, Wainryb and colleagues found the 
3-year-olds to be unable to understand that the characters in the scenarios had 
different beliefs than their own, and therefore evaluated the characters’ behaviors in 
terms of what they themselves thought to be the right thing to do (Wainryb & Ford, 
1998).  The 5- and 7- year olds were able to attribute beliefs that were differnt than 




own factual beliefs, and the majority judged the behaviors based on non-normative 
moral beliefs to be wrong (Wainryb & Ford, 1998).  It wasn’t until the children were 
8- or 9-years old that they would accept the behavior based on factual beliefs different 
than their own, but still were much less accepting of the same behavior if it was based 
on moral beliefs other than their own (Wainryb & Ford, 1998).  These studies add 
strongly to the field, in that they provide valuable details concerning what 
information children are using when making judgments about act acceptability in a 
morally relevant scenario, and also provide evidence that children are attending to 
many details in a scenario when making their judgments about act acceptability.  The 
intentions of the actors in these scenarios are made transparent though, so what is still 
unclear are the interpretations that would be made and the conclusions that would be 
drawn if the intentions were not explicit, and what contextual information the 
characters would use to make those decisions. 
Moral Judgments when Intentions are Ambiguous 
In 2005, Wainryb and Brehl partially addressed these concerns as they 
examined the behavioral and moral interpretations that 4-, 7-, and 10-year-olds made 
when presented with hypothetical scenarios in which one child hurt the feelings of a 
peer by excluding him/her from a group, making unequal distribution of desired 
goods, or saying something mean (Brehl & Wainryb, 2005).  They found that the 
younger children were less likely to refer to intentions or beliefs when explaining the 
behavior than the older children (Brehl & Wainryb, 2005).  The authors suspected 
that this difference was due to the younger children’s equating of intention with 




were able to understand that someone can intend for something to happen, but have 
something separate occur, leading them to discuss intentionality more often (Brehl & 
Wainryb, 2005).  In this study, while the intentions of the action are not explicitly 
made obvious, the outcome is decidedly, and strongly, negative.  The action here is 
not ambiguous, even though the intentions are, and trying to find a plausible reason 
for why the actor could not have had negative intentions would be a creative 
challenge for all the participants, and especially for the younger partici nts simply 
due to the verbal and imaginative difficulty of it.  Additionally, while this study 
broaches the question of determining intentionality in a scenario that is similar to 
what one would encounter in their daily lives, it still leaves us with many unanswered 
questions, such as what the attributions would be if the interpretation of the action 
was ambiguous, and what contextual information the participant was attending to or 
using in order to make their attribution of intention.  
In a similar vein, Leslie and colleagues conducted a series of studies 
examining the connection between explicitly foreseen side effects of an intentio al 
act and the positive or negative valence of that foreseen side effect (Leslie, et al., 
2006). In the scenarios the participants were told that a child who loved frogs was 
going to bring a frog over to a friend’s house, and in one condition the friend loved 
frogs, while in the comparison condition, the friend hated frogs. In both conditions, 
the participant was told that the actor did not care that the friend will be alternately 
happy or upset.  The authors investigated the participant’s judgments of 
intentionality, and found that the participants judged the action to be intentional in the 




2006). The authors attributed this outcome to what they describe as the side-effect 
effect (Leslie et al., 2006), and consider the intentionality judgment to be driven by 
the valence of the scenario, which the authors refer to as the moral judgment of the 
scenario, instead of the moral judgment being driven by the judgment of 
intentionality (Leslie et al., 2006).  
This line of research does provide significant information concerning what 
aspects of a scenario children are attending to and using in order to make their 
judgments of intentionality, but again, the initial intentions of the actor were 
explicitly stated, and were not ambiguous.  Therefore, the question of what aspects of 
the contextual information would be utilized if the intentions were ambiguous still 
abound. 
Taken together, all of these studies have added greatly to both the moral 
development literature. Cumulatively, they provide evidence that children are 
attending to many details in a scenario when making their judgments about act 
acceptability (Wainryb & Brehl, 2006), they address what aspects of a scenario 
children are attending to and using in order to make their judgments of intentionality 
and act acceptability in morally relevant scenarios (Leslie et al., 2006; Wainryb & 
Brehl, 2006) and provide evidence that younger children have a harder time 
integrating the intention information with the morally relevant information (Helwig, 
Zelazo, & Wilson, 2001). There is a great deal left to be understood about this 
connection of morality and theory of mind though.  A study, such as the one 
conducted by Killen and colleagues (Killen, Mulvey, et al., in press) that used a 




one’s daily life, and also examined morality and theory of mind in the same task and 
additionally added social and contextual information to the embedded theory of mind 
task addressed many of these concerns, but also opened the door to more questions at 
the same time, such as what other contextual information is being used to attribute 
intentionality.   
Morality and Theory of Mind Study 
As discussed earlier , in a study conducted by Killen and colleagues children 
from 4 – 8 – years-of-age were interviewed about a series of tasks, one prototypical 
moral reasoning, one prototypical false belief theory of mind, and one that embeds 
false belief theory of mind into a morally relevant hypothetical scenario.  As stated 
previously, in the morally relevant theory of mind task, the children were read a 
vignette involving a child who is helping the teacher clean up the classroom while the 
rest of the class is outside at recess, and accidentally throws away another child’s 
special cupcake.  Participants were asked to make evaluations, judgments, and 
justifications concerning intentionality, as well as punishment acceptability, and 
attribution of emotions (Killen, Mulvey, et al., in press).  The main findings from this 
study were that children without theory of mind were more likely to attribute negativ  
intentions and found it more acceptable to punish children in the morally relevant 
hypothetical scenario than children with theory of mind, and that children attributed 
negative emotions and intentions to the accidental transgressor up until 8 – years-of-
age (Killen, Mulvey, et al., in press).  Again, this study was the first to make it clear 




The study by Killen and colleagues allows us to see some of what is impacting 
a child’s ability to make an attribution of intentionality.  It is clear that while a 4- or 
5-year-old can correctly distinguish intentionality in a straightforward scenario 
involving no emotional valence or moral concerns, the addition of a moral premise 
adds a layer of complexity to the scenario that makes it more difficult to correctly 
decipher intentionality.  What is not known is what other aspects of a scenario may 
also contribute to increasing difficulty or greater ease in the ability to discern 
intentionality.  Killen and colleagues found that the fundamental determinations of 
intentionality, a core aspect of moral and social reasoning, is affected by the
introduction of a moral premise to a straightforward theory of mind scenario, which 
falls into line with previous social domain research indicating that children and 
adolescents use more social conventional reasoning when presented with a 
multifaceted scenario (Killen, Mulvey, et al., in press). These new data add a wealth 
of information concerning what children are taking into account when making 
attributions of intentionality, and additionally informs us that these determinations of 
intentionality are context dependent.   
This study also established that attributions of intentionality in a morally 
relevant scenario are affected by a child’s theory of mind competence, and also that 
taking the false belief theory of mind task and embedding it into a moral context 
impact the age at which a child can demonstrate theory of mind competence (Killen, 
Mulvey, et al., in press).  It is still unclear what contextual aspects were impacting the 
attribution of intentionality, and if adding contextual information that children 




the attribution of intentions further or impact the age trends of false belief theory of 
mind competence.  Adding contextual features, such as a highly gender stereotyped 
toy instead if an object which elicits no emotional reaction, to a scenario aimed at 
examining a child’s ability to attribute intentionality will allow for a more thorough 
investigation of the impact of those contextual features.  This would enable us to 
examine what information children are using when attributing intentionality as well 
as to examine if theory of mind would impact these decisions or be impacted by the 
additional contextual information. There is a paucity of research evaluating what 
other aspects of the context are affecting the decisions surrounding attribution of 
intentionality.  There has been though, a great deal of previous social domain research 
indicating that group identification, intergroup interactions, and stereotypes all imp ct 
exclusion decisions (Killen, Sinno, & Margie, 2006; Smetana, 2006; Horn, 1999; 
2003). It is important to explore whether this impact of intergroup interactions, 
attitudes, and stereotypes will impact decisions surrounding attributions of 
intentionality.  
Developmental Research on Gender Stereotypes 
Development of Gender Stereotyping 
Children are aware of gender stereotypes as early as preschool, and children’s 
gender stereotyping increases with age (Liben & Bigler, 2002; Ruble & Martin, 
1998).  Arthur, Bigler, Liben, Gelman, and Ruble (2008) hold that these stereotypes 
are created based on characteristics of others that adults mark as important, which is 
often done through labeling. Simply giving an object or a group a common name 




Waxman, 2003; Heyman & Gelman, 1999). Additionally, labels are thought to 
facilitate children’s belief that members of a category share important, if non-obvious 
qualities (Diesendruck, Gelman, & Lebowitz, 1998; Diesendruck & Markson, 2001; 
Heyman & Gelman, 2000).  Gender labeling is very common, with gender labels built 
into the English language forcing distinctions between male (he) and female (she) 
(Gelman, Taylor, Nguyen, Leaper, & Bigler, 2004), and even gender labeled 
occupations (e.g., mailman, actress, cowboy) (Liben, Bigler, & Krogh, 2001). Most 
children learn gender words between 18 and 24 months (Poulin, Serbin, & 
Derbyshire, 1998), and there is a strong positive correlation between the acquisition 
of gender labels and sex typing (Leinbach & Fagot, 1986). In fact, children who 
acquired gender labels have been shown to have more sex-typed toy preferences than 
those who had not, while children who were early labelers (27- to 28-months-of-age) 
had more gender stereotype knowledge at 4 –years-of-age than children who were 
late labelers (Leinbach & Fagot, 1986). 
Martin, Wood, and Little interviewed children 4- to 6-years-of-age and 
children 8- to 10-years-age and examined how their use of gender stereotyping 
affected their ability to predict the likelihood of other stereotypically feminine or 
masculine characteristics when they knew one characteristic of a child whose gender 
was not mentioned (1990).  For the younger children, the target characteristic was oy 
preference and of the older children, the target characteristic was appear nc , 
personality, occupation, or toy choice (Martin, Wood, & Little, 1990). They found 
that the younger children had an easier time making associations about toy preference 




make associations for their own gender and the opposite gender.  Furthermore, the 
older children were found to be more extreme in their stereotypical judgments than 
the younger children.  Understanding the developmental progression of gender 
stereotypes will inform us as to when and how these stereotypes could be impacting 
the decisions that children are making about intentionality, especially around gender 
stereotyped toys. 
Knowledge of Gender Stereotypes 
Knowledge of gender stereotypes for concrete items and activities emerges in 
the preschool years and reaches ceiling levels by 5- or 6-years-of-age (Ruble & 
Martin, 1998). Children as young as three begin to understand that items such as 
hairbrushes, dolls, irons, vacuums, and a needle and thread are associated with 
females, while bats, balls, shovels, and cars are associated with males (Rubl & 
Martin, 1998).  As children grow older, they continue to develop more detailed 
knowledge of concrete items, and begin to learn about stereotypes in other domains 
such as occupations and personality attributes (Ruble & Martin, 1998). 
Trautner, Ruble, Kirsten, and Hartmann (2005) reported on a longitudinal 
study examining children’s (interviews starting in kindergarten and continuig for 5 
years) gender knowledge of specific objects and activities and children’s verbal
preference for those same items. In this study, the authors found that stereotypic 
knowledge is already high at age 5, increases slightly at 6 years, and levels off until
age 10.  The increase in knowledge from ages 5 to 6 is paired with an increase in 
rigidity, which begins to decline when kids reach their peak level of knowledge 




throughout the age range of 5- to 6-years-of-age.  Additionally boys demonstrate an 
increase in avoidance of opposite-sex items from age 5- to 9-years-of-age, while girls 
demonstrate an increase until the age of 7.  Furthermore, boys’ knowledge of 
stereotypes at year one was associated with same-sex preference and opposite-sex 
avoidance at years 1, 2, and 3, while girls’ knowledge did not predict preference 
(Trautner et al., 2005).  These male and female differences could be because male 
toys and items are seen as overall, more desirable, and of a higher status than female 
toys and items (Antill, Goodnow, Russell, & Cotton, 1996). 
These findings prove that children hold gender stereotypes and same-sex 
preferences as early as 4-year-of-age, use these gender stereotypes to make 
interpretations about toy preference, activities, and behaviors, indicating that 
stereotypes could additionally impact decisions that children are making concerning 
stereotypically male and female toys. 
Gender and Status 
While it has been shown that both male and female children hold gender 
stereotypes, Rowley, Kurtz-Costes, Mistry, and Leagans (2007) have found that 
social status can impact who holds what stereotypes. The authors interviewed 4th, 6th, 
and 8th grade students who reported on their perceptions of the competence of Black, 
White, female, and male children in the domains of academia, sports, and music, and 
found that the children in lower status groups (females and Black children) did not 
endorse stereotypes that reflected negatively on their own group, but were likely to 
report stereotypes that favored their social group (Rowley et al., 2007).  The childrn 




stereotypes, whether they were positive or negative, for their social group (Rowley et 
al., 2007).  This effect was found in all the age groups, but the older children were 
more likely than the younger children to report traditional stereotypes and the status 
effects were even more pronounced for the older children than the younger children 
(Rowley et al., 2007).  
In addition, female occupations and gender roles are more highly stereotyped 
than male gender roles and occupations (Shepard & Hess, 1975; Smetana, 1986) most 
likely reflecting greater societal discomfort with males who exhibit non-traditional 
gender role behavior than with females who do so (Liben & Bigler, 2002).  
Furthermore, children as young as elementary school, identify that masculine 
occupations, as a group, are higher in status than female occupations (Liben, Bigler, 
& Krogh, 2001).  In fact, not only are males higher in social status, masculine items 
are seen as more desirable than feminine items (e.g., Antill, Goodnow, Russell, & 
Cotton, 1996).  If the social status of the group and the toys as well as the opinion of 
the gender appropriate behavior of a group is affecting what stereotypes children 
endorse about their group, it is possible that these differences in status could impact 
how children evaluate gender stereotyped objects and children acting in counter-
stereotypic ways.  The female children, in the comparatively lower status group as 
compared to men, could have a harder time imagining that another female could take 






Ingroup/outgroup research is important to the study of moral reasoning, 
attribution of intentions, and gender relations as the power of the ingroup can have an 
impressive impact on the decisions that are made in social situations involving 
morality, especially in the attribution of intentions, as gender has a dramatically 
powerful ingroup and outgroup.  Patterson and Bigler (2006) were able to create a 
viable ingroup/outgroup relationship with novel groups of preschoolers (3- to 5-years-
of-age) using colors (red or blue). Even though these groups were novel, and either 
used to organize the classroom (experimental condition), or not at all (control), all the 
children developed ingroup-biased attitudes.  If Patterson and Bigler were able to 
fabricate novel groups and find ingroup biases that impacted the attitudes of the 
children, an existing group such as gender with an extreme history of bias and 
segregation is able to produce immense running ingroup/outgroup attitudes with the 
power to impact the perception of social interactions and the decisions that are made 
because of that.  
Children, in fact, have been repeatedly shown to exhibit preferences for 
individuals of their own gender, as well as to self-segregate by gender, and prefer 
same-sex peers as early as the second and third years of life (Martin, 1989; Martin, 
Eisenbud, & Rose, 1995; Ruble & Martin, 1998).  By their 4th year, children 
increasingly believe that unfamiliar peers are more likely to have same- ex than 
other-sex friendships, and this belief is associated with the tendency of children to 
play exclusively with same-sex peers (Martin, Fabes, Evans, & Wyman, 1999).  




time in sex-segregated play became increasingly sex-typed in their play overtime.  
Powlishta (1995) was additionally able to show that 8- and 9-year-old children report 
their own gender to have a greater number of positive, and a smaller number of 
negative traits than the other gender.  
There is a long history of general ingroup/outgroup research in the social and 
developmental literatures (Brewer & Silver, 1978; Foddy, Platow, & Yamagishi, 
2009; Patterson & Bigler, 2006; Platow, McClintock, & Liebrand, 1990; Rowley, et 
al., 2007).  The literature consistently points to an individual’s favoritism toward thei  
ingroup, with simply referring to a collection of individuals as a group sufficient to 
produce ingroup favoritism, even when the group membership was random (Brewer, 
1979; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971; Tajfel & Turner, 2001).  People tend to 
judge ingroup members as generally better, nicer, and more helpful than outgroup 
members, as well as more generous, trustworthy, and fair (Boldizar & Messick, 1988; 
Brewer & Silver, 1978; McAllister, 1995; Platow, et al., 1990).  Ingroup members 
even have expectations of altruistic and fair behavior from ingroup members 
(Kiyonari, 2002; Yamagishi, Jin, & Kiyonari, 1999; Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000).  
In fact, when Foddy and colleagues examined ingroup relationships, they found that 
people are more likely to place their trust in members of an ingroup than a more 
relevant outgroup member, and additionally preferred the ingroup even when there 
was a stereotype for the ingroup that was more negative than that of the outgroup 
(Foddy et al., 2009). 
Recent research indicates that ingroup favoritism depends on group status, as 




2004). It is possible that this is because members of low-status groups often 
internalize negative ingroup stereotypes as a means of justifying the existing social 
order (Jost & Banaji, 1994). With gender stereotypes, women often associate traits 
like dependence with females over males (Banaji, Hardin, & Rothman, 1993; Blair & 
Banaji, 1996) and implicitly prefer male over female leaders (Rudman & Kilianski, 
2000). This ingroup favoritism could affect how children are attributing intentions in 
situations involving both males and females and gender stereotyped toys. Children 
could have a hard time admitting that same sex peers would purposely take a toy that 
did not belong to them, indicating that the same sex peer would have taken the toy by 
accident, thus showing an ingroup bias. 
Gender Stereotypes and Punishment Decisions 
Karinol and Aida (1997), examined if punishment contingent to the accidental 
breaking of a toy was affected by the gender stereotype of the toy. They interviewed 
80 second grade children from 7- to 81/2-years-of-age concerning two stories in 
which a neutral (cup), male-stereotyped (truck), or female-stereotyped (doll) toy was 
held by a target child (male or female) and then accidentally dropped and broken 
(Karniol & Aida, 1997). Each participant judged one neutral and one sex-stereotyped 
story, with half of the participants receiving a same-sex story (girl dropping a doll, 
boy dropping a truck) and half of the participants received an opposite-sex story (girl 
dropping a truck, boy dropping a doll).  The participants were asked to judge how 
much to punish the target child (scale from no punishment to severe punishment) and 




 Karinol and Aida (1997) found that both male and female children judged the 
breaking of the neutral toy in the same manner, not recommending punishment, but 
when compared to the neutral story, the target children who violated gender 
stereotypes were judged more severely than those who did not.  Additionally, females 
judged both male and female toy breakers who violated gender stereotypes more 
severely than those who did not, while males did not (Karinol & Aida, 1997).  When 
the male participants justified their judgments, they referred to toy ownership for 
everyone and intentions when the toy breaker was male, while the female participants 
did not refer to toy ownership or intentionality (Karinol & Aida, 1997).  When the 
authors co-varied out toy ownership, they found the differences between males and 
females disappear, as the boys judged the toy breakers who violated the gender 
stereotypes as not owning the toy, and the toy breaking to be presumably accidental, 
as the females held that children should not want a toy that violates gender 
stereotypes, and judged those who broke an inconsistent toy more severely (Karinol 
& Aida, 1997). 
 These results confirm that gender stereotypes are impacting the decisions that 
children are making in everyday situations involving gender stereotyped toys.  
Additionally, there were differences in the male and female participants’ responses, 
as the females judged the gender stereotype violators more severely, possibly do to 
confusion about toy ownership and the intentionality of breaking the toy.  
Unfortunately, we are unable to disentangle this result as the participants were nev r 
asked to judge intentionality, simply punishment.  Additionally, since the participants 




that the children assumed that the breaking of the toy was intentional because they 
were asked to judge punishment.  Having specific questions concerning the intentions 
of the target child, followed by justifications for those judgments as well as que tions 
and justifications about punishment would allow for a more thorough examination of 
these affects.  
 It is also unclear whether any of these children hold gender stereotypes, and 
how these stereotypes impacted the punishment decisions that were make.  Also, 
unfortunately, no age related trends were found, as the age range was very limited.  A 
more broad range of ages would allow for greater exploration of these possible 
differences. 
Social Domain Research on Gender 
 Research delving into intergroup relationships with the social-cognitive 
domain theory began with the exploration of gender related stereotypes (Carter & 
Patterson, 1982; Killen & Stangor, 2001; Smetana, 1986; Stoddart & Turiel, 1985; 
Theimer, Killen, & Stangor, 2001).  The majority of the research has found that 
children generally consider conforming or not conforming to gender stereotypes as 
part of the social conventional or personal reasoning domain, as preschoolers have 
been shown to consider sex-role deviations as informed by social rules, and not an 
issue of fairness or justice (Smetana, 1986).  Carter and Patterson (1982) asked 
elementary school-aged children to reason about the flexibility and cultural 
implications of gender-stereotypic toys and occupations, in addition to table manners 
and a natural law.  The study showed that children evaluated cross-gender behavior to 




gender appropriate were seen that way because that was what most people believe 
and think, not because it was a moral issue (Carter & Patterson, 1982). 
 Furthering this line of research, Stoddart and Turiel (1985) interviewed 
children from 5-years-of-age to 13-years-of-age about their acceptance of cross-
gender activities.  Stoddart and Turiel discovered a U-shaped curve, as the young st 
and oldest children found participation in gender-inconsistent activities as more 
wrong than did children in middle childhood (1985).  The authors assert that this is 
because the maintenance of gender identity is defined in physical terms for 
kindergarteners, and thus if a girl was to play with trucks or a boy was to play with 
dolls, other children might question their gender.  In adolescence, the authors found 
gender identity closely linked with psychological characteristics, and rather than 
others thinking that you may be the other gender for participating in gender-
inconsistent activities, others may exclude you socially for this (Stoddart & Turiel, 
1985).  These studies indicate that gender-inconsistent behavior is noted by children 
from preschool up until adolescence, and it is reasoned about using social 
conventional reasoning.  Furthermore, gender-inconsistent behavior is deemed 
unacceptable by the majority of children because of the reactions of their peers to this 
behavior (Carter & Patterson, 1982; Smetana, 1986; Stoddart & Turiel, 1985).  These 
beliefs about cross-gender behavior could then impact the decisions that children are 
making about the intentionality of a child taking a gender-consistent or gender-
inconsistent toy. 
 Killen and colleagues made their first foray into intergroup research through 




Stangor, 2001).  Through this research, it became obvious that children as young as 4-
years-of-age can hold stereotypes, specifically gender related sterotypes, and that 
moral considerations were more salient to these preschool children than stereotypic 
considerations (Killen et al., 2001). Killen and colleagues interviewed children 3 ½ -, 
4 ½ -, and 5 ½ - years-of-age, and asked if it was all right for girls to exclude a boy 
from playing with dolls or for boys to exclude a girl from playing with trucks (Killen 
et al., 2001).  They found that with age, children judged it wrong to exclude because 
it would be unfair.  Additionally, when the children were asked to make a forced-
choice judgment, (if there were to be only room for one more child to play, should the 
group pick a boy or a girl), stereotypical judgments increased with age, and the 
majority of the justifications for these judgments fell into the social conventional 
reasoning category with the children and adolescents noting issues of group 
functioning (Killen et al., 2001).  Furthermore, Killen and colleagues found that the 
younger preschoolers, 4.5-years-of-age, were more likely than the older preschool rs, 
5.5-years-of-age, to base initial judgments on stereotypic knowledge (Killen et al., 
2001).  
 In 2001, Killen and Stangor furthered this line of research and interviewed 9-, 
13-, and 15- year-olds regarding exclusion decisions about stereotypic peer activities 
based on gender and race that were both straightforward and exclusively moral in 
nature, as well as multifaceted decisions, possibly moral, social conventional, or 
personal (e.g., a group that excludes: a girl from a baseball club, a boy from a ballet 
club, an African-American child from a math club, and a European-American child 




group at first with equal qualifications for entrance (e.g. they were both equally good 
at math when desiring entrance to the math club) and then they were presented with 
the scenario where the children had unequal qualifications and the child who was 
consistent with the stereotype associated with the group was better at the activity than 
the non-stereotypic child (e.g. the European American was better at math than t e 
African American child) (Killen & Stangor, 2001). It was found that the vast majority 
of straightforward exclusion was regarded as wrong, with the children and 
adolescents citing moral reasons of unfairness (Killen & Stangor, 2001).  
Furthermore, it was found that in the multifaceted situations, both moral and social 
conventional reasons were given for the exclusion decision and when the exclusion 
decision was moderated by a set of qualifications, (Killen & Stangor, 2001) the 
participants were more likely to make the non-stereotypic choice in the equal 
qualifications context than in the context where the qualifications were unequal, with 
the reasoning often referencing group functioning as why (Killen & Stangor, 2001).  
The participants therefore chose the stereotypic choice when the functioning of the 
group was being threatened.  
 These findings strengthen the claim that not only do young children hold 
gender stereotypes, they view gender-inconsistent behavior negatively, and these 
stereotypes and beliefs about gender-inconsistent behaviors can influence decisions 
that children are making concerning stereotypically male and female toys and the 




Negative Bias in Attribution of Intentions 
As noted earlier, children take intentions into account when making 
interpretations about moral relevance.  Understanding the cues that are being used to 
attribute intentions will help in gaining an understanding of when moral norms are 
applied to social exchanges and encounters as well as the contextual factors that are 
impacting the attribution of intentions. Children and adolescents have been shown to 
have stereotypes that become more entrenched with age (Stangor & Schaller, 1996), 
and younger adolescents and European Americans have been shown to make 
accusations based on stereotypic assumptions with less available information than 
older adolescents, who reserve judgment until more evidence is presented (Horn, 
Killen, & Stangor, 1999; Killen, Kelly, Richardson, & Jampol, in press).  These 
children and adolescents may use this stereotypic information to make inaccurate 
attributions of intentions based on gender or ethnic stereotypes.  Gaining a better 
understanding of the ages that this occurs, and the contextual scenarios that encourage 
this misattribution of intentions will inevitably broaden our understanding of the 
biases that children and adolescents hold, as well as help to indicate what can be done 
to ameliorate theses biases.  
The majority of the research concerning attribution of intentions focuses on 
the individuals with the social deficits, and not on the victims of the misattribution of 
bias (Juvonen, Graham, & Schuster, 2003), missing out on the social and relational 
contexts within which the victimization is occurring (Graham, 2006). Graham and 
colleagues have been able to show that ethnic diversity, where no one group is of the 




“attributional ambiguity”, where multiple social cues are present and various 
appraisals of causality of social predicaments are possible (Graham, 2006). Their 
research suggests that with these myriad of social cues to draw from in ethnically 
diverse situations, individuals have a more comprehensive understanding of the 
various behaviors of individuals and therefore do not focus simply on the superficial 
and inconsequential physical or situational attributes of an individual or a social 
encounter, but rather the specifics of that particular encounter, reducing a 
misattribution of intentions or an over-attribution of bias based on race (Bellmore, 
Witkow, Graham, & Juvonen, 2004; Graham, 2006; Juvonen, Nishina, & Graham, 
2006). The same may apply to gender biases as well; Bigler, Brown, and Markell 
(2001) have shown that teachers routinely differentiate boys and girls through explicit 
and implicit messages about gender-specific abilities, and Patterson and Bigler (2006) 
have found that simply differentiating between two groups can create an ingroup-bias 
and ingroup-favoritism. Creating classrooms that are diverse in gender and thnicity 
may allow for the focus of social encounters to be on the encounter, and not on the 
ethnicity or gender of the participants in the encounter.  
Additional research with children focusing on the relational context associated 
with hostile attribution bias in children, has shown that attribution of bias varies by 
the relationship with the child (enemy, friend, neutral) even when social and 
behavioral reputation is accounted for (Peets, Hodges, Kikas, & Salmivalli, 2007). 
This indicates that attribution bias is not just a matter of an aggressive child 




contextual variables, and the relationships associated with the interpretation of bias 
are critical to understanding attributional biases.  
 Studies conducted by McGlothlin and colleagues explored attributions of 
intentions with preschool children through an ambiguous picture card tasks featuring 
both male and female children depicted as either “Black” or “White” (McGlothlin & 
Killen, 2006). McGlothlin found that European American children from 
homogeneous school, with low levels of intergroup contact, attributed more negative 
intentions to the Black character in the card than to the White character (McGlothlin 
& Killen, 2006).  Additionally, with age, and irrespective of school composition, the 
majority of European-American children were less likely to expect that an interracial 
peer dyad could be friends.   
Together, these findings indicated that school experience and social 
experience of the participant played a role in the attributions of intentions in peer 
exchanges.  These findings were not about the European American children from the 
homogeneous schools being more aggressive or having social deficits in their abilities 
to read social cues, but more likely were about these children being at risk for holding 
racial biases, possibly due to a lack of social experience with people of different 
ethnicities.  Additionally, another study conducted by Killen and colleagues found 
that attribution of intention varied by the context of the ambiguous scenario, the 
ethnicity of the characters in the scenario, the ethnicity of the participant, as well as 
the age of the participant (Killen, Kelly, Richardson, & Jampol, in press).  This 
provides strength to the argument that social experience plays a role in a 




explored more fully in order to have a deeper understanding of how and why children 
are attributing intentions in social scenarios and what factors in the context are 
contributing to the decisions being made. 
Current Study 
It is clear from the abundant research on moral development, theory of mind, 
and gender stereotypes, that these are areas ripe for further research.  To date, n  
research has examined the impact of intergroup attitudes and theory of mind 
competencies on moral judgments and justifications of intentionality.  It is proposed, 
that this line of research will push the field of moral development forward and reveal
the new information about the ontogeny of moral reasoning, the impact of theory of 
mind competency on moral reasoning, and the impact of intergroup stereotypes on 
moral reasoning.  As seen through the previously discussed research the social-
cognitive domain model provides a useful heuristic for investigating these issues, and 
allows for an in depth critical analysis of the evaluations, judgments, and 
justifications that children and adolescents make concerning everyday situations.  
This will allow for a more thorough understanding of children’s attribution of 
intentionality and thus their moral reasoning, and will address if stereotypic 
expectations are related to children’s attributions of intentions and moral judgments.  
Children who have stereotypic expectations may unknowingly be using these 
expectations as a reason to assume that a child did not intentionally do something in 
an ambiguous situation when the action does not conform to a stereotype, and by 
contrast assign blame to someone when the ambiguous act does conform to 




attitudes, such as gender stereotypes, impact with a child’s social evaluations, 






Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
Participants 
Participants were 44 3 - 4.5 year olds, 40 4.5 - 6 year olds, and 43 6 - 8 year 
olds (N = 127) from private nursery schools, kindergartens, and elementary schools in 
the Mid-Atlantic.  Participants were evenly divided by gender (63 female, 64 male), 
and are representative of the diverse metropolitan from which they live (18.9% 
African American, 60.6% European American, 2.4% Latino, 18% Asian, and 5% 
other).  Only students receiving parental consent were interviewed (see Appendix A 
for consent forms). The return rate was approximately 75%.  Those children who 
chose not to participate where nearly identical in demographic breakdown to that of 
the overall school they attended as well as to the demographic breakdown of the 
sample from the present study. All children whose parents gave permission agreed to 
be interviewed.  Two participants were excluded from the data as they were unablto 
complete the interview. Power analysis revealed that the sample size of this study was 
sufficient for a medium effect size at the .05 significance level (Cohen, 1992).   
Design 
The study involved between-subjects and within-subjects factors for an 
overall design that included a 2 (gender: Female, Male) X 3 (age: 3-4, 5-6, 7-8 years) 
X 2 (false belief theory of mind competence: yes, no) X 2 (gender stereotype 
consistency: consistent, inconsistent) X 2 (identification with agent; ingroup, 
outgroup) X 2 (status of object; high (truck), low (doll)) model with repeated 




time. This statement is exclusively for the purpose of explaining all the variables to 
be measured. 
Three tasks were administered.  The main task of this study is a 2 (gender 
stereotype consistency: consistent, inconsistent) X 2 (identification with the agent: 
ingroup, outgroup) X 2 (status of object of interest: high (truck), low (doll)) model, 
with repeated measures on the last two factors.  This task includes four scenarios that 
are varied in order to systematically examine the impact of gender stereotype 
consistency of the agent in the scenario and the object of interest,   ingroup versus 
outgroup identification of the participant with the agent, and the status of the object of 
interest on the assessments of intentionality, friendship, punishment, and emotionality 
of the victim (see Table 1 for task design).  
All of the participants were administered both a gender consistent scenario as 
well as a gender inconsistent scenario.  The gender consistent scenario was matched 
in gender to the gender of the participant.  Half of the participants (n = 64) were 
administered a gender inconsistent scenario in which the agent of the scenario is male 
and the object of interest is of low status (doll).  The other half of the participants (n = 
63) were administered a gender inconsistent scenario in which the agent of the 
scenario is female and the object of interest is of high status (truck). 
 This design allows for an examination of the distinct impact of 
ingroup/outgroups identification, participants’ identification with the agent, as well as 




A gender stereotype task as well a false belief theory of mind task were 
administered as participant variables for gender stereotype knowledge, tolerance, and 
flexibility as well as false belief theory of mind competence.   
Procedure 
The three tasks were administered by a trained researcher in a quiet room a
each school.  The research assistants went through a rigorous two week training in 
order to be able to interview the children.  The training involved readings of 
previously done transcripts of interviews completed by a trained research assistant, 
observations of interviews done by a previously trained research assistant, multiple 
practice runs of the interview with a trained research assistant, reviews of their own 
taped practice interviews with a trained interviewer with review of all areas in need of 
improvement, observations of the children they will be interviewing, as well as a 
review of their first interview completed on their own.  The research assistant will 
additionally be trained to notice when a child is not paying attention to the interview, 
how to re-engage the child, how to tell if a child will need to be excluded from the 
protocol (due to a pre-existing developmental condition such as ADHD, a significant 
language delay, or any other problem which would interfere with the completion of 
the interview).  
With an age appropriate vocabulary, participants were told that there are no 
right or wrong answers and that all of their responses are anonymous and 
confidential.  Additionally, participants were told that their participation is voluntary 
and that they may chose to stop the assessment at any time.  Prior to the beginning of 




score for judgments, being shown a scale with happy faces ranging from a long frown 
to a large smile (See Appendix D for Likert Scale).  The assessment did not continue 
until it was clear that the child understood how to use a Likert scale.  The assessment 
took an average of 25 minutes to complete. 
Measures 
The assessment consisted of three tasks (for the complete interview, see 
Appendix B). Each assessment followed the same order of tasks: Intergroup Attitudes 
Attribution of Intentions Task, Theory of Mind Task, and then the Gender Stereotype 
Task.  The Intergroup Attitudes Attribution of Intentions Task as well as the Theory of 
Mind Task were modified from Killen, Mulvey, Richardson, Jampol, & Woodward 
(in press).  The coding categories were correspondingly adapted from the Killen et al., 
study (in press) as well.  The Gender Stereotype Task was modified from Signorella, 
Bigler, and Liben (1993).  
Intergroup Attitudes Attribution of Intentions Task 
The Intergroup Attitudes Attribution of Intentions Task consists of four possible 
hypothetical scenarios in which a child, ambiguous as to intent, places a doll (or 
truck) in his or her own backpack instead of the backpack of the classmate that owns 
the doll (or truck) while helping the teacher clean up the classroom (see Tables1 nd 
2 for more scenario and design details).  Each child heard only two scenarios, a 
gender stereotype consistent scenario in which the two children in the scenario are of 
the same gender as the participant and the toy is gender stereotype consistent (e.g., a 




includes two children of mixed gender, and a toy that is gender stereotype 
inconsistent for the potential transgressor (e.g., a girl taking a truck or a boy t king a 
doll) (see Table 1 for task design).  
The first scenario was always the gender stereotype inconsistent scenario.  
Half of the participants were read a gender stereotype inconsistent scenario where the 
potential transgressor is in the participant’s ingroup (e.g., a male particint was read 
the scenario in which a boy puts a doll into his backpack or a female participant was 
read a scenario in which a female is putting a truck into her backpack).  The other half 
of the participants were read a gender stereotype inconsistent scenario where the 
potential transgressor is in the participants’ outgroup (e.g. a male participant has the 
scenario where a girl puts a truck into her backpack or a female participant has the 
scenario where a boy  puts a doll into his backpack).  These splits allow for an 
examination of the importance of ingroup/outgroup identity when making decisions 
about intentionality in a morally relevant scenario.  
 The second scenario was matched with the gender of the participant and 
either involved a girl putting a doll into her own backpack when it belongs to another 
girl in the class, or a boy putting a truck into his own backpack when it belongs to 
another boy in the class.  This allows for a comparison group to the gender stereotype 
inconsistent scenario. 
 Each child had the story read aloud to them, and additionally had picture cards 
of the children and objects depicted in the stories shown to them in correspondence to 





Dependent Measures for the Intergroup Attitudes Attribution of Intentions 
Task 
The two scenarios in this measure contain the same 9 assessments, so as to 
allow for a direct comparison between scenarios.  The assessment, Intentions of 
Transgressor, includes one question which reads, 1) “Whose backpack did 
(transgressor’s name) think he/she was putting the toy into?”  Two choices are 
provided; the transgressor’s backpack and the victim’s backpack.  This assessment 
showed what the participant believes the intentions of the transgressor are.  
Judgment and Justification of Transgressor’s Intentions, includes 3 questions.  
The questions read, 2) “When (transgressor’s name) put the toy truck (or doll) into 
the backpack did she (or he) think she (or he) was doing something that was all right 
or not all right?”  3) “How all right (or not all right depending on the answer they 
provided for the previous question) did (transgressor’s name) think he/she was for 
doing that?”  4) “Why?”  This assessment allows the participant to judge the 
transgressor’s intentions as all right or not all right, place this judgment on a Likert 
scale (1, not all right to 4, all right), and then justify the judgment.  This assessment 
provided information about the participants’ moral judgments of the transgressor’s 
intentions as well as their reasoning to support this justification, and can provide 
insight into what information they are using to make their judgments.  The coding 
categories for the justifications were based on previous research used to analyze
social reasoning (Killen et al., 2001; Smetana, 1995) and were modified from the 




Judgment and Justification of Transgressor’s Action by Participant, asks the 
participant first to judge if they think the transgressor was doing something that was 
all right or not all right, then to place this judgment on a Likert scale from 1 (not all 
right) to 4 (all right), and then to justify this judgment.  The questions read, 5) “When 
(transgressor’s name) put the truck (or doll) into the backpack, do you think he (or 
she) was doing something that was all right or not all right?” 6) “How all right/not all 
right do you think she was for doing that?”  7) “Why?”  The justifications were coded 
using the same coding categories as the fourth assessment.  This assessment provided 
further information as to the participant’s own evaluation of the intentions of the 
transgressor, and the reasoning that they used to support this judgment. 
Friendship Judgment and Justification asks the participant to determine how 
much they think the transgressor and the victim like each other  based on a Likert 
scale from 1 (not at all) to 4 (a lot), and then to justify this judgment.  The questions 
read, 8) “How much do you think (transgressor’s name) and (victim’s name) like each 
other?”  9) “Why?”  The justification for this assessment was coded using a modified 
version of the coding categories used in the previous assessments.  This assessment 
provided information about how the participant views the relationship between the 
transgressor and the victim, which may have implications as to the intentionality 
judgments and justifications.  In the cross gender scenario, scenario 1, this question 
also provided information as to the participant’s beliefs about males and females 
being friends, which could be related to their stereotype assessment.  
Theory of Mind Location Change, asks the participant to determine if the 




and to justify their determination.  The questions read, 10) “Where will (victim’s 
name) look for his (or her) truck (or doll)?”  11) “Why will (victim’s name) look 
there?”  Three possible choices are provided for the location decision, on the floor 
(which is where he (or she) left it and should look for it), in transgressor’s backpack 
(where it actually is), in victim’s own backpack).  This false belief theory of mind 
assessment is considered first order false belief theory of mind, as the participant is 
asked to interpret the scenario from just one person’s point of view.  The coding 
categories for the justification were modified from the Killen et al., 2009 study. 
Emotion Judgment of Victim, includes one questions which reads, 12) “When 
(victim’s name) finds out his (or her) truck (or doll) is not where he (or she) left it, 
how will (victim’s name) feel?”  This assessment provides information as to the
participants’ belief about the victim’s emotional reaction to the loss of the toy, which 
may have implications as to the judgments of intentionality and punishment of the 
transgression.  
Punishment of Transgressor, includes three questions which read, 13) “Should 
(transgressor’s name) get in trouble for putting the truck (or doll) into the backpack 
(researcher points to transgressor’s backpack)?”  14) (If the participant answers yes) 
“How much trouble should (transgressor’s name) get in?”  15) “Why?” (or why not 
depending on the answer to the previous question)?  A choice of “a little” or “a lot” is 
provided for the second question in this assessment.  The justifications for the final 
question in the assessment were coded using the same coding categories as the 




the participants’ judgments of intentionality of the transgressor’s actions, as well as 
the participants’ feelings about the severity of this transgression. 
Second Order Theory of Mind, includes two questions which read, 16) “What 
did (victim’s name) think that (transgressor’s name) thought he (or she) was trying to 
do?”  17) “Why?”  Two choices were provided for this assessment, “Put (victim’s 
name) truck (or doll) in (transgressor’s name) backpack,” or “Put (victim’s name) 
into (victim’s name) backpack”.  The justifications were coded using the same coding 
categories as the False Belief Theory of Mind, Location Change assessment.  
Emotion Judgment and Justification after Knowledge of Transgression, 
includes three questions which read, 18) “How will (victim’s name) feel about 
(transgressor’s name) now that he (or she) knows (transgressor’s name) put the truck 
(or doll) into this backpack (researcher points to transgressor’s backpack)?”  19) 
“How good (or bad, depending on the participant’s answer to the previous question) 
will (victim’s name) feel about (transgressor’s name)?”  20) “Why?”  A Likert scale 
was provided for the second question in this assessment from 1 (bad) to 4 (good).  
The justifications were coded using the same coding categories as the Liking 
justification.  This assessment provided further information as to their feelings 
concerning the transgression, the participants’ determinations of intentionality, and 
the participant’s interpretation of the severity of the transgression.  
Coding Categories for Justifications 
The coding categories for the justification were based on previous research 
used to analyze social reasoning (Killen et al., 2001; Smetana, 1995) and were 




each with subcategories.  Coding is conducted to categorize children’s spontaneous 
judgments and justifications.  The 3 superordinate categories are: (A) Moral, (B) 
Social Conventional, (C) Personal, and (D) Other (see Table 3 for further explanation 
and delineations).  
A justification of (A) Moral was a response that involved a victim and 
included a focus on the subcategories of 1) psychological harm (e.g., “She’ll be sad 
that she doesn’t have her doll”); 2) negligence (e.g., “He should have looked at the 
initials”), 3)ownership and wrongfulness of stealing (e.g., “He wanted to take it 
home”, “She took it to her house”, “It’s not okay to steal”); 3) prosocial behavior (e.g. 
“She was trying to help the teacher.”); and 5) accident/lack of negative intentio s 
(e.g., “She put it in the wrong backpack by accident.”). A justification of (B) Social 
Conventional was a response that involved social rules and conventions and included 
a focus on the subcategories of 6) deference to the rules, a response that was based on
rules and authority and involved a focus on deference to the rules (e.g., “It is against 
the rules to take something that is not yours”, “She was just doing what she was 
told”); and 7) gender stereotypes, a response that referred to the gender stereotypes 
(e.g., “Girls don’t want to take trucks home; it must have been an accident” or “Girls 
don’t play with trucks, she shouldn’t have done that.”, “Boys don’t steal”). A 
justification of (C) Personal was a response that was based on a personal decision, 
under no authority dictates and included a focus on the subcategory of 8) selfish 
desires (e.g., “She will have what she wants”); and justifications that did not fit into 




undifferentiated (e.g., “I don’t know; It’s bad; Because it’s good”) or 10) incomplete 
or inaudible.  
Reliability of the coding system was calculated using two coders who 
independently code all 10 coding categories for 20% of the surveys. Inter-rater 
reliability was 98%, and was determined by the percent agreement between the 
coders as well as the more conservative Cohen’s kappa statistic, 0.98, which adjusts 
for chance agreement.  
False Belief Theory of Mind Task 
The False Belief Theory of Mind task (Killen et al., 2009) consisted of two 
short scenarios that are prototypical Theory of Mind Tasks for false belief/fals  
contents and change of location.  The first scenario, false contents, read, “See this box 
(pointing to a crayon box)?  This is a crayon box.  Now, here is Sarah.  She is 
cleaning up the classroom and puts some crackers in the empty crayon box.”  The 
change of location scenario read, “Lenny is using markers before recess over at the 
art table.  Lenny goes outside to play and the teacher, Mr. Jones puts the markersin 
the cabinet.”  The scenarios were read aloud to the participants, and photos of the 
objects within the scenarios were shown in concordance with the reading of the 
scenario.  
Dependent Measures for the False Belief Theory of Mind Task 
The first assessment, False Belief Theory of Mind, read 1) “When the other 
children come back in from playing outside, what will they think is in the crayon 




view when they had a false belief.  The second assessment, False Contents – 
Information Accessible, read, 2) “Did the children who were playing outside see 
Sarah put the crackers in the box?”  This assessment determined if the participant 
could access the information that they were just read concerning the crackers being 
put into the crayon box.  The third assessment, False Contents – Real Contents, read, 
3) “What is really in the crayon box?”  This assessment determined if the participan  
could indicate the true contents of the crayon box.  These three assessments, taken 
together, provided an indication as to the participant’s false belief theory of mind with 
respect to a false contents scenario.  
The fourth assessment, False Belief Theory of Mind – Location Change, r ad, 
1) “When Lenny comes back inside from recess, where will he look for the markers?”  
This assessment discerned if the participant could see someone else’s point of view 
when they had a false belief.  The fifth assessment, Location Change – Information 
Accessible, read, 2) “Did Lenny see where Mr. Jones put the markers?”  This 
assessment determined if the participant could accurately remember the information 
that was read to them in the scenario.  The sixth assessment, Location Change – Real 
Location, read, 3) “Where are the markers really located?” and determined if the 
participant could indicate the true location of the markers.  These three assessments 
taken together, provided an indication as to the participant’s false belief theory of 
mind in a location change scenario, and when combined with the previous three 
assessments, provided a strong indication as to the participants’ theory of mind for 




Gender Stereotype Task 
The Gender Stereotype Task consisted of the presentation of 9 photos of toys; 
three that were stereotypically female (beads, kitchen set, jump rope), thre that were 
stereotypically male (airplane, football, toolset), and three that were gender neutral 
(marbles, puzzles, and paint set).  The toys were chosen based on previous research 
by Liben and Bigler (2002) and the task was based on a survey by Signorella and 
colleagues (1993). 
Dependent Measures for the Gender Stereotype Task 
The first assessment, Rule Knowledge, read, 1) “Who usually plays with this 
toy?” with the choices of boy, girl, or both provided.  This assessment provided 
information as to the participant’s knowledge of gender stereotypes with regards to 
common toys.  The second assessment, Rule Flexibility, read, 2) “Who can play with 
this toy?” with the choices of boy, girl, and both provided again.  This assessment 
provided information as to the participant’s flexibility with gender stereotyped toy 
play. The third assessment, Tolerance, read, 3) “How much would you like it if a 
(read opposite gender as one provided for answer to the second assessment) wanted to 
play with this toy?”  A Likert scale was provided for this assessment from 1 (not at 
all) to 4 (a lot).   This assessment provided information as to the participant’s 
tolerance of the opposite gender playing with the gender stereotyped toy (see 





Plan for Analysis 
Hypotheses were tested using ANOVA (see Table 4 for further details 
concerning the hypotheses).  Follow up tests were conducted using Bonferroni to 
control for Type I errors, and the Bonferroni adjustment was made automatically 
when needed.  Dichotomous responses were coded 0 or 1.  Justifications were 
indicated as proportions of responses for each respective coding category.  The False 
Belief Theory of Mind Task was transformed into an independent variable by 
summing the score of the three false content assessments and the three location 
change assessments and converted into a dichotomous variable of either possessing a 
Theory of Mind or not possessing a Theory of Mind.  Participants had to answer all 
six assessments correctly in order to indicate that they possess a false belief theory of 
mind.  A 3 (age: 3-4, 5-6, 7-8 years) X 2 (Theory of Mind, no Theory of Mind) is 
hypothesized to indicate that with age, children acquire Theory of Mind.  The Gender 
Stereotype Task was converted into a scale indicating degree of gender stereotype 
tolerance and flexibility (a high score will indicate greater flexibility and tolerance), 
and additionally transformed in a dichotomous high/low variable using a median split, 
in order to incorporate it as an independent variable in the analysis of the Intergroup 
Attitudes Attribution of Intentions Task.  A 3 (age: 3-4, 5-6, 7-8 years) X 2 (gender: 
male, female) is hypothesized to indicate that stereotype flexibility increases with 
age, and varies by gender, with males consistently indicating lower gender stereotype 





Intergroup Attitudes Attribution of Intentions Task 
A 3 (age of participant: 3-4, 5-6, 7-8) X 2 (gender of participant: female, 
male) X 2 (Theory of Mind, No Theory of Mind) X 2 (gender stereotype flexibility 
and tolerance: high, low) X 2 (scenario: stereotype inconsistent, stereotype consistent) 
ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor was conducted on the assessments 
in the Intergroup Attitudes Attribution of Intentions Task.  
Hypotheses regarding the Intentions of Transgressor, the Judgment of the 
Transgressor’s Intentions, and the Judgment of Transgressor’s Action by Participant 
assessments were tested by conducting  3 (age: 3-4, 5-6, 7-8 years) X 2 (gender: male, 
female) X (theory of mind, no theory of mind) X 2 (gender stereotype flexibility and 
tolerance, high, low) X 2 (scenario; gender inconsistent, gender consistent) ANOVAs 
with repeated measures on the final factor for each dependent variable.  It was 
hypothesized that with Intentions of Transgressor, the Judgment of the 
Transgressor’s Intentions, and the Judgment of Transgressor’s Action by Participant 
participants for the gender inconsistent story as well as the gender consistent story, 
would indicate a main effect for age, gender, false belief theory of mind, and gender 
stereotype flexibility and tolerance.  It was hypothesized that participants would 
indicate the action to be more all right (less negative intentions) as age increased.  
Also, it was hypothesized that participants who have a false belief theory of mind 
would indicate the action to be more all right, as they would be more likely to be able 
to see the accidental nature of the transgression. 
 Additionally, it was hypothesized that there would be a main effect for 




flexibility and tolerance would be more likely to indicate that  the action is more not 
all right, or less likely to be able to see the accidental nature of this transgression.  
Furthermore, a 2 (scenario: gender inconsistent, gender consistent) X 2 (gender 
stereotype flexibility and tolerance, high, low) ANOVA was hypothesized to show 
that participants that are low in gender stereotype flexibility and toleranc  would see 
more negative intent in the gender consistent scenario than in the gender consistent 
scenario.  Also, it was hypothesized that participants will find the action to be more 
all right for ingroup transgressors than for outgroup transgressors for the stereotyp  
inconsistent scenario and the stereotype consistent scenario. 
Additionally, follow-up testing was hypothesized to indicate that participants 
with low stereotype flexibility and tolerance would indicate the action to be mor  all 
right for the stereotype inconsistent scenario than for the stereotype consistent 
scenario.  
Hypotheses regarding the Justification of Transgressor’s Intentions, and 
Justification of Transgressor’s Action by Participant were tested by conducting 
individual 3 (age: 3-4, 5-6, 7-8 years) X 2 (gender: male, female) X 2 (Theory of 
Mind, no Theory of Mind) X 2 (Gender stereotype flexibility and tolerance; high, 
low) X 2 (scenario; gender inconsistent, gender consistent) ANOVAs with repeated 
measures on the final factor for each reasoning category (moral, social convention – 
deference to the rules, social conventional – gender stereotype, or personal). A min 
effect for age was hypothesized to reveal more social conventional reasoning 
indicating deference to the rules, as age increases, and with the indication of a false 




social conventional reasoning indicating gender stereotypes for male participants, as 
well as those participants with lower gender stereotype flexibility and tolerance.  It 
was also hypothesized that there would be more “Social Conventional – gender 
stereotype” reasoning in the gender inconsistent scenario than in the gender consistent 
scenario.   
Hypotheses regarding the Liking Judgment assessment were tested by 
conducting a 3 (age: 3-4, 5-6, 7-8 years) X 2 (gender: male, female) X 2 (Theory of 
Mind, no Theory of Mind) X 2 (Gender stereotype flexibility and tolerance; high, 
low) X 2 (scenario; gender inconsistent, gender consistent) ANOVA with repeated 
measures on the final factor.  Main effects for age and stereotype flexibility and 
tolerance were expected, as it was expected that with age, participants would think 
that male and female children cannot be friends and that participants who have less 
stereotype flexibility and tolerance would think that male and female children cannot 
be friends than participants with more flexibility and tolerance.  
Hypotheses regarding the Theory of Mind Location Change assessment were 
tested by conducting a 3 (age: 3-4, 5-6, 7-8 years) X 2 (gender: male, female) X 2 
(Theory of Mind, no Theory of Mind) X 2 (Gender stereotype flexibility and 
tolerance; high, low) X 2 (scenario; gender inconsistent, gender consistent) ANOVA 
with repeated measures on the final factor.  A main effect of age and false belief 
theory of mind was hypothesized, as with age, children acquire false belief theory of 
mind for location change in a multifaceted scenario, and with a general indication of 




where the victim should look for the toy, thus indicating that they have a false belief 
theory of mind in a morally relevant, multifaceted scenario.  
Hypotheses regarding the Emotion Judgment of Victim assessment were tested 
by conducting 3 (age: 3-4, 5-6, 7-8 years) X 2 (gender: male, female) X 2 (Theory of 
Mind, no Theory of Mind) X 2 (Gender stereotype flexibility and tolerance; high, 
low) X 2 (scenario; gender inconsistent, gender consistent) ANOVA with repeated 
measures on the final factor.  It was expected that all participants would say that the 
victim felt badly when the toy was moved.  It was also expected that particints 
would indicate that the victim would feel more badly in the gender consistent 
scenario than in the gender inconsistent scenario, and that the children with low 
gender stereotype flexibility and tolerance as well as the male partici nts would 
indicate that the victim would feel more badly than the participants with high gender 
stereotype flexibility and tolerance, and the female participants. 
Hypotheses regarding the Punishment of the Transgressor assessment were 
tested by conducting a 3 (age: 3-4, 5-6, 7-8 years) X 2 (gender: male, female) X 
(theory of mind, no theory of mind) X 2 (gender stereotype flexibility and toleranc, 
high, low) X 2 (scenario; gender inconsistent, gender consistent) ANOVA with 
repeated measures on the final factor.  It was expected that participants would 
indicate a main effect for age, gender, theory of mind, and gender stereotype 
flexibility and knowledge.  The participant was expected to indicate not to punish, or 
to punish to a lesser degree as age increases and with an indication of having false 




Additionally, it was expected that participants with low stereotype flexibility 
and tolerance, and the male participants, would indicate the action to be more 
punishable for the stereotype inconsistent scenario than for the stereotype consistent 
scenario.  Furthermore, it was expected that participants will find the action to be 
more all right for an ingroup transgressor than for outgroup transgressors for the
stereotype inconsistent scenario and the stereotype consistent scenario.  
Hypotheses regarding the Punishment of Transgressor, Justification were 
tested by conducting individual 3 (age: 3-4, 5-6, 7-8 years) X 2 (gender: male, 
female) X 2 (Theory of Mind, no Theory of Mind) X 2 (Gender stereotype flexibility 
and tolerance; high, low) X 2 (scenario; gender inconsistent, gender consistent) 
ANOVAs with repeated measures on the final factor for each reasoning category 
(moral, social convention – deference to the rules, social conventional – gender 
stereotype, or personal). A main effect for age was expected to reveal more social 
conventional reasoning – deference to the rules as age increases, and with the 
indication of a false belief theory of mind.  Additionally, it was expected that there
would be more social conventional reasoning indicating gender stereotypes for male 
participants, as well as those participants with lower gender stereotype flexibility and 
tolerance.  It was also expected that there would be more social conventional 
reasoning using gender stereotypes in the gender inconsistent scenario than in the 
gender consistent scenario.   
Hypotheses regarding the Second Order Theory of Mind assessment were 
tested by conducting a 3 (age: 3-4, 5-6, 7-8 years) X 2 (gender: male, female) X 2 




tolerance; high, low) X 2 (scenario; gender inconsistent, gender consistent) ANOVA 
with repeated measures on the final factor. There was expected to be a main effect of 
age and false belief theory of mind, as children acquire a second order theory of mind 
after they acquire a first order theory of mind, and thus theory of mind is requisit  for 
being able to accurately answer this assessment.  An additional 2 (scenario: 
inconsistent gender, consistent gender) X 2 (scenario: inconsistent gender, consistent 
gender) ANOVA was conducted for this assessment in comparison to Judgment of 
Transgressor’s Intentions as it was expected that participants with second-order 
theory of mind would think that transgressor has less negative intentions than those 
participants who do not have a second order theory of mind. 
Hypotheses regarding the Emotion Judgment and Justification after 
Knowledge of Transgression assessment were tested by conducting 3 (age: 3-4, 5-6, 
7-8 years) X 2 (gender: male, female) X 2 (Theory of Mind, no Theory of Mind) X 2 
(Gender stereotype flexibility and tolerance; high, low) X 2 (scenario; gender 
inconsistent, gender consistent) ANOVA with repeated measures on the final factor 





Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
Hypotheses were tested by conducting Univariate ANOVAs for the dependent 
measures within each scenario of the Intergroup Attitudes Attribution of Intentions 
Task, and using repeated measures ANOVAs in order to make comparisons between 
the two scenarios within the Intergroup Task (see Table 5 for a summary of the 
dependent variables, Table 6 for a summary of the independent variables, and Table 4 
for a summary of the hypotheses).  Follow-up tests to examine interaction effects 
were done using one-way ANOVAs. 
 The results of the False Belief Theory of Mind Task and the Gender 
Stereotype Task will be discussed first, as the responses to these tasks were u ed as 
independent variables that were then used to examine the various dependent variables 
in the Intergroup Attitudes Attribution of Intentions Task.  The results of the 
Intergroup Attitudes Attribution of Intentions Task is organized so as to first review 
the hypotheses and results pertinent to the intentionality related assessments first 
followed by the hypotheses and results pertinent to the punishment acceptability 
assessment.  Second, the hypotheses and results associated with the justification  or 
each of those assessments will be addressed.  Third, the hypotheses and results of the 





False Belief Theory of Mind Task 
The participant responses to the false belief theory of mind task was converted 
into an independent variable by summing the score of the three false content 
assessments and the three location change assessments and converting the task into a 
dichotomous variable of either possessing a false belief theory of mind or not 
possessing a false belief theory of mind.  Participants had to answer all six 
assessments correctly to indicate that they possessed a false belief theory of mind.  A 
Univariate ANOVA for age (age: 3-4, 5-6, 7-8 years) was conducted for the false 
belief task.  A significant effect for age, F (2, 118) = 42.79, p = .000, ηp
2 = .43, (M = 
.10, SD = .30; M = .44, SD = .50; M = .88, SD = .33 for ages 3-4, 5-6, 7-8 years 
respectively) was found indicating that children were more likely to pass the false 
belief task with age (see Table 7).    
The Gender Stereotype Task 
The Gender Stereotype Task was converted into three individual scales 
separately indicating degree of gender stereotype tolerance, flexibility, and 
knowledge. The scales, gender stereotype flexibility (How much would you like it if a 
child of the opposite gender were to play with this toy?  (Likert scale: 1 = not at all, 4 
= a lot); gender stereotype tolerance (Who can play with this toy?  girls, boys, either); 
and gender stereotype knowledge (Who usually plays with this toy?  girls, boys, 
either), were then each converted into separate dichotomous high/low variables using 
median splits.  For the variable gender stereotype flexibility, high gender ster otype 
flexibility indicated the participant was flexible in liking any child playing with any 




was not flexible in liking a child playing with counter-stereotypic toys. High gender 
stereotype tolerance indicated the participant was tolerant of any child playing with 
any toy, regardless of the gender stereotype, while a low gender stereotype tolerance 
indicated the participant was intolerant of children playing with counter-stereotypic 
toys.  Finally, high gender stereotype knowledge indicated the participant associ ted 
gender with the toys along stereotypic categories. Low gender stereotype knowledge 
indicated the participant did not associate gender with the stereotypic toys.   
These dichotomous variables were then incorporated as independent variables 
in the analysis of the Intergroup Attitudes Attribution of Intentions Task.  Three 
separate ANOVA analyses were conducted; one for gender stereotype tolerance, one 
for gender stereotype flexibility, and one for gender stereotype knowledge.  It was 
hypothesized that participants would indicate an increase in gender stereotype 
knowledge, tolerance, and flexibility with age, as well as with an indication of having 
a false belief theory of mind.  It was also hypothesized that male participan s would 
indicate lower gender stereotype tolerance and flexibility than female participants.  
A 3 (age: 3-4, 5-6, 7-8 years) X 2 (gender: male, female) X 2 (False belief: 
fail, pass) ANOVA was conducted on gender stereotype tolerance, and  in concert 
with the hypotheses, a significant effect was found for age, F (2 121) = 12.57, p = 
.000, ηp
2 = .17, (M = .33, SD = .48; M = .28, SD = .45; M = .738, SD = .44 for ages 3-
4, 5-6, 7-8 years respectively), revealing that with age, children were more tolerant of 
gender counter-stereotypic play.  A main effect for false belief, F (1 115) = 14.29, p 
= .000, ηp
2 = .11, (M = .30, SD = .46; M = .63, SD = .49 for no false belief and false 




tolerant of counter-stereotypic play.  These main effects indicate that, with age, there 
was an increase in tolerance of counter-stereotypic play, and additionally as one 
passes the false belief task, there is also an increase in tolerance of counter-
stereotypic play.  No significant effects for participant sex and no interaction effects 
were found. 
For gender stereotype flexibility, contrary to hypotheses, no significant effec s 
or interaction effects for age, false belief theory of mind, or participant sex were 
found. 
A 3 (age: 3-4, 5-6, 7-8 years) X 2 (gender: male, female) X 2 (False belief: 
fail, pass) ANOVA was conducted on gender stereotype knowledge, and the 
hypotheses for age and gender were confirmed.  A significant effect for age, F (2, 
121) = 42.72, p = .000, ηp
2 = .24, (M = .07, SD = .26; M = .28, SD = .45; M = .62, SD 
= .49 for ages 3-4, 5-6, 7-8 years respectively), indicated that as age increased so did 
knowledge about gender stereotypes.  Furthermore a significant effect for participant 
sex was found, F (1, 122) = 6.17, p = .014, ηp
2= .05, (M = .42, SD = .50; M = .22, SD 
= .42 for female and male participants respectively), indicating that female 
participants had more knowledge of gender stereotypes than did the male participants. 
A significant effect for false belief was also found, F (1, 115) = 21.78, p = 
.000, ηp
2 = .16, (M = .15, SD = .36; M = .53, SD = .50), revealing, contrary to the 
hypothesis, those who pass the false belief task are more likely to have a higher 




Intergroup Attitudes Attribution of Intentions Task 
Judgment of Transgressor’s Intentions 
Overall results.  In order to discern if the participants, across the gender 
inconsistent and gender consistent scenarios, attributed negative intentions to the ac  
of placing another child’s toy into his/her own backpack (not all right, indicated by a 
1 or 2 on the Likert scale) or positive (all right, indicated by a 3 or 4 on the Likert 
scale) frequency data were run for the combined answers to the judgment of the 
transgressor’s intentions.  The frequency data revealed 72% of the participants 
indicated the action to be not all right. No significant interaction effects were found, 
and therefore the individual Univariate ANOVAs are reported. 
Two separate assessments of intentionality were given to the participants in 
order to examine the participants’ interpretation of the intentions of the transgressor 
in the scenarios.  The judgment of transgressor’s intentions assesses if the participant 
believes that the transgressor in the story thinks that he/she did something all right or
not all right.  The second assessment of intentionality, judgment of the transgressor’s 
action by the participant, is examined and reported separately.  That assessment 
measures if the participant him/herself believes the transgressor did something all 
right or not all right.  
Age related significant effects.  In order to test the hypothesis that children 
would attribute less negative intentions with age two separate Univariate ANOV s 
were conducted.  The Univariate ANOVA for age (age: 3-4, 5-6, 7-8 years) on the 
intention judgment in the gender inconsistent scenario confirmed the hypothesis, F (2, 
124) = 8.44, p = .000, ηp




2.54, SD = 1.05 ages 3-4, 5-6, 7-8 years respectively), indicating that with age, the 
children were less likely to attribute negative intention.  The Univariate ANOVA for 
age (age: 3-4, 5-6, 7-8 years) on the intention judgment in the gender consistent 
scenario, F (2, 122) = 7.05, p = .001, ηp
2 = .10, (M = 2.00, SD = 1.06; M = 2.30, SD = 
1.17; M = 2.86, SD = .98 for ages 3-4, 5-6, 7-8 years respectively), additionally 
indicated that with age, children were less likely to attribute negative intentions (see 
Figure 1). 
False belief significant effects.  It was hypothesized that children who passed 
the false belief task would indicate less negative intent on the judgment of intentio  
assessment. With respect to this hypothesis, two separate Univariate ANOVAs were 
conducted.  The Univariate ANOVA for false belief (false belief: pass, fail) on the 
intention judgment (intent judgment: Likert scale ranging from 1, not all right to 4, all 
right) confirmed the hypothesis, F (1, 116) = 14.71, p =.000, ηp
2 = .11, (M = 1.64, SD 
= .97; M = 2.42, SD = 1.24 for no false, and false belief respectively), revealed that 
children who passed the false belief task were more likely to indicate less negative 
intentions than children who did not pass.  The Univariate ANOVA for false belief 
(false belief: pass, fail) conducted on the intention judgment in the gender consistent 
scenario, F (1, 115) = 10.28, p = .002, ηp
2 = .08, (M = 2.08, SD = 1.09; M = 2.74, SD 
= 1.14 for no false belief and false belief respectively) additionally confirmed the 
hypothesis by revealing that children who passed the false belief task were more 
likely to indicate less negative intent (see Figure 2).   
Gender stereotype significant effects.  In regards to the hypothesis that 




stereotype tolerance and flexibility, and low stereotype knowledge, separat  
Univariate ANOVAs were conducted for each of the stereotype variables, tolerance, 
flexibility, and knowledge.  
The Univariate ANOVA (gender stereotype tolerance: low, high) on the 
intention judgment for the gender inconsistent scenario confirmed the hypothesis, F 
(1, 122) = 10.60, p = .001, ηp
2 = .08, (M = 1.68, SD = 1.04; M = 2.32, SD = 1.16 for 
participants with low stereotype tolerance and high stereotype tolerance respectively), 
and revealed that participants with high tolerance of counter-stereotypic play 
indicated less negative intent than those with low tolerance. Additionally, a 
Univariate ANOVA (gender stereotype tolerance: low, high) on the intention 
judgment for the gender consistent scenario confirmed hypothesis, F (1, 121) = 9.10, 
p = .003, ηp
2 = .07, (M = 2.10, SD = 1.07; M = 2.70, SD = 1.09 for participants with 
low gender stereotype tolerance and high stereotype tolerance respectively), and 
signified again that participants with high gender stereotype tolerance indicated less 
negative intent than those participants with low stereotype tolerance. 
This hypothesis was further confirmed for stereotype flexibility for the gender 
inconsistent scenario and consistent scenarios.  The Univariate ANOVA (gender 
stereotype flexibility: low, high) on the intention judgment for the gender inconsiste t 
scenario, F (1, 122) = 4.93, p = .028, ηp
2 = .039, (M = 1.78, SD = 1.10; M = 2.24, SD 
= 1.15 for participants with low gender stereotype flexibility and high stereo ype 
flexibility respectively), indicated that participants with high flexibility with gender 
stereotypes revealed less negative intent than those with low flexibility.  Furthermore, 




judgment for the gender consistent scenario, F (1, 121) = 4.12, p = .043, ηp
2 = .03, (M 
= 2.21, SD = 1.19; M = 2.62, SD = 0.97 for participants with low stereotype flexibility 
and high stereotype flexibility respectively), additionally indicated that participants 
with high stereotype flexibility revealed less negative intent than those partici nts 
with low stereotype flexibility. 
The Univariate ANOVA (gender stereotype knowledge: low, high) on the 
intention judgment for the gender inconsistent scenario, F (1 122) = 6.96, p = .009, 
ηp
2 = .05, (M = 1.79, SD = 1.07; M = 2.35, SD = 1.21 for participants with low gender 
stereotype knowledge and high stereotype knowledge respectively), contrary to what 
was hypothesized, signified that participants with high knowledge of gender 
stereotypes indicated less negative intent than those with low knowledge of gender 
stereotypes.  The Univariate ANOVA (gender stereotype knowledge: low, high) on 
the intention judgment for the gender consistent scenario, F (1, 121) = 10.37, p = 
.002, ηp
2 = .08, (M = 2.16, SD = 1.08; M = 2.83, SD = 1.08 for participants with low 
stereotype knowledge and high stereotype knowledge respectively), in concert with 
what was found with gender stereotype tolerance and flexibility, but contrary to 
hypothesis, also showed that participants with high stereotype knowledge indicated 
less negative intent than those participants with low stereotype knowledge. 
Differences between gender consistent and gender inconsistent scenarios.  
In order to test the hypothesis that overall, participants would view the action of a 
child placing another child’s toy into their own backpack as more negative for the 
gender consistent scenario than for the gender inconsistent scenario, a repeated 




conducted on the intentionality judgment.  A significant effect was found for the 
intentionality judgments, F (1, 124) = 13.86, p = .000, ηp
2 = .10, (M = 1.98, SD = 
1.15; M = 2.38, SD = 1.12 for participants on the gender inconsistent scenario and the 
gender consistent scenario respectively), and indicated that, contrary to the 
hypothesis, participants found the action in the gender inconsistent scenario more 
negative than the action in the gender consistent scenario (see Figure 3).   
Ingroup and outgroup differences.  In order to test the hypothesis that 
participants would find the action more all right for ingroup transgressors than for 
outgroup transgressors, a repeated measures ANOVA for scenario (scenario: male 
transgressor (ingroup), female transgressor (outgroup)) was conducted for the male 
participants on the intention judgment, however no significant effects were found.  
An additional repeated measures ANOVA for scenario (scenario: male transgressor 
(outgroup), female transgressor (ingroup)) was conducted for the female participants 
on the intention judgment, and again, no significant effects were found. 
Judgment of Transgressor’s Action by Participant 
Overall results.  This second assessment of intentionality, judgment of the 
transgressor’s action by the participant, measures if the participant him/herself 
believes the transgressor did something all right or not all right (Likert scale: 1, not all 
right; 4, all right). In order to discern if the participants, across the gender inconsistent 
and gender consistent scenarios, attributed negative intentions to the act of placing 
another child’s toy into his/her own backpack (not all right, indicated by a 1 or 2 on 
the Likert scale) or positive (all right, indicated by a 3 or 4 on the Likert scale) 




transgressor’s action by the participant.  The frequency data revealed 87.8% of the 
participants indicated the action to be not all right. No significant interaction effects 
were found, and therefore the individual Univariate ANOVAs are reported. 
Age related main effects.  Regarding the hypothesis that children would 
indicate the ambiguous act would be more all right (indicate less negative intent) wi h 
age, a Univariate ANOVA for (age: 3 - 4, 5 - 6, 7 - 8 years) was conducted for age on 
the intention judgment in the gender inconsistent scenario.  No significant effects 
were found.  An additional Univariate ANOVA for (age: 3 - 4, 5 - 6, 7 - 8 years) wa  
conducted for age on the intention judgment in the gender consistent scenario.  Again, 
no significant effects were found.   
False belief theory of mind main effects.  In order to test our expectations 
that children who pass the false belief task would indicate less negative intent, a 
Univariate ANOVA was conducted for false belief (false belief: pass, fil) on the 
intent judgment in the gender inconsistent scenario, F (1 116) = 4.43, p = .038, ηp
2 = 
.038, (M = 1.42, SD = .81; M = 1.88, SD = .93 for no false belief and false belief 
respectively), and indicated that children who passed the false belief task in f ct did 
indicate less negative intent (see Figure 2). The Univariate ANOVA conducted for 
false belief (false belief; pass, fail) on the intent judgment in the gender consistent 
scenario did not reveal any significant effects. 
Gender stereotype main effects.  As with the previous intent judgment, the 
hypotheses regarding gender stereotype tolerance, flexibility, and knowledge for the 




conducting separate Univariate ANOVAs for each stereotype variable.  Significant 
effects were found for gender stereotype flexibility only. 
It was expected that those participants with high flexibility with gender 
stereotypes would indicate less negative intent. This hypothesis was tested with a 
Univariate ANOVA for tolerance (gender stereotype tolerance: low, high) on the 
intent judgment for the gender inconsistent scenario, F (1 122) = 4.03, p = .047, ηp
2 = 
.03, (M = 1.62, SD = .82; M = 1.96, SD = 1.05 for participants with low stereotype 
flexibility and high stereotype flexibility respectively), and indicated that participants 
with high stereotype flexibility did indicate less negative intent than those participants 
with low stereotype flexibility. Another Univariate ANOVA for tolerance (gender 
stereotype tolerance: low, high) on the intent judgment for the gender consistent 
scenario was conducted as well, however no significant effects were found.  
Differences between gender consistent and gender inconsistent scenarios.  A 
repeated measures ANOVA for scenario (scenario: gender inconsistent, gender 
consistent) was conducted for the intentionality judgment in order to examine if, as 
expected, participants would demonstrate less negative intent in the gender 
inconsistent scenario than in the gender consistent scenario.  Contrary to the original 
hypothesis, F (1, 123) = 4.19, p = .043, ηp
2 = .03, (M = 1.76, SD =.93; M = 1.96, SD = 
1.03 for participants on the gender inconsistent scenario and the gender consistent 
scenario respectively), it was demonstrated that participants found the action in the 
gender inconsistent scenario as more negative than the action in the gender consistent 




Ingroup and outgroup differences. It was expected that the male participants 
would find the action to be more negative for a transgressor in his outgroup (female 
transgressor) than for a transgressor in his ingroup (male transgressor).  In order to 
test this likelihood, a Univariate ANOVA for scenario (scenario: male trnsgressor 
(ingroup), female transgressor (outgroup)) was conducted for the intent judgment for 
male participants, but no significant effects were found.  A Univariate ANOVA for 
scenario (scenario: male transgressor (outgroup), female transgressor (ingroup) was 
conducted on the intent judgment for the female participants as well, F (1, 62) = 4.96, 
p = .030, ηp
2 = .07, (M = 1.94, SD = .83; M = 1.45, SD = .89 for participants 
examining their outgroup or their ingroup, respectively), and revealed, contrary to 
predictions, that females indicated less negative intentions for their outgroup (male 
transgressor) than for their ingroup (female transgressor).  
Punishment of the Transgressor Decision 
Overall results.  In order to discern if the participants, across the gender 
inconsistent and gender consistent scenarios, indicated the action should be punished 
or not (0, no punishment; 1, a little punishment; 3, a lot of punishment), frequency 
data were run for the combined answers to the punishment acceptability assessment.  
The frequency data revealed 76.7% of the participants indicated the action should be 
punished either a little, or a lot. No significant interaction effects were found, and 
therefore the individual Univariate ANOVAs are reported. 
Age related main effects.  Age differences for punishment judgments were 
analyzed by conducting separate Univariate ANOVAs for age (age: 3–4, 4–5, 6–7 




scenarios.  The Univariate ANOVA for the gender inconsistent scenario, F (2, 124) = 
18.37, p = .000, ηp
2 = .23, (M = 1.52, SD = .67; M = 1.68, SD = .66; M = .77, SD = .84 
for ages 3-4, 5-6, 7-8 years respectively), confirmed the hypothesis that with age, 
participants would endorse less punishment.  Furthermore, the Univariate ANOVA 
for the gender consistent story, F (2, 121) = 12.56, p = .000, ηp
2 = .17, (M = 1.3, SD = 
.77; M = 1.46, SD = .72; M = .69, SD = .72 for ages 3-4, 5-6, 7-8 years respectively), 
additionally demonstrated that with age, participants endorsed less puni hment (see 
Figure 4). 
False belief theory of mind main effects.  In concordance with the hypotheses 
for the two previous intentionality assessments, it was hypothesized that children who 
pass the false belief task would endorse less punishment than those children who did 
not past the false belief task.  A Univariate ANOVA for false belief (false belief; fail, 
pass) on the punishment judgment was conducted for the gender inconsistent 
scenario, F (1, 116) = 10.12, p = .002, ηp
2 = .08, (M = 1.54, SD = .70; M = 1.07, SD = 
.90 for no false belief and false belief respectively), and showed that, as expect d, 
those participants who passed the false belief task indicated less negative intentions 
than those who did not pass.  The Univariate ANOVA for false belief (false belief: 
fail, pass) on the punishment judgment in the gender consistent scenario, F (1, 115) = 
7.70, p = .006, ηp
2 = .06, (M = 1.33, SD = .75; M = .93, SD = .82 for no false belief 
and false belief respectively), revealed concordantly that participants who passed the 
false belief task were less likely to endorse punishment than the participants who had 




Gender stereotype main effects.  The hypotheses for the effects of the gender 
stereotype variables on the punishment judgment were in accord with the hypotheses 
for the two intentionality judgments. Participants indicating high tolerance ad 
flexibility with gender stereotypes were expected to endorse less punishmet t an 
those with low tolerance and flexibility, and alternately that those participants with 
high knowledge of gender stereotypes were expected to endorse more punishment 
than those with low knowledge.  
The Univariate ANOVA for gender stereotype tolerance (tolerance: low, high)
on the punishment judgment in the gender inconsistent scenario, F (1, 122) = 5.37, p 
= .022, ηp
2 = .04, (M = 1.49, SD = .74; M = 1.14, SD = .90 for participants with low 
stereotype tolerance and high stereotype tolerance respectively), revealed, as 
predicted, that those participants with high tolerance of counter-stereotypic play 
endorsed less punishment than those participants with low tolerance.  This result was 
further demonstrated by the Univariate ANOVA for tolerance (tolerance: low, high) 
on the punishment judgment in the gender consistent scenario, F (1, 121) = 6.05, p = 
.015, ηp
2 = .05, (M = 1.31, SD = .78; M = .96, SD = .79 for participants with low 
stereotype tolerance and high stereotype tolerance respectively), indicati g again that 
those participants with high tolerance of gender stereotypes were less likely to 
endorse punishment than those participants with low tolerance of gender stereotypes. 
Results revealed for gender stereotype flexibility mirrored those found for 
tolerance.  A Univariate ANOVA for flexibility (flexibility; low, high) on the 
punishment assessment in the gender inconsistent scenario, F (1, 122) = 4.51, p = 
.036, ηp




stereotype flexibility and high stereotype flexibility respectively), as well as 
Univariate ANOVA for flexibility (flexibility; low, high) on the punishment 
assessment for the gender consistent scenario, F (1, 121) = 6.32, p = .013, ηp
2 = .05, 
(M = 1.30, SD =.79; M = .94, SD = .77, indicated that those participants with high 
flexibility with gender stereotypes were less likely to endorse punishment tha  those 
participants with low flexibility with gender stereotypes. 
The Univariate ANOVA for gender stereotype knowledge (knowledge: low, 
high) on the punishment judgment for the gender inconsistent scenario, F (1, 122) = 
9.97, p = .002, ηp
2 = .08, (M = 1.49, SD = .77; M = 1.00, SD = .88 for participants 
with low stereotype knowledge and high stereotype knowledge respectively), as well 
as the Univariate ANOVA for knowledge (knowledge: low, high) on the punishment 
judgment for the gender consistent scenario, F (1, 121) = 10.87, p = .001, ηp
2 = .08, 
(M = 1.31, SD = .76; M = .82, SD = .78, both, contrary to hypothesis, but in 
conformity to what was found with the previous two intention judgments, indicated 
that participants with high stereotype knowledge were less likely to endorse 
punishment than those participants with low stereotype knowledge.  
Differences between gender consistent and gender inconsistent scenarios.  
The hypothesis that participants would endorse more punishment in the gender 
consistent scenario than in the gender inconsistent scenario was examined with a 
repeated measures ANOVA for scenario (scenario: gender inconsistent, gender 
consistent) on the punishment judgment, F (1, 124) = 6.85, p = .010, ηp
2 = .10, (M = 
1.32, SD =.83; M = 1.15, SD = .80 for participants on the gender inconsistent scenario 




hypotheses, but in accord with what was found with the initial intentionality 
judgment, that participants endorsed more punishment for the gender inconsistent 
scenario than for the gender consistent scenario (see Figure 6). 
Ingroup and outgroup differences.  A repeated measures ANOVA for 
scenario (scenario: male transgressor, female transgressor) on the punishment 
judgment was conducted separately for male participants and female participants, in 
order to test the hypothesis that participants would endorse less punishment for 
ingroup transgressors than for outgroup transgressors.  No significant effects were 
found. 
Justifications for the Judgment of Transgressor’s Intentions 
Justifications were provided by the participants for the two intentionality 
assessments as well as for the punishment acceptability assessment for both the 
gender inconsistent as well as the gender consistent scenarios, for a total of 6 
assessments.  Additionally, there are a total of 8 justifications (Moral: psychological 
harm, negligence, ownership, prosocial, accident; Social Conventional: deference to 
the rules, gender stereotypes; Personal: selfish desires) (for a full description of the 
justification categories see Table 3), each a dichotomous variable (0, not utilized; 1, 
utilized).  No analyses were conducted with justifications that were utilized by fewer 
than 10% of the participants.  This eliminated the moral justifications of 
psychological harm, and prosocial, as well as the social conventional justification of 
deference to the rules, and the personal justification of selfish desires.  Each of the 
remaining justifications was examined separately for each assessment in each 




stereotype tolerance, stereotype flexibility, stereotype knowledge) the differences 
between ingroup and outgroup populations and between the inconsistent and 
consistent scenarios (see Tables 8 and 9 for overall proportions of coding categories 
for each the intentionality and punishment acceptability variables).  These analyses, 
in concert with the hypotheses, revealed findings overwhelmingly similar for the two 
intention judgments as well as the punishment judgment.  In order to limit the 
redundancy of the findings, only the results for the first intentionality judgment will 
be reported here. Furthermore, no significant interaction effects were found, and 
therefore the individual Univariate ANOVAs are reported. 
Age related main effects.  It was hypothesized that participants would use 
more moral reasoning indicating no negative intentions with age.  The moral 
justifications indicating no negative intentions were negligence (the action was due to 
the transgressor neglecting to look carefully at the initials on the backpacks), nd 
accident (the action was an accident on the part of the transgressor).  A Univariate 
ANOVA was conducted for age (age: 3- 4, 5 -6, 7 – 8 years) on the justification of 
negligence for the gender inconsistent scenario, F (1, 120) = 3.23, p = .043, ηp
2 = .05, 
(M = .09, SD = .25; M = .22, SD = .39; M = .28, SD = .41 for 3 – 4 year olds, 5 – 6 
year olds, and 7 – 8 year olds respectively), indicating that with age, participants were 
more likely to reason the action was due to negligence.  A Univariate ANOVA was 
additionally conducted for (age: 3- 4, 5 -6, 7 – 8 years) on the justification of 





In furtherance of the same hypothesis, a Univariate ANOVA was conducted 
for (age: 3- 4, 5 -6, 7 – 8 years) on the justification of accident for the gender 
inconsistent scenario, F (1, 120) = 4.94, p = .009, ηp
2 = .08, (M = .07, SD = .23; M = 
.06, SD = .20; M = .23, SD = .38 for 3 – 4 year olds, 5 – 6 year olds, and 7 – 8 year 
olds respectively), indicating that with age, participants were more likely to reason 
the action was due to an accident.  In concordance, a Univariate ANOVA as 
conducted for age (age: 3- 4, 5 -6, 7 – 8 years) on the justification of accident for the 
gender consistent scenario, F (1, 120) = 4.66, p = .011, ηp
2 = .07, (M = .06, SD = .22; 
M = .14, SD = .31; M = .27, SD = .41 for 3 – 4 year olds, 5 – 6 year olds, and 7 – 8 
year olds respectively), again indicating that with age, participants were more likely 
to reason the action was due to an accident.  Taken together, with age, participants 
justified the action as more likely to be due to moral reasoning indicating no negative 
intentions by reasoning it was due negligence or an accident.  
False belief theory of mind main effects.  To illustrate the expectation that 
participants who pass the false belief task would use more moral reasoning indicating 
no negative intentions  a Univariate ANOVA was conducted for false belief (false 
belief: fail, pass) on the justification of negligence for the gender inconsistet 
scenario, F (1, 112) = 15.46, p = .000, ηp
2 = .12, (M = .11, SD = .29; M = .37, SD = 
.41 for those without false belief and those with false belief respectively), 
demonstrating that participants who passed the false belief task were more likely to 
reason the action was due to negligence. Additionally, a Univariate ANOVA was 
conducted for false belief (false belief: fail, pass) on the justification of negligence for 
the gender consistent scenario, F (1, 112) = 5.75, p = .018, ηp




.32; M = .30, SD = .41 for those without false belief and those with false belief 
respectively) confirming the hypothesis that participants who passed the false belief 
task were more likely to reason the action was due to negligence.   
Furthermore, a Univariate ANOVA was conducted for false belief (false 
belief: fail, pass) on the justification of accident for the gender inconsistent sc ario, 
F (1, 112) = 11.28, p = .001, ηp
2 = .09, (M = .03, SD = .13; M = .20, SD = .39 for 
those without false belief and those with false belief respectively), demonstrati g 
again, that participants who passed the false belief task were more likely to indicate 
the action was due to an accident.  Taken together, those participants who passed the 
false belief task were more likely to reason the action was a result of negligence or an 
accident, not negative intentions. 
Gender stereotype main effects.  In concert with the previous findings for the 
gender stereotype variables, it was expected that participants with high gender 
stereotype tolerance and flexibility, and low gender stereotype knowledge would 
indicate the action would be more likely due to moral reasoning indicating no 
negative intentions.  These expectations were tested with a Univariate ANOVA for 
gender stereotype tolerance (tolerance: low, high) for the justification of negligence in 
the gender inconsistent scenario, as well as a Univariate ANOVA for gender 
stereotype tolerance (tolerance: low, high) for the justification of negligence in the 
gender consistent scenario, however no significant effects were found for either 
scenario.   
In order to further examine this hypothesis, a Univariate ANOVA for gender 




gender inconsistent scenario, as well as a Univariate ANOVA for gender stereotype 
tolerance (tolerance: low, high) for the justification of accident in the gender 
consistent scenario, however again, no significant effects were found for either 
scenario.   
The hypotheses regarding gender stereotype flexibility were also examined.  
A Univariate ANOVA for gender stereotype flexibility (flexibility: low, high) for the 
justification of negligence in the gender consistent scenario, as well as a Univariate 
ANOVA for gender stereotype flexibility (flexibility: low, high) in the gender 
consistent scenario, however again, no significant effects were found for either 
scenario.  Additionally, a Univariate ANOVA for gender stereotype flexibility 
(flexibility: low, high) for the justification of accident in the gender consistent 
scenario, as well as a Univariate ANOVA for gender stereotype flexibility (flexibility: 
low, high) in the gender consistent scenario were conducted, however again, no 
significant effects were found for either scenario. 
Finally, the effects of gender stereotype knowledge on the justifications were 
examined.  A Univariate ANOVA for gender stereotype knowledge (knowledge: low, 
high) for the justification of negligence in the gender inconsistent scenario w s 
conducted, F (1, 118) = 6.42, p = .013, ηp
2 = .05, (M = .17, SD = .06; M = .35, SD = 
.11 for participants with low stereotype knowledge and high stereotype knowledge 
respectively), demonstrated that participants with a high knowledge of gender 
stereotypes were more likely to reason the action was due to negligence than those 
participants with low knowledge of gender stereotypes.  In addition, a Univariate 




justification of negligence in the gender consistent scenario was conducted, F (1, 118) 
= 6.66, p = .011, ηp
2 = .05, (M = .14, SD = .08; M = .32, SD = .13 for participants with 
low stereotype knowledge and high stereotype knowledge respectively), and also 
indicated that those with a high knowledge of gender stereotypes were more likely to 
reason the action was due to negligence than those participants with a low knowledge 
of gender stereotypes.  
Furthermore, this hypothesis was analyzed with respect to the justification of 
accident for gender stereotype knowledge.  A Univariate ANOVA for gender 
stereotype knowledge (knowledge: low, high) for the justification of accident in the 
gender inconsistent scenario, F (1, 118) = 5.82, p = .017, ηp
2 = .05, (M = .08, SD = 
.09; M = .22, SD = .12 for participants with low stereotype knowledge and high 
stereotype knowledge respectively) signified that participants with high gender 
stereotype knowledge were more likely to reason the action was due to an accident 
than those with low stereotype knowledge.  Finally, a Univariate ANOVA for gender 
stereotype knowledge (knowledge: low, high) for the justification of accident in the 
gender consistent scenario, F (1, 118) = 5.07, p = .026, ηp
2 = .04, (M = .11, SD = .04; 
M = .26, SD = .14 for participants with low stereotype knowledge and high stereotype 
knowledge respectively) revealed that participants with high gender stereotype 
knowledge were more likely to reason the action was due to an accident than those 
with low gender stereotype knowledge.  These results taken together, although 
different than initial hypotheses, are consistent with the findings of intentionali y and 




knowledge of gender stereotypes indicated the transgression to be less negative than 
those participants with a low knowledge of gender stereotypes.  
Differences between gender consistent and gender inconsistent scenarios.  
In order to test the hypothesis that participants would be more likely to use moral 
reasoning indicating no negative intentions for the gender inconsistent scenario than 
for the gender consistent scenario, a repeated measures ANOVA for scenario 
(scenario: gender inconsistent, gender consistent) for the justification of neglige ce 
was conducted.  No significant effects were found.  In order to further examine this 
hypothesis, a repeated measures ANOVA for scenario (scenario: gender inconsistent, 
gender consistent) on the justification of accident was conducted.  Again, no 
significant effects were found.   
Ingroup and outgroup differences.  Regarding the hypothesis that 
participants would be more likely to justify their judgments of intentionality wh
moral reasoning indicating no negative intentions in scenarios that depicted their 
ingroup rather than their outgroup as the potential transgressor, a repeated msures 
ANOVA for scenario (scenario: male transgressor; female transgressor) on the 
justification of negligence was conducted for male participants, and then again 
separately conducted for female participants.  No significant effects were found.  The 
hypothesis was further examined by conducting a repeated measures ANOVA for 
scenario (scenario: male transgressor; female transgressor) on the justification of 
accident for male participants, and then again separately for female participants.  
Again, no significant differences were found for the ingroup or the outgroup in their 




Embedded False Belief Task 
The false belief task administered separate from the Intergroup Attitudes 
Attribution of Intentions Task and converted into an independent variable, is the 
standard false belief task used in the false belief theory of mind research. The 
embedded false belief task was created for the sole purpose of the current study.  The 
embedded false belief task is a part of the Intergroup Attitudes Attributions of 
Intentions Task, and as such, is embedded in a morally relevant scenario, rich with 
contextual information such as the highly stereotyped toys. No significant interaction 
effects were found, and therefore the individual Univariate ANOVAs are reported. 
Age related main effects.  It was hypothesized that, similar to the independent 
false belief task, participants would be more likely to pass the embedded false belief 
task with age.  This hypothesis was examined by conducting a Univariate ANOVA 
for age 3 (age: 3-4, 5-6, 7-8 years) on the embedded false belief task in the gender 
inconsistent scenario, F (2, 124) = 17.30, p = .000, ηp
2 = .22, (M = .023, SD = .15; M 
= .17, SD = .38; M = .49, SD = .51 for ages 3-4, 5-6, 7-8 years respectively), 
confirming hypotheses that participants were more likely to pass the false belief task 
with age.  An additional Univariate ANOVA for age 3 (age: 3-4, 5-6, 7-8 years) on 
the embedded false belief task in the gender consistent scenario, F (2, 124) = 27.03, p
= .000, ηp
2 = .30, (M = .023, SD = .15; M = .13, SD = .33; M = .56, SD = .50 for ages 
3-4, 5-6, 7-8 years respectively), also confirmed hypotheses that participants were 
more likely to pass the embedded false belief task with age (see Table 7).  
False belief theory of mind main effects.  In order to test the hypothesis that 




independent measure of false belief than on the embedded task, a 3 (age: 3-4, 5-6, 7-8 
years) X 2 (false belief: fail, pass) ANOVA was conducted on the embedded fals  
belief theory of mind task for the gender inconsistent scenario and then again 
separately for the gender consistent scenario.  While separate main effects for age 
were found for both the false belief task as well as the embedded false belief task, no 
interaction between the two was found for either the gender inconsistent or the gender 
consistent scenarios.   
Despite this, the frequency data do signify that the participants were indicat g 
a false belief theory of mind on the independent task at an earlier age than on the 
embedded false belief theory of mind assessment.  For the 3 – 4 year olds, 10% 
indicate having an independently measured false belief theory of mind, while only 
2.3% indicate having a false belief theory of mind in the embedded measure.  
Similarly, for the 5 – 6 year olds, 44% indicate having an independently measured 
false belief theory of mind, while 15% indicate having a false belief theory of mind in 
the embedded measure.  Furthermore, for the 7 – 8 year olds, 88% indicate having an 
independently measured false belief theory of mind, while 52.3% indicate having a 
false belief theory of mind in the embedded measure.  Additionally, overall, 48.3% of 
the participants indicate having an independently measured false belief theory of 
mind, while only 23.6% of the participants indicate having a false belief theory of 
mind in the embedded measure.  This demonstrates that, as expected, participants 
were able to indicate a false belief theory of mind more easily and at an earlier age for 





Chapter 5:  Discussion 
 
Introduction 
The goal of this study was to investigate how intergroup attitudes, such as 
gender stereotypes, in combination with a false belief theory of mind competency, 
impact moral judgments.  More specifically, the goal was to examine whether gender 
stereotypes impact children’s attributions of intentionality in peer interactions when 
the intention is ambiguous.  To measure the role of cognitive judgment on these 
judgments, children were also measured for their false belief theory of mind ab lity, 
and whether this ability contributed to judgments about attributions of intentions in 
contexts in which gender stereotypes were made salient.  These issues are important 
to examine because when children’s gender stereotypes are affecting how they 
attribute intentions then children may be assigning blame inappropriately in peer 
contexts. This over attribution of negative intentions can lead to peer rejection and 
exclusion (Crick & Dodge, 1996; Dodge & Newman, 1981).  To date, no research has 
examined the impact of intergroup attitudes and false belief theory of mind 
competencies on moral judgments.  
There were many novel findings from this study.  Gender stereotypes and 
false belief theory of mind were shown to be related to children’s attributions of 
intentionality, and children’s gender stereotypes impacted their decisions ab ut 
intentionality.  Additionally, it was shown that false belief theory of mind facilit ted 




stereotypes impacted children’s ability to indicate a false belief theory of mind. 
Children found it difficult to make a false belief judgment when it was embedded in a 
task involving intentions that were ambiguous.  Children were not able to pass the 
false belief theory of mind task until a significantly later age, with less than half 
passing at 7 -8-years-of-age, instead of the majority passing at 4 – 5-years-of-age (see 
Figure 7) (Wellman & Liu, 2004).  
The impact of the gender inconsistent scenario in contrast to the gender 
consistent scenario did not emerge as predicted.  The original hypothesis predicted 
the participants would indicate less negative attributions of intentions (indicati g that 
the action was less wrong or more all right) in the gender inconsistent scenario in 
which a boy put a girl’s doll into his backpack or a girl put a boy’s truck into her 
backpack.  This prediction was based on the assumption that participants would view 
the taking of the counter-stereotypic toy as accidental, assuming that the child would 
not want to actually steal or take home a counter-stereotypic toy.  What was found 
instead was participants indicated more negative intentions (indicating the action was 
more wrong) in the gender inconsistent scenario (see Figure 3).  This result has to be 
viewed in light of the data indicating that overall, the overwhelming majority f he 
participants found the action to be not all right, and indicated negative intentions. If 
the children were viewing this action negatively, they were not paying attention to the
possible accidental placement of the toy into the wrong backpack. Instead, the 
children were focusing on the taking of the toy. When focusing on the taking of the 




gender inconsistent scenario, as more wrong than the taking of the gender consistent 
toy.  
This result is not surprising as Karinol and Aida’s (1997) examination of 
judgments associated with children breaking counter-stereotypic toys yielded similar 
results.  Karinol and Aida (1997) found that when judging the breaking of a neutral 
toy, punishment was not recommended. However, the participants expressed that 
children should not want a toy that violates gender stereotypes, and subsequently 
judged those who broke gender inconsistent toys more severely (Karinol & Aida, 
1997).  This is consistent with what was found in the current study, as the participants 
judged the child who took the inconsistent toy more severely than the child who took 
the gender consistent toy.  
Overall, the current study also contributes to social cognitive domain theory of 
moral development by illustrating the importance as well as the role of false be ief 
theory of mind competency in making attributions of intentionality in general as well 
as in morally relevant intergroup scenarios.  In concordance with the hypotheses, t 
participants with a false belief theory of mind competency were able to indicate less 
negative intentionality (indicated the action to be more all right) across both 
scenarios, regardless of gender stereotypes, and were thereby better able to see the 
ambiguity of the scenarios and withhold judgment.  This finding indicates that having 
a false belief theory of mind is critical to being able to make sound moral decisions 
regarding intentionality, and can even ameliorate the impact of having gender 
stereotypes when making decisions about intentionality.  In addition, when the false 




relevant, but included contextual variables that were gender stereotypic, children were 
not able to pass until a much later age.  This indicates that the addition of the gender 
stereotype contextual information made it significantly more difficult for the children 
to be able to indicate a false belief.  These novel findings, along with others will be
discussed below in greater detail, and with respect to the other variables in this study. 
False Belief Theory of Mind Task 
In concordance with previous findings (Wellman & Liu, 2004) as well as 
hypotheses made, the findings revealed that with age, children acquire a false belief 
theory of mind as indicated by the separate and independent false belief theory of 
mind task.  The overwhelming majority of participants from 3 – 4 years-of-age were 
unable to pass the false belief theory of mind task, while, as expected (Wellman, 
Cross, & Watson, 2001), by 5 – 6 years of age, many of the participants were able to 
pass (see Table 7).  Finally, the vast majority of the participants from 7 – 8-years of-
age, also as expected, were able to pass the independent false belief theory of mind 
task.  These findings serve to confirm previous findings as well as validate the age 
range chosen for the current study. 
Gender Stereotype Task 
In the current study, three gender stereotype scales were assessed.  For the 
gender stereotype flexibility scale, high gender stereotype flexibility indicated the 
participant was flexible in liking any child playing with any toy regardless of the 
gender stereotype, and low flexibility indicated the participant was not flexible in 




indicated the participant was tolerant of any child playing with any toy, regardless of 
the gender stereotype, while a low gender stereotype tolerance indicated the 
participant was intolerant of children playing with counter-stereotypic toys. Finally, 
high gender stereotype knowledge indicated the participant could accurately predict 
which toys were gender stereotyped for boys and which were stereotyped for girls, 
and low gender stereotype knowledge indicated the participant was not able to 
accurately specify the gender stereotyped toys. 
 It was predicted, and found, that children with high gender stereotype 
flexibility and tolerance would indicate less negative attribution of intentions, as these 
children would be able to see past the stereotypic nature of the scenario to better see 
the ambiguity and withhold judgment.  It was also predicted that children with a hig 
knowledge of gender stereotypes would indicate more negative attributions of 
intentions, as it was expected that these children with a high knowledge would also 
endorse stereotypes. This was not the case. Children with high knowledge of gender 
stereotypes were in line with the children with high tolerance and flexibility of gender 
stereotypes. They could accurately specify the gender stereotype of toys, but did not 
necessarily endorse the stereotype of only that gender of child playing with the 
gender stereotyped toys.  
The inclusion of these gender stereotype scales uniquely allowed for the 
examination of the direct impact of gender stereotypes on attributions of 
intentionality, punishment decisions, the social reasoning supporting those decisions, 
as well as the impact of having a false belief theory of mind.  Previously in the




rigidity, increases with age up until a ceiling is reached by 5- or 6-years-of-age 
(Ruble & Martin, 1998; Trautner, Ruble, Kirsten, & Hartmann, 2005).  In the current 
study, in accord with the previous literature, it was found that gender stereotype 
knowledge increased with age.  For the standard measure of false belief competency, 
most studies demonstrate that this ability is achieved by 5- or 6-years-of-ge.  Yet, in 
this study, as was shown in a previous study on morally-relevant theory of mind, 
children as old as 8 years of age did not apply their false belief knowledge to the 
gender stereotype context.  In addition, children’s tolerance for gender stereotypes 
increased with age, again with no ceiling emerging. 
 False belief theory of mind competency is a cognitive competency that 
indicates children can accurately view or predict what another person’s perspective 
would be, and predict that person’s actions even when the other person’s perspective 
or beliefs differ from reality and the child’s own beliefs (Wimmer & Perner, 1983).  
This is a complex cognitive capacity which facilitates social development as it allows 
children to see social situations from another person’s perspective and acknowledge 
that the other person may be making decisions based on inaccurate information.  Due 
to the cognitive complexity of the task, the current study predicted that children who 
were able to accomplish this and pass a false belief theory of mind task would als be 
more likely to have greater flexibility with gender stereotypes as well as greater 
tolerance with gender stereotypes.  This hypothesis was partially confirmed as a 
greater tolerance of gender stereotypes was found with the indication of a false belief 
theory of mind competency.  The findings for gender stereotype flexibility were 




been found that rigidity of gender stereotypes increases with age (Turiel & Stoddard, 
1985), as does the acquisition of a false belief theory of mind (Wimmer & Perner, 
1983), the impact of the cognitive phenomenon are cancelling each other out for the 
age range that has been explored.  
 The acquisition of a false belief theory of mind was also seen to coincide with 
the acquisition of greater knowledge of gender stereotypes, contrary to the initial 
hypothesis.  The original hypothesis was that gender stereotype knowledge ould 
coincide with gender stereotype use and endorsement (Trautner at al., 2005), and 
therefore be correlated with a low gender stereotype tolerance as well aslow gender 
stereotype flexibility, but as previously mentioned, this was not the case, high 
knowledge correlated with high tolerance and flexibility. It was therefore logical that 
as children passed the false belief theory of mind task, they would additionally be 
more likely to have a greater understanding of gender stereotypes, and therefore also 
have a high knowledge of gender stereotypes along with a high tolerance of gender 
stereotypes.  
The gender stereotype scale additionally revealed a significant finding for sex 
of participant such that the female participants were revealed to have more knowl dge 
of gender stereotypes than were the male participants.  This is in concordance with 
previous findings that male toys are seen overall as more desirable and of a higher 
status than female toys (Antill et al., 1996).  Therefore males and females would be 
more likely to desire to play with male stereotyped toys, and the females would be 
more encounter more discouragement from playing with toys that are considered 




socially acceptable for them to play with and what is not as children seen playing 
with opposite-sex toys is rated by other children as relatively bad (Smetana, 1986).  
Attribution of Intention and Punishment Acceptability Judgments 
Differences between Gender Consistent and Gender Inconsistent Scenarios 
As briefly outlined above, a significant difference between the judgments 
made in the gender inconsistent scenario (a boy puts a doll into his backpack) and the 
gender consistent scenario (a girl puts a truck into her backpack) was found not only 
for the attribution of intention assessment, but additionally for the punishment 
acceptability assessment as well (see Figures 3 and 6).  The two scenarios were 
identical except for the use of a gender stereotypic inconsistent versus gender 
consistent toy in the scenarios.  These findings show for the first time that children 
are using stereotypic information to make attributions of intentionality, over attribute 
negative intentions to children engaging in counter-stereotypic behavior, and make 
more severe punishment acceptability decisions for the children engaging in counter-
stereotypic behavior based on this over attribution of negative intentionality.  
While these findings are novel, they are supported by the literature.  Gender-
inconsistent behavior has been shown to be deemed unacceptable by the majority of 
children because of the reactions of their peers to this behavior (Carter & Patterson, 
1982; Smetana, 1986; Stoddart & Turiel, 1985).  Stoddard and Turiel (1985) 
discovered a U-shaped curve as the youngest (5-years-of-age) and oldest children
(13-years-of-age) in their study found participation in gender-inconsistent activi ies 
more wrong than did children in middle childhood.  Additionally they discovered that 




that participation in a gender-atypical activity was wrong. The authors concluded that 
in kindergarten the maintenance of gender identity is defined in physical terms, so if a 
girl was to play a male-stereotypical game, other children might question her gender, 
which would be highly undesirable for a young child (Stoddart & Turiel, 1985).  The 
findings from the current study reinforced this as the participants of all three age 
groups, from age 3 – 8-years-of-age found the action in the gender counter-
stereotypic scenario as more wrong (more negative intention) than the gender
consistent scenario, but also added to this research as the participants did not just 
evaluate the counter-stereotypic behavior as negative, they evaluated the intentions of 
the actor as negative simply because he/she was engaging in counter-stereotypic 
behavior.   
Additionally, Killen and Stangor (2001) found that children viewed 
straightforward exclusion, based on gender alone, from a stereotype inconsistent 
activity (boys from a ballet club, girls from a baseball club) as wrong from a moral 
viewpoint. However when the children were asked to make a choice between a 
stereotypic child (presented as more qualified) and a counter-stereotypic child, the 
stereotypic child was chosen, and group functioning was referenced for why. This 
indicates that the participants viewed the gender-inconsistent activity negatively 
(Killen & Stangor, 2001).  This was again confirmed in the current study, and the 
results furthered as the participants did not just exclude the counter-stereotypic child 
from an activity, they judged that child to be doing something more wrong than a 




participants’ attributions of intentions were highly influenced by the stereotypic 
nature of the toy, which is an over attribution of negative intentions.   
The current study additionally serves to further Horn, Killen, and Stangor’s 
(1999) research on adolescents. Horn, Killen, and Stangor (1999) examined 
ambiguous scenarios with adolescents in a high school setting (scenario 1, someone 
broke the sound equipment at a party; scenario 2, someone broke into the school’s 
computer system). In this study, the participants used stereotypic expectations o 
assign blame. The authors revealed participants to be more likely to accuse the 
“jocks” than the “techies” of breaking the sound equipment at the party, and were 
more likely to accuse the “techies” than the “jocks” of breaking into the computer 
system (Horn, Killen, & Stangor, 1999).  Even though both scenarios were 
ambiguous, as are the ones in the current study, the participants used stereotypic 
expectations to assign blame.  The current study though, was able to establish a 
similar finding, but with a much younger population, showing that children are using 
gender stereotypes to assign blame from as early as 3 years of age.  
These studies, taken together, revealed that children and adolescents used 
stereotypes to make exclusion decisions as well as to attribute intentions.  Not only 
did this over attribution of negative intentions indicate that these participants were 
allowing gender stereotypes and bias to influence their decisions, these decisions 
about intentionality were leading to prejudicial behavior about the acceptability of 
punishment of this action.  Importantly, over attribution of negative intentions has 
been linked to peer rejection and exclusion (Crick & Dodge, 1996; Dodge & 




adolescents have been shown to have stereotypes that become more entrenched with 
age (Stangor & Schaller, 1996), and the current study demonstrated that children are 
making decisions about not just intentionality, but also punishment using gender 
stereotypes as early as 3-years-of-age.  It is therefore critical to ontinue this line of 
research so as to understand as much about children’s over attribution of negative 
intentions based on stereotypes as possible, as well as to understand when and how it 
begins, and to recognize and discern what other decisions children could be making 
that are influenced by these stereotypes and others.  
Impact of Gender Stereotypes on Intent and Punishment Judgments 
In line with the original prediction that children would view the counter-
stereotypic scenario with less negative intent than the stereotype consistent cenario, 
it was also originally hypothesized that participants with a low tolerance and 
flexibility for gender counter-stereotypic play would indicate more negative intent for 
protagonists in the stereotype consistent scenario.  As the original prediction was not 
realized, and rather the opposite occurred, likely due to the overall negative 
evaluation of the actions in both scenarios, the assumption concerning the impact of 
gender stereotypes was not realized either.  
The findings for gender stereotype flexibility and tolerance are in accord with 
the newly informed interpretation of the data.  The participants with high tolerance 
and flexibility with gender stereotypes indicated less negative intent and endorsed 
less punishment for both the gender inconsistent as well as the gender consistent 
scenario, with no differences between the two scenarios.  The lack of differentiation 




with those children with a high tolerance and flexibility better able to see the 
ambiguity in both scenarios, not hindered by the stereotypic nature of the toy, thereby 
able to indicate less negative intent and endorse less punishment for both.  
No hypotheses were made with regard to high knowledge of stereotypes, as 
originally it was hypothesized that high knowledge of stereotypes would indicate a 
high use and acceptance of gender stereotypes.  As this scale of gender stereotype 
knowledge did not indicate use or endorsement of gender stereotypes, but rather an 
understanding of how typical gender stereotypes are applied, it is not surprising that 
in harmony with the previous finding for high tolerance and high flexibility, those 
participants with a high knowledge of gender stereotypes also indicated less negative 
intent and endorsed less punishment for both the gender inconsistent as well as the 
gender consistent scenario, with no differences between the two scenarios.  Again, 
this is possibly because those participants with a high knowledge of gender 
stereotypes were better able to see the ambiguity in both scenarios, therebyable to 
indicate less negative intent and endorse less punishment for both.  
Ingroup and Outgroup Differences 
It was hypothesized that participants would find the action to be more all right 
(indicate less negative intentions), and endorse less punishment for ingroup 
transgressors than for outgroup transgressors in concert with the rich literature 
indicating a strong ingroup favoritism (Boldizar & Messick, 1988; Brewer & Silver, 
1978; McAllister, 1995; Platow, et al., 1990). However, this was not found. The first 
judgment of intentionality as well as the punishment decision yeilded no significant 




the female participants found the action to be more all right for the male (outgroup) 
potential transgressor than for the female (ingroup), indicating more negative 
intentions, not less, for the ingroup.  As this finding was not revealed for the first 
attribution of intention assessment or the punishment judgment, it could be that this 
finding is an anomaly.  It is also possible that this finding is in accord with recent 
research that indicates ingroup favoritism depends on group status (Jost, Banaji, & 
Nosek, 2004), as well as the research that  demonstrates that some females implicitly 
endorse certain male stereotypes (Rudman & Kilianski, 2000) while preferring higher 
status male items and toys (Antill, Goodnow, Russell, & Cotton, 1996). In that case, 
the females would understand why a girl would want a truck, and would therefore 
believe that a girl took the truck on purpose because it was desirable.  A measure with 
the more explicit goal of a comparison of ingroup and outgroup attributions of 
intentions is needed in order to further extricate and disentangle this finding.  
Impact of False Belief Theory of Mind 
The current study verified the hypotheses made for false belief theory of 
mind, as it was hypothesized that those participants who indicated having a false 
belief theory of mind would be more likely to see the accidental nature of the 
transgression in either the gender inconsistent or gender consistent scenarios and 
thereby indicate less negative intention for both intention judgments, and also endorse 
less punishment for the action. In accord with these hypotheses, the participants in the 
current study passed the false belief task did indicate for both attribution of intentio  




participants with a false belief were better able to see the accidental nature of the 
scenarios than were those participants without a false belief.  
 This hypothesis and the concurrent findings are in accord with the vast 
literature on false belief theory of mind that indicates that a child able to pass afal e
belief task is able to understand that another individual can have beliefs that are not 
only different from their own, but different from reality, and subsequently able to 
predict decisions made by an individual based on those false beliefs (Wellman & Liu, 
2004).  This is a very complex cognitive achievement, and Wellman and Liu (2004) 
have also found that before a child can understand false beliefs, that child understand 
that individuals are able to have differing desires from their own, and can also predict
what choices and decisions those individuals would make based on those differing 
desires.  This would indicate that children who have a false belief theory of mind 
competency additionally have the ability to see that someone could want a toy that 
they themselves would not desire, and therefore would not be hindered in their 
judgments by the stereotypic nature of either of the scenarios.  
Additionally, recent research by Killen and colleagues (in press) directly 
speaks to the current findings as they revealed that children without a false belief 
theory of mind viewed it as more acceptable to punish an accidental transgressor than 
did participants with a false belief theory of mind (Killen, Mulvey, et al., in press).  
The current findings not only support what was already known about false belief 
theory of mind, but are also able to move the fields of false belief theory of mind and 
moral development forward. The current study was able to determine that having a 




intentionality in an ambiguous scenario, but also in a scenario steeped in gender 
stereotypes. These findings not only speak to the critical nature of this cognitive 
capacity in general, but also speak to its importance in moral decision making, and 
additionally its impact on the maintenance and influence of gender stereotypes on the 
decision making process. This is accomplished as the current study showed that 
children with a false belief theory of mind were able to see past the stereotypic nature 
of the scenarios in order to indicate less negative intentionality, thus ameliorating the 
negative impact of the gender stereotypes on the attribution of intentionality.  
Age Related Findings 
 The current study demonstrated age related findings regarding the attribution 
of intentionality (see Figure 2).  It was hypothesized that with age, participants would 
indicate less negative intentions and endorse less punishment, as with age, the 
participants would be better able to see the accidental nature of the transgression, and 
in fact, that hypothesis was confirmed.  For the first attribution of intention 
assessment as well as the punishment judgment, with age, children indicated less 
negative intention as well as less endorsement of punishment for both the gender 
inconsistent as well as the gender consistent scenarios.  
 These findings are highly supported by what has been previously found in the 
social domain literature as Killen and colleagues were able to show that children and 
younger adolescents were more likely to make accusations based on stereotypic 
assumptions with less available information than older adolescents, who reserve 
judgment until more evidence is presented (Horn, Killen, & Stangor, 1999; Killen, 




that the younger preschoolers, 4.5-years-of-age, were more likely than the older 
preschoolers, 5.5-years-of-age, to base initial judgments on stereotypic knowledge 
(Killen et al., 2001).   
Social Reasoning about Attribution of Intentions and Punishment Acceptability 
Judgments 
A unique aspect of the research of the social domain model is the focus on 
social reasoning data which elucidates individuals’ evaluations of social interactions.  
The current study was able to support the findings already made in this study and 
others as well as move the field of moral development and false belief theory of mind 
forward with these social reasoning data. 
Age Related Findings 
The current study’s age related findings that children were less likely to 
attribute negative intentions and less likely to endorse punishment with age were 
supported by the social reasoning data. Overall, the participants used more moral 
reasoning indicating the action was due to an accident or the negligence of the actor 
to pay attention to the initials on the backpacks which indicated ownership, both 
moral reasons indicating a lack of negative intentions. It was hypothesized though
that participants would use more reasoning, indicating deference to the rules 
(indicating no negative intentions) with age for the attribution of intention judgments 
as well as for the punishment judgment, but very few participants reasoned about the 
action using deference to the rules. The inclusive hypothesis however, indicating 




revealed for both the attribution of intention judgments as well as the punishment 
judgment across both the inconsistent and consistent scenarios.   
These findings are supported by what has been found in the social domain 
literature to date, as Killen and colleagues have found younger children to use more 
reasoning intended on blaming a potential transgressor in ambiguous scenarios than 
older children, while the older children were more likely to refer to a lack of negativ  
intentions to explain their attribution of intentions (Horn, Killen, & Stangor, 1999; 
Killen, Kelly, Richardson, & Jampol, in press; Killen, Pisacane, Lee-Kim, and Ardila-
Rey 2001).  
False Belief Theory of Mind 
The study of false belief theory of mind very rarely is inclusive of social 
reasoning data (for exceptions see: Killen, Mulvey, et al., in press). The social 
reasoning data in the current study served to support the false belief theory of mind 
findings that those participants with a false belief were able to indicate less negative 
intentionality as well as indicate less punishment than those participants with no false 
belief. The participants with a false belief used more moral reasoning indicati g the 
action was an accident, and not intended at all, as well as reasoning that the action 
was due to the negligence of the actor to look closely at the bags, also indicating no 
negative intentions, than those participants that did not indicate a false belief theory 
of mind.  
The hypothesis that participants with a false belief would use more reasoning 
indicating a lack of negative intentions than those participants without a false belief 




Killen and colleagues which found that children without a false belief were more 
likely to attribute negative intentions to an accidental transgressor the children with a 
false belief (Killen, Kelly, Richardson, & Jampol, in press). This study however, did 
not include a gender stereotypic context as the current study did.  
Differences between Gender Inconsistent and Gender Consistent Scenarios 
Very few participants explicitly noted a gender stereotype in their justification 
of their judgments of intention or punishment.  Therefore, no differences were found 
between the gender inconsistent and gender consistent scenario as far as reasoning 
about gender stereotypes.  Additionally, no differences were found at all between the 
reasoning used for the gender inconsistent and gender consistent scenarios.  It is 
possible that no differences were found due to the general nature of the justification 
asked for.  Therefore, had the justification not simply asked why it was all right or not 
all right for the actor to have put the toy into the wrong backpack, but instead 
included more probing questions, it is possible more distinctions between the two 
scenarios could have been made.   
Gender Stereotype Findings 
The findings from the social reasoning data again served to support the earlier 
findings that those individuals with high tolerance, high flexibility, and high 
knowledge of gender stereotypes made less negative attributions of intentionality and 
endorsed less punishment than those with low flexibility, tolerance, and knowledge. 
The participants with high tolerance, flexibility, and knowledge were more likely to 




tolerance, flexibility, and knowledge. More specifically, participants who indicated a 
high tolerance and knowledge of and flexibility with gender stereotypes reason d 
more often than those low in gender stereotype knowledge, tolerance, and flexibility 
that the action was without negative intentions, indicating that the action was likely 
an accident, or that the action was due to the negligence of the actor to look closely at 
the initials on the bags, both of which indicate a lack of negative intentions.  
It was originally hypothesized that participants with were low in gender 
stereotype flexibility and tolerance would use more reasoning using gender 
stereotypes than participants that indicated a high tolerance of and flexibility with 
gender stereotypes, but again, as very few participants used reasoning indicating 
gender stereotypes, this hypothesis was not corroborated by the data.  
These findings do much to support the attribution of intentionality findings.  
The children who were highly knowledgeable, tolerant of, and flexible with gender 
stereotypes were not only indicating less negative intentions for the judgments, th y 
were more likely to reason that the action was due to either an accident, or the 
negligence of the transgressor to pay attention to which bag the toy was going int . 
This supports the contention that these participants who are knowledgeable, tolerant 
and flexible with gender stereotypes are clearly better able to see the accid ntal nature 
of the transgression, and are not hindered by the stereotypical or counter-stereotypical 
nature of the toy that is being taken, and are not over attributing negative intentions to 
the transgressor. The over attribution of negative intentions due to gender stereotype 
inflexibility and intolerance can have serious consequences in social relationships in 




Dodge, 1996; Dodge & Newman, 1981) and more likely to hold stereotypes and 
prejudices as they age as stereotypes become more entrenched with age (Stan or & 
Schaller, 1996).   
Embedded False Belief Theory of Mind Task 
The embedded false belief theory of mind task was of great importance to the 
current study, as it was able to further the very limited research connecting theory of 
mind to moral development. This was accomplished by replicating the findings from 
Killen and colleagues study on morality and theory of mind (Killen, Mulvey, et al., in 
press), which indicated that children without false belief competency were more 
likely to attribute negative intentions and found it more acceptable to punish children 
in the morally relevant hypothetical scenario than children with false belif. 
Additionally, it was found that children attributed negative emotions and intentions to 
the accidental transgressor up until 8 – years-of-age and made it clear for the irst 
time that integrating moral judgment and false belief theory of mind poses challenges 
to children (see Table 7 and Figure 7) (Killen, Mulvey, et al., in press).   
The study by Killen and colleagues revealed a portion of what is impacting a 
child’s ability to make an attribution of intentionality.  It is clear that while a 4- or 5-
year-old can correctly distinguish intentionality in a straightforward scenario 
involving no emotional valence or moral concerns, the addition of a moral premise 
adds a layer of complexity to the scenario that makes it more difficult to correctly 
decipher intentionality.  What had not yet been explored was if adding more 
contextual features, such as a highly gender stereotyped toy, instead of an object 




to attribute intentionality would allow for a more thorough investigation of the impact 
of those contextual features.   
The current study revealed that adding the layer of complexity and contextual 
information of the gender stereotyped toys influenced the participants’ ability to 
discern intentionality.  In the embedded false belief task, the participants were more 
likely to pass the task with age. The ages that the participants were able to indicate a 
false belief theory of mind were much later as a whole than the age at which they 
were able to indicate a false belief in the independent task, which included no 
contextual or social information unlike situations that are likely to arise on an 
everyday basis where the objects and people involved are identifiable and known.  
Furthermore, it was revealed that even by the oldest age range, 7 -8-years-of-age, 
only 49% of the participants were able to pass the embedded false belief theory of 
mind task.  This is not only much later than the 4 – 5-year-old age range that is seen
in the literature for false belief (Wellman & Liu, 2004), but it is additionally l ter than 
what was found in independent false belief theory of mind task in this measure, and 
what was found for the embedded task for Killen and colleagues morality and theory 
of mind study (Killen, Mulvey, et al., in press).  The morality and theory of mind 
study was able to indicate that most of the participants had indicated a falsebelief 
theory of mind on the embedded task by the age of 8-years-of-age (Killen, Mulvey, et 
al., in press).  In our task, which included not only contextual and social information 
in a morally relevant scenario, but additionally included gender stereotyped 
information, only 49% of the 7 – 8-year-old participants were able to indicate a false 




gender stereotyped information is making it more difficult for children to discern 
intentionality.  
The fundamental determinations of intentionality, a core aspect of moral and 
social reasoning, is affected not only by the introduction of a moral premise to a 
straightforward false belief theory of mind scenario, but also strongly affected by the 
introduction of gender stereotyped contextual information.  These new data show that 
children are taking the contextual information into account when making attributions 
of intentionality and punishment decisions, and additionally these data inform us that 
determinations of intentionality are context dependent.  
 
Conclusion 
The current study had many unique aspects with the inclusion of an embedded 
false belief theory of mind task into a scenario of moral relevance with a gender 
stereotyped context, as well as the inclusion of measures of gender stereotype 
tolerance, flexibility, and knowledge.  There are therefore many novel finding that are 
able to push the fields of moral development and false belief theory of mind forward. 
First, the finding of a difference between the gender inconsistent and gender 
consistent scenarios reveals for the first time that children as young as three years of 
age are having their decisions concerning attribution of intentionality, a core aspect of 
moral development research, impacted by gender stereotypes and the inclusion of 
gender stereotypical objects.  Furthermore, it was able to be seen that children’s 
gender stereotypes, as directly measured with the tolerance, flexibility, and 




and punishment in scenarios involving gender stereotyped objects.  It was clear that 
those children with gender stereotypes were more likely to over attribute negative 
intentions than those without gender stereotypes.   
These findings are critically important as gender stereotypes tend to become 
more entrenched with age (Stangor & Schaller, 1996), and they impact critical social 
decisions such as the attribution of intentionality, which when negatively over 
attributed can lead to peer exclusion and rejection (Crick & Dodge, 1996; Dodge & 
Newman, 1981). Children that perceive negative intentions tend to react to those 
perceived negative intentions with a concordant negative reaction and possible 
aggression, and so therefore children who are over attributing negative intentions 
perceive and react to negativity even when it is not there. This can lead to peer 
rejection and exclusion because of the child’s avoidable negative reactions and 
possible aggressive behavior (Crick & Dodge, 1996; Dodge & Newman, 1981). 
These findings emphasize the importance of exploring this phenomenon even further 
with respect to age as well as additional contextual variables which could be 
impacting these decisions.  
The current study was able to discern that having a false belief theory of mind 
did help to ameliorate the negative impact of the inclusion of gender stereotyped 
objects into the scenario, by allowing the children to see past the gender stereotyped 
objects and see the ambiguity of the scenario and indicate less negative intentions.  
This cognitive capacity could therefore hold promise in the field of moral 




theory of mind could facilitate children’s ability to see past their stereo yp s when 
making social decisions. 
The other major finding to come out of the current study directly speaks to the 
field of false belief theory of mind, as it was found that embedding a false be ief task 
into a scenario that is both morally relevant as well as contextually rich with gender 
stereotyped objects significantly impacts the age at which a child can pass the ta k.  
The task becomes more complex because of the abundance of contextual information, 
but everyday scenarios are inclusive of the same level of contextual information, and 
adding that into the false belief theory of mind task therefore represents a more
realistic view of the amount and kind of information that a child is sorting through in 
order to make decisions about another’s false belief, and beliefs in general.  
Limitations 
The current study has done a great deal to add to the relevant fields of study, 
but also has several limitations that should be noted, and possibly addressed in a 
follow-up study.  The gender inconsistent scenarios and gender consistent scenario  
did differ in the inclusion of a cross-gender interaction for the gender inconsistent 
scenario.  While it is unlikely that the findings were due to the introduction of an 
opposite gendered peer, that possibility should be ruled out with the inclusion of a 
scenario involving a gender-inconsistent toy but a same sex peer (a girl taking another 
girl’s truck) or the inclusion of a scenario that includes a boy and a girl, but with a 
neutral toy (a girl taking another boy’s puzzle).  The inclusion of these scenarios 




negative intentions in the gender inconsistent scenario was due to the cross-gender 
nature of the scenario and not the use of the counter-stereotypic toy.  
No differences were found between the scenarios for social reasoning.  
Including more probing for the justifications would allow for a more rich level of 
reasoning and therefore more information would be available to discern if there are or 
are not differences between how the participants were reasoning about the intention 
and punishment decisions in the scenarios.  
Furthermore, since the ingroup and outgroup differences did not come out as 
expected, or with abundance, a measure should be created with the more explicit goal 
of comparing ingroup and outgroup attributions of intentions is needed in order to 
further extricate and disentangle the finding that female participants found the action 
to be more all right for the male (outgroup) potential transgressor than for the female 
(ingroup), indicating more negative intentions, not less, for the ingroup. 
Another point to address is that the toys used in the current study, a doll and 
truck, varied not only on their gender stereotypes, but also on their level of 
personalization.  The doll is highly personalized, as a child could identify themselves 
or a close other with the doll, while the truck is an inanimate object that the child 
cannot identify with.  Using a less personalized female stereotyped toy such as a 
kitchen set, or a more personalized toy for the male such as an action figure, would 
eliminate that discrepancy as well as any impact it may have on the findings.  
Overall, it is also possible that the younger children, and other children with 
less capable language skills, were not able to fully understand the intricacies and 




conducted research very similar in methodology to the current research. Similar 
assessment questions and scenarios were presented to the participants, and 
comparable content and complexity were employed in their interview. Smetana and 
Braeges (1990) additionally utilized a language comprehension task in their research, 
and were able to indicate that language comprehension was not a concern for these 
kinds of questions and scenarios past the age of 3 years of age.  They did find that 
children younger than 3 years-of-age were impacted by less capable language skills as 
those children had more difficulty discriminating the fine details of a scenario (the 
difference between moral and social conventional judgments) (Smetana & Braeges, 
1990).  The inclusion of a language comprehension measure would allow for the 
impact of language deficiencies to be explored or ruled out in the attribution of 
intentionality decisions.   
Additionally, the demographics of this study are limited.  The current study is 
inclusive of low to middle class subjects only, and can therefore be generalized to this 
population only.  It is possible that children within a lower socio-economic status 
could have differing age trends and could be impacted differently by the inclusion of 
gender stereotyped contextual information, which could impact the findings.  The 
inclusion of this sample in a follow-up study would allow for us to examine if a lower 
SES sample would differ in their attributions of intentionality or the age at which they 
pass both the independent as well as the embedded false belief task. 
Finally, the ethnicity of the participant was not addressed in this study, and the 
ethnicity of the characters used was randomized, not matched, both of which could be 




to differing social experiences, could be impacting their attributions of intent onality. 
Killen and colleagues have been able to find in previous studies that the differing 
social experiences of individuals in differing social and ethnic groups’ impacts their 
social decision making (Killen, Kelly, et al., in press).  Therefore, the inclusion of 
ethnicity as a variable of measure could illustrate an impact of participant ethnicity on 
attribution of intentionality that is distinct from the findings presented here for the 
current study.  Additionally, it is possible that the participants indicated differing 
attributions of intentionality or punishment decisions due to the ethnicity of the 
characters that were presented to them in the scenarios.  The ethnicity of the 
characters was randomized so as to reduce their impact on decision making, however, 
if the ethnicity was controlled and entered as a variable of measure the possibility of 
the ethnicity of the characters impacting the judgments and justifications made, could 
be eliminated. 
Future Directions 
The most critical future direction of the current study is the exploration of the 
over attribution of negative intentions that was found.  It is critical to understand at 
what age, and in what manner this over attribution of negative intention is presenting 
itself, so that a means of ameliorating the problem can be explored.  It is possible that 
pushing the age range of this study back so as to be inclusive of even younger 
children is not truly an option, as three years of age is possibly the youngest age at 
which a child could comprehend and acknowledge the complexity and intricacies of 
the scenarios and assessments presented.  If the age range were to be pushed back, a 




by researchers in the moral development field who are drawing upon samples of 
children as young as 14 – 18-months-of-age may allow for the examination of some 
of the rudimentary aspects of moral decision making that could be impacted by 
gender stereotypes (Warneken & Tomasello, 2009).  In addition, the field of theory of 
mind has broached a much younger sample as well, exploring the cognitive capacities 
of infants (Woodward & Needham, 2009). These two lines of research could be 
paired utilizing a much younger sample than the current study so as to gain further 
insight into the ontogeny of moral decision making, and the impact of a theory of 
mind on that decision making.  
Furthermore, finding that gender stereotypes were impacting attributions of 
intentionality and punishment decisions and reasoning, indicates that there could be 
many other contextual variables that additionally impact these judgments.  A full 
exploration of other contextual variables such as but not limited to ethnicity, social 
class, social group,  and religious affiliation could elucidate the myriad of contextual 
factors that could be impacting a child’s ability to make an attribution of 
intentionality.  Exploring these various possibilities will facilitate our growing 
understanding of the fields of moral development and false belief theory of mind 







Table 1: Design of Intergroup Attitudes Attribution of Intentions Task Justifications 






Victim Object Action Stereotype 
information in 










Boy puts doll in boy 
backpack.  Doll 











Girl puts truck in girl 
backpack.  Truck 
belongs to boy. 
Stereotype 
inconsistent 








Girl 1 puts doll in 
Girl 1 backpack.  











Boy 1 puts truck in 
Boy 1 backpack. 







Table 2: Descriptions of Intergroup Attitudes Attribution of Intentions Task 
Descriptions of Intergroup Attitudes Attribution of Intentions Task 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Scenario   Description 
 
Gender Inconsistent Todd and Melissa are children in the same classroom 
who have 
Female Transgressor backpacks that look the same except Todd’s has a T on 
the front and Melissa’s has an M on the front.  They are 
playing with their toys when the teacher asks them to 
get their backpacks ready to go home.  Todd puts his 
truck next to a pile of backpacks near the door, where 
both his and Melissa’s backpacks are.  The children go 
outside to play, but Melissa stays to help the teacher 
clean up. Melissa see’s Todd’s truck and puts it into 
this backpack (researcher points to Melissa’s 
backpack).  Researcher then asks the child to show 
them where the toy is to make sure that the participant 
is following the story).  
 








 (Table 2 continued) 
_____________________________________________________________________  
Scenario   Description 
 
Gender Inconsistent Tina and Mark are children in the same classroom who 
have  
Male Transgressor backpacks that look the same except Tina’s has a T on 
the front and Mark’s has an M on the front.  They are 
playing with their toys when the teacher asks them to 
get their backpacks ready to go home.  Tina puts her 
doll next to a pile of backpacks near the door, where 
both her and Mark’s backpacks are. The children go 
outside to play, but Mark stays to help the teacher clean 
up. Mark see’s Tina’s doll and puts it into this backpack 
(researcher points to Mark’s backpack).  Researcher 
then asks the child to show them where the toy is to 
make sure that the participant is following the story).  
Gender Consistent (male) Tim and Martin are children in the same classroom who 
have backpacks that look the same except Tim’s has a T 
on the front and Martin’s has an M on the front.  They 
are playing with their toys when the teacher asks them 
to get their backpacks ready to go home. Tim puts his 
truck next to a pile of backpacks near the door, where  






(Table 2 continued) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Scenario   Description 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 both his and Martin’s backpacks are. The children go 
outside to play, but Martin stays to help the teacher 
clean up. Martin see’s Tim’s truck and puts it into this 
backpack (researcher points to Martin’s backpack).  
Researcher then asks the child to show them where the 
toy is to make sure that the participant is following the 
story).   
Gender Consistent (female) Tara and Michelle are children in the same clssroom 
who have backpacks that look the same except Tara’s 
has a T on the front and Michelle’s has an M on the 
front. They are playing with their toys when the teacher 
asks them to get their backpacks ready to go home.  
Tara puts her doll next to a pile of backpacks near the 
door, where both her and Michelle’s backpacks are. The 
children go outside to play, but Michelle stays to help 
the teacher clean up. Michelle see’s Tara’s doll and puts 
it into this backpack (researcher points to Michelle’s 
backpack). Researcher then asks the child to show them 
where the toy is to make sure that the participant is 




Table 3: Descriptions of Social Reasoning Responses to Intergroup Attitudes 
Attribution of Intentions Task Justifications 
Description of Social Reasoning Responses to Intergroup Attitudes Attribution of 
Intentions Task Assessments on Intentions and Punishment 







Example of Response 
A. Moral 1. Psychological 
harm 
She’ll be sad; He’ll be angry that someone did 
that to him; She’ll get angry 
2. Negligence He should have looked at the initials; She didn’t 
ask him before she put it in; He should have 





He wanted to take it home; She took it to her 
house; He shouldn’t have put it in his bag; She 
won’t have it because he has it 
4. Prosocial Well, she was trying to help the teacher clean up 








6. Deference to 
the rules   
It’s against the rules to put it in your bag; She 
was just doing what she was told to do 
7. Gender 
Stereotypes 
Girls don’t want to take trucks home; it must 
have been an accident; Girls don’t play with 
trucks; Boys shouldn’t play with dolls; Girls 
don’t steal  
C. Personal 8. Selfish 
Desires 
She will have what she wants 
D. Uncodable 9. Undifferentiat
ed 
I don’t know; It’s bad; Because it’s good 







Table 4: Summary of Independent Variables 
Independent Variable Criteria 
1. Age  3 age groups: 1 (3 – 4.5 years); 2 (4.5 – 6 years); (6 – 8 
years) 
2. Gender  2 genders: Male; Female 
3. Scenario 2 scenarios: gender inconsistent (transgressor takes a toy that
is inconsistent with their own gender, girl takes a truck, boy 
takes a doll); gender consistent (transgressor puts a toy into 
their own backpack that is consistent with their own gender, 
boy takes a truck, girl takes a doll) 
4. False Belief Theory 
of Mind 
Dichotomous pass (correctly answered all 6 questions on 
False belief theory of mind task)/fail 
5. Gender Stereotype 
Tolerance 
Dichotomous high/low (as decided by a median split for 
Gender stereotype tolerance scale) 
 
6. Gender Stereotype 
Flexibility 
Dichotomous high/low (as decided by a median split for 
Gender stereotype flexibility scale) 
 
7. Gender Stereotype 
Knowledge 
Dichotomous high/low (as decided by a median split for 







Table 5: Summary of Hypotheses 
 
Summary of Hypotheses 
Intergroup Attitudes Attribution of Intentions Task 
Judgments of Intentionality 
1. Participants will indicate the action to be more all right (less negative 
intentions) as age increases. 
 
2. Participants who have a false belief theory of mind will indicate the action to 
be more all right, as they will be more likely to be able to see the accidental 
nature of the transgression. 
 
3. Participants low in gender stereotype flexibility and tolerance will be more 
likely to indicate that the action is more not all right, or less likely to be able 
to see the accidental nature of this transgression. 
 
4. Participants that are low in gender stereotype flexibility and toleranc will see 
more negative intent in the gender consistent scenario than in the gender 
inconsistent scenario.  
 
5. Participants will find the action to be more all right for ingroup transgressors 
than for outgroup transgressors for the stereotype inconsistent scenario and the 
stereotype consistent scenario. 
 
Justifications for Intention Assessments 
6. Participants will use more social conventional reasoning – deference to the 
rules and moral reasoning - no negative intentions as age increases. 
 
7. Participants will use more social conventional reasoning – deference to the 
rules and moral reasoning - no negative intentions with the indication of a 
false belief. 
 
8. Male participants will use more social conventional reasoning using gender 
stereotypes. 
 
9. Participants with lower gender stereotype flexibility and tolerance will use 
more social conventional reasoning using gender stereotypes. 
 
10. Participants will use more Social Conventional – gender stereotype reasoning 
in the gender inconsistent scenario than in the gender consistent scenario.   
 
11. Participants will be more likely to think that male and female children can be 
friends with age. 






(Table 5 continued) 
 
Liking Judgment and Justification 
12. Participants who have less stereotype flexibility and tolerance will think that 
male and female children cannot be friends than participants with more 
flexibility and tolerance.  
 
False Belief Theory of Mind, Location Change 
13. Participants will correctly indicate where the victim should look for the toy 
with age as children acquire a Theory of Mind for multifaceted scenarios with 
age. 
 
14. Participants with a false belief will more likely be able to correctly indicate 
where the victim should look for the toy thus indicating that they have a 
theory of mind in a morally relevant, multifaceted scenario.  
 
Emotion Judgment of Victim 
15. Participants will all indicate that the victim feels bad when the toy is moved.  
16. Participants will indicate that the victim will feel more badly in the gender 
consistent scenario than in the gender inconsistent scenario. 
 
17. Participants with low gender stereotype flexibility and tolerance as will 
indicate that the victim will feel more badly than the participants with high 
gender stereotype flexibility and tolerance. 
 
18. Male participants will indicate that the victim will feel more badly than female 
participants. 
 
Punishment of Transgressor 
19. Participants will indicate not to punish, or to punish to a lesser degree as age 
increases. 
 
20. Participants will indicate not to punish, or to punish to a lesser degree with an 
indication of having a false belief.  
 
21. Participants with low stereotype flexibility and tolerance will indicate the 
action to be more punishable for the stereotype inconsistent scenario than for 
the stereotype consistent scenario.  
 
22. Male participants will indicate the action to be more punishable for the 
stereotype inconsistent scenario than for the stereotype consistent scenario. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 





(Table 5 continued) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
23. Participants will find the action to be more all right for an ingroup 
transgressor than for outgroup transgressors for the stereotype inconsistent 
scenario and the stereotype consistent scenario. 
 
Justifications for Punishment Judgment 
 
24. Participants will use more social conventional reasoning – deference to the 
rules and moral reasoning - no negative intentions as age increases. 
 
25. Participants will use more social conventional reasoning – deference to the 
rules and moral reasoning - no negative intentions with the indication of a 
false belief.  
 
26. Male participants use more social conventional reasoning using gender 
stereotypes. 
 
27. Participants with lower gender stereotype flexibility and tolerance will use 
more reasoning social conventional reasoning using gender stereotypes. 
 
28.  Participants will use more social conventional reasoning using gender 
stereotype in the gender inconsistent scenario than in the gender consistent 
scenario.   
 
Second Order Theory of Mind 
 
29. Participants will indicate that the transgressor was trying to put the toy into 
the victim’s backpack with age and with an indication of having a Theory of 
Mind as children acquire a second order Theory of Mind after they acquire a 
first order theory of mind, and thus theory of mind is requisite for being able 
to accurately answer this assessment.  
 
30. Participants with second-order Theory of Mind will think that transgressor has 
less negative intentions than those participants who do not have a second 
order Theory of Mind. 
 
False Belief Theory of Mind Task 
 
31. Participants will correctly indicate what others will think is in the crayon box 
with age. 
 
32. Participants will correctly indicate if the children outside saw what was in the 






 (Table 5 continued) 
__________________________________________________________________ 
33. Participants will correctly indicate the actual contents of the crayon box with 
age. 
 
34. Participants will correctly indicate where Lenny should look for the markers 
with age. 
 
35. Participants will correctly indicate if Lenny saw where the teachr put the 
markers. 
 
36. Participants will correctly indicate where the markers are located. 
 
Gender Stereotype Task 
 
37. Participants will increase in stereotype knowledge, tolerance, and flexibility 
with age. 
 
38. Male participants will indicate lower gender stereotype flexibility and 




Table 6: Summary of Dependent Variables in Intergroup Attitudes Attribution of 
Intentions Task 
Description of Dependent Variables in Intergroup Attitudes Attribution of Intentions 
Task  
Dependent Variable Question Potential Answers 
1. Intentions of 
Transgressor 
“Whose backpack did 
(transgressor’s name) 
think he/she was putting 




2. Judgment of 
Transgressor’s Intentions, 
dichotomous 
 “When (transgressor’s 
name) put the toy truck (or 
doll) into the backpack did 
she (or he) think she (or 
he) was doing something 
that was all right or not 
alright?  
Two Choices: All right, 
Not all right 
3. Judgment of 
Transgressor’s Intentions, 
Likert 
“How alright (or not 
alright depending on the 
answer they provided for 
the previous question) did 
(transgressor’s name) 
think he/she was for doing 
that?” 
Likert Scale: 1, Not all 
right; 4, All right  
4. Justification of 
Transgressor’s Intention 
“Why?” Open ended verbal 
response coded 
dichotomously as 0 (not 
present) or 1(present)  for 
each justification category 
(Psychological harm, 
Negligence, Ownership 















(Table 6 continued) 
 
Dependent Variable Question Potential Answer 
5. Judgment of 




name) put the truck (or 
doll) into the backpack, do 
you think he (or she) was 
doing something that was 
alright or not alright? 6) 
How alright/not alright do 
you think she was for 
doing that?” 
Two Choices: All right, 
Not all right 
6. Judgment of 
Transgressor’s Action by 
the Participant, Likert 
“How alright/not alright 
do you think she was for 
doing that?” 
Likert Scale: 1, Not all 
right; 4, All right 
7. Justification of 





Open ended verbal 
response coded 
dichotomously as 0 (not 
present) or 1(present)  for 
each justification category 
8. Friendship Judgment “How much do you think 
(transgressor’s name) and 
(victim’s name) like each 
other?” 
Likert scale: 1, Not at all; 
4, A lot 
9. Friendship Justification “Why” Open ended verbal 
response coded 
dichotomously as 0 (not 
present) or 1(present)  for 
each justification category 
10. False Belief Theory of 
Mind, Location Change 
“Where will (victim’s 
name) look for his (or her) 
truck (or doll)?” 
Three choices:  
on the floor (which is 
where he (or she) left it 
and should look for it); in 
transgressor’s backpack 
(where it actually is); in 
victim’s own backpack 
11. False Belief Theory of 
Mind, Location Change 
Justification 
“Why will (victim’s name) 
look there?”  
Open ended verbal 
response coded 
dichotomously as 0 (not 
present) or 1(present)  for 








(Table 6 continued) 
 
Dependent Variable Questions Potential Answers 
12. Emotion Judgment of 
the Victim 
“When (victim’s name) 
finds out his (or her) truck 
(or doll) is not where he 
(or she) left it, how will 
(victim’s name) feel?” 
Two choices: Good, Bad 
13. Punishment of 
Transgressor, Yes/No 
“Should (transgressor’s 
name) get in trouble for 
putting the truck (or doll) 
into the backpack 
(researcher points to 
transgressor’s backpack)?” 
Two Choices: Yes, No 
14. Punishment of 
Transgressor, Amount 
(If the participant answers 
yes to previous question) 
“How much trouble 
should (transgressor’s 
name) get in?” 
Two Choices: A little; A 
lot 
15. Justification of 
Punishment of 
Transgressor 
“Why” Open ended verbal 
response coded 
dichotomously as 0 (not 
present) or 1(present)  for 
each justification category 
16. Second Order Theory 
of Mind 
“What did (victim’s name) 
think that (transgressor’s 
name) thought he (or she) 
was trying to do? 
Two Choices: Put 
(victim’s name) truck (or 
doll) in (transgressor’s 
name) backpack; Put 
(victim’s name) into 
(victim’s name) backpack 
17. Justification for 
Second Order Theory of 
Mind 
“Why” Open ended verbal 
response coded 
dichotomously as 0 (not 
present) or 1(present)  for 
each justification category 
18. Emotion Judgment 
after Knowledge of 
Transgression, 
dichotomous 
“How will (victim’s name) 
feel about (transgressor’s 
name) now that he (or she) 
knows (transgressor’s 
name) put the truck (or 
doll) into this backpack 
(researcher points to 
transgressor’s backpack)?” 
Two Choices: Good; Bad 






(Table 6 continued) 
 
Dependent Variable Question Potential Answers 
19. Emotion Judgment 
after Knowledge of 
Transgression, Likert 
“How good (or bad, 
depending on the 
participant’s answer to the 
previous question) will 
(victim’s name) feel about 
(transgressor’s name)?” 
Likert scale: 1, bad; 4, 
good 
20. Justification for 
Emotion Judgment after 
Knowledge of 
Transgression 
“Why” Open ended verbal 
response coded 
dichotomously as 0 (not 
present) or 1(present)  for 






Table 7: Proportions of Reasoning about Evaluations of Punishment of Transgressor 
Summary of Proportions of Justifications for Judgment of Punishment of 
Transgressor 
 

































































Table 8: Percentage and Amount of Participants Who Passed the False Belief Tasks 





False Belief Task 
Stereotype Inconsistent 
Embedded False Belief 
Task 
Stereotype Consistent 
Embedded False Belief 
Task 
 n % n % n % 
3 – 4 
years 
4 10% 1 2.3% 1 2.3% 
5 – 6 
years 
16 44.4% 7 17.5% 4 12.5% 
7 – 8 
years 




Table 9: Proportions of Reasoning about Evaluation of Transgressor’s Intentions 
 


























































































































Appendix B: Parental Consent Form 
 
 
Institute for Child Study/Department of Human Development Melanie Killen, Ph.D. 
3304 Benjamin Building  Office: 301.405.3176 
College Park, MD  20742-1131  Email: mkillen@umd.edu 
 
Dear Parents/ Guardians: 
 
We are conducting a project on children’s perspective taking about property 
ownership. This is a follow-up study to one that we recently conducted in which we 
found that children, under about 7 years of age, had difficulty determining another 
child’s intentions in situations in which children were asked to take the perspective of 
another child. We would like to ask your permission to interview your son or daughter 
for this new project in which we are varying the stories to have more information 
regarding ownership of property.   
 
Children are told simple short vignettes about typical exchanges between children in 
the classroom (such as taking a toy from someone else) and then asked to respond 
to a series of simple open-ended questions. For example, one child “mistakenly” puts 
a doll or truck owned by another child into their own backpack.  Participants are 
asked whether the child intended to keep the toy, and what his or her intentions will 
be regarding their next action. In addition to administering the “intentionality” story, 
we will ask children about ownership and interest of toys (e.g., who likes to play with 
trucks?). There are no right or wrong answers.  We are interested in documenting 
the ways in which children’s judgments and reasoning are related to the 
development of perspective taking.    
 
All information is confidential and anonymous.  Please read the description of the 
project on the reverse side of this letter.  If you are willing to have your child 
participate in the project, please fill out the inf ormation and return it to your 
child’s teacher.  
 
The results of this study will help teachers, counselors, and educators understand 
children’s intentions and social development.  This research has been approved by 
the Institutional Review Board at the University of Maryland. 
 
We thank you, in advance, for reading this letter, and for your willingness to allow 
your child to participate. We have found that children enjoy the interviews.  They 
enjoy hearing the stories, and they appreciate the chance to express their viewpoints 
to an interested adult.   
 
  Thank you, 
  Melanie Killen, Ph.D., Professor  






PARENTAL CONSENT FORM 
Project Title Children’s Attributions of Intentions 
Why is this 
research being 
done? 
The purpose of the research is to understand how children attribute intentions in 
situations involving ownership of toys.  
What will your 
child be asked to 
do? 
The procedure involves a one-time, audiotape-recorded individually administered 
interview session, lasting approximately 30 minutes.  Your child will be interviewed in a 
quiet setting by a trained research assistant from the University of Maryland. A few short 
stories, developed by the researcher, about everyday peer encounters and social rule 
transgressions along with illustrated picture cards will be presented to your child and 
simple, straightforward questions evaluating the situat on will be asked. In addition, your 
child will be asked questions to evaluate in what circumstances they can take other 
people’s perspectives.  Example questions include: Where did the teacher put the 
markers? Does Sally know where the teacher put the markers? Why or why not? They 
will also be asked questions about who can and should play with everyday toys (like 
dolls and trucks). 
What about 
confidentiality? 
We will do our best to keep your personal information confidential.  We will not share 
your answers with anyone, including your teachers, principal, or parents. If we write a 
report or article about this research project, your name will not appear in it. 
What are the risks 
of this research? 
There are no known risks associated with this reseach. 
What are the 
benefits of this 
research? 
This research is not designed to help your child personally. Instead, research is obtained 
about age-related patterns regarding stereotypes and ocial rule transgressions.  The 
results will help us learn more about what kids think about social relationships. 
Educators, counselors, and school professionals will incorporate the findings into their 
curriculum and guidance programs through reports made available by us to the 
participating schools 
Do I have to be in 
this research? 
May I stop 
participating at any 
time?   
Your child’s participation is strictly voluntary. You can ask any questions at any time, or 
withdraw your child from participation at any time. Your child may decide to stop 
participating at any time and will not be penalized or lose any benefits.  Participation is 
not a school or class requirement. Participation will not affect your child’s grades or 
performance evaluation. 
What if I have 
questions? 
This research is being conducted by Dr. Melanie Killen , a professor in the Department 
of Human Development at the University of Maryland, College Park.  If you have any 
questions about the research study itself, please conta t Dr. Killen at: Department of 
Human Development, 3304 Benjamin Building, College Park, MD 20742-1131; 
(telephone) 301-405-3176. 
If you have questions about your rights as a research subject or wish to report a research-
related injury, please contact: Institutional Review Board (IRB) Office, University of 
Maryland, College Park, Maryland, 20742; (e-mail) irb@deans.umd.edu; 
(telephone) 301-405-0678.This research has been reviewed according to the University 
of Maryland, College Park IRB procedures for research involving human subjects. 
Consent Your signature indicates that:  the research has been explained to you; your questions 
have been fully answered; and that you allow your child to participate in this research 
project. 
Signature and Date Child’s Name 
Child’s Classroom 
Child’s Birth Date 







Appendix C: Complete Interview 
University of Maryland 
Attributions of Intentions in Early Childhood 




Date of Birth:__________________________________ 
Gender: M  F 




I am going to show you pictures of some kids and tell you a little bi about them.  
Then I want to ask you some questions about these kids.  After you look at the
pictures, I am going to show you some cards of kids doing different things and then I 
will ask you some questions about the kids in the cards.  I am interested in finding out 
what children your age think about things kids do. There are no right or wrong 
answers. This is not a test. No one will see your answers.  So just tell me what you 
think. Do you have any questions? 
We are going to tape-record this interview to help us remember what we talked about.  
So, before we start, let’s make sure this tape-recorder works.  
Rewind and check tape-recording: 
Tape-Recorder Check: “This is (Name of Interviewer) and I’m talking with (Name of 
Interviewee).  (Interviewee’s name’s) birth date is ________.  Today’s date is ___________. 
Introduce Likert Scale:   Have you ever seen one of these before? 
This is a way we show how much we think something is good or bad (pointing to correct sides of 
the scale).  Can you show me how much you like pizza?  (Wait until the child shows you).  Ilike 
it this much (use the opposite side of the scale).  Can you show me how much you like playing 
outside?  Do you think you understand how to use this?  (Check for understanding and continue 
with examples if needed).   




Story 1:  
This is Tina and this is Mark (show pictures). They are children in this classroom wh  
like playing with dolls and trucks and balls. Tina and Mark have backpacks that look 
the same, except Tina’s has a T on the front and Mark’s has an M on the front.  This 
is Tina’s (show T backpack) and this is Mark’s (show M backpack).  They are 
playing with their toys at school when the teacher asks them to get their backpacks 
ready to go home before they go outside for recess.  Tina picks up her doll and puts it 
next to the pile of backpacks near the door, where her backpack and Mark’s backpack 
are sitting.  Then, she goes outside for recess.  Mark stays inside to help the teacher 
clean up the classroom.  Mark sees Tina’s doll and puts it into this backpack (show M 
backpack). Can you show me which backpack the doll is in now?  (If incorrect, 
retell/clarify).     
  
Q1. Whose backpack did Mark think  he was putting the doll into? (Intent and 
check)  
 
MARK’S                         TINA’S 
 
Q2. When Mark put the doll into the backpack, did he think he was doing 
something that was alright or not alright?  
     
NOT ALRIGHT  ALRIGHT   
 
Q3.  How alright/not alright (READ WHICHEVER THEY PICKED IN THE 
LAST QUESTION) did Mark think he was for doing that?  
 
1   2    3   4 
NOT ALRIGHT        ALRIGHT 
 
Q4. Why?  




Q5. When Mark put the doll into the backpack, do you think he was doing 
something that was alright or not alright?  
     
NOT ALRIGHT  ALRIGHT   
 
Q6.  How alright/not alright (READ WHICHEVER THEY PICKED IN THE 
LAST QUESTION) do you think he was for doing that?  
 
1   2    3   4 








Q7. Why?  




Q8.  How much do you think Mark and Tina like each other? 
 
1   2    3   4 






Now, Tina comes back inside to get ready to go home.   
 
Q10. Where will Tina look for her doll? 
  
ON THE FLOOR                        IN MARK’S BACKPACK   
        
           IN TINA’S BACKPACK                     
 




Q12.  When Tina finds out her doll is not where she left it, how will Tina 
feel?  
 
GOOD           BAD 
 
Q13. Should Mark get in trouble for putting the doll into this backpack 
(point to M backpack)? 
 
YES                              NO  
 
Q14. (If Yes) How much trouble should Mark get in? 
   
  A LITTLE   A LOT 
 
Q15. Why or why not?       
______________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________








Q16. What did Tina think that Mark thought he was trying to do? 
  
PUT TINA’S DOLL INTO    PUT TINA’S DOLL INTO  






Q18. How will Tina feel about Mark now that she knows Mark put the doll into 
this backpack (point to backpack M)?  
 
GOOD  BAD       NEUTRAL 
 
Q19.  How good/bad (READ WHICHEVER THEY 
PICKED IN THE LAST QUESTION) will Tina feel 
about Mark?  
 
1   2    3   4 
 BAD         GOOD 
 










This is Tara and this is Michelle (show pictures). They are children in this clas room 
who like playing with dolls and trucks and balls. Tara and Michelle have backpacks 
that look the same, except Tara’s has a T on the front and Michelle’s has an M on the 
front.  This is Tara’s (show T backpack) and this is Michelle’s (show M backpack).  
They are playing with their toys at school when the teacher asks them to get their 
backpacks ready to go home before they go outside for recess.  Tara picks up her doll 
and puts it next to the pile of backpacks near the door, where her backpack and 
Michelle’s backpack are sitting.  Then, she goes outside for recess.  Michelle stays 
inside to help the teacher clean up the classroom.  Michelle sees Tara’s doll and puts 
it into this backpack (show M backpack). Can you show me which backpack the doll 
is in now?  (If incorrect, retell/clarify).     
  
Q1. Whose backpack did Michelle think  she was putting the doll into?  
 
MICHELLE’S                         TARA’S 
 
Q2. When Michelle put the doll into the backpack, did shethink she was doing 
something that was alright or not alright?  
     
NOT ALRIGHT   ALRIGHT   
 
Q3.  How alright/not alright (READ WHICHEVER THEY PICKED IN THE 
LAST QUESTION) did Michelle think she was for doing that?  
 
1   2    3   4 
NOT ALRIGHT        ALRIGHT 
 
Q4. Why?  




Q5. When Michelle put the doll into the backpack, do you think she was doing 
something that was alright or not alright?  
     
NOT ALRIGHT     ALRIGHT   
 
Q6.  How alright/not alright (READ WHICHEVER THEY PICKED IN THE 
LAST QUESTION) do you think she was for doing that?  
 
1   2    3   4 






Q7. Why?  




Q8.  How much do you think Michelle and Tara like each other? 
 
1   2    3   4 






Now, Tara comes back inside to get ready to go home.   
 
Q10. Where will Tara look for her doll? 
  
ON THE FLOOR                        IN MICHELLE’S BACKPACK   
        
     IN TARA’S BACKPACK                     
 




Q12.  When Tara finds out her doll is not where she left it, how will Tara 
feel?  
 
GOOD           BAD 
 
Q13. Should Michelle get in trouble for putting the doll into this backpack 
(point to M backpack)? 
 
YES                              NO  
 
Q14. (If Yes) How much trouble should Michelle get in? 
   
  A LITTLE    A LOT 
 
Q15. Why or why not?       
______________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________






Q16. What did Tara think that Michelle thought she was trying to do? 
  
PUT TARA’S DOLL INTO    PUT TARA’S DOLL INTO  






Q18. How will Tara feel about Michelle now that she knows Michelle put the doll 
into this backpack (point to backpack M)?  
 
GOOD  BAD       NEUTRAL 
 
Q19.  How good/bad (READ WHICHEVER THEY 
PICKED IN THE LAST QUESTION) will Tara feel 
about Michelle?  
 
1   2    3   4 
 BAD         GOOD 
 








See this box (pointing to a crayon box)? This is a crayon box. Now here is 
Sarah. She is cleaning up the classroom and puts some crackers in the empty 
crayon box.  
 
Q1. When the other children come back in from playing outside, what will they 
think is in the crayon box?  
 
CRAYONS   CRACKERS 
 
Q2. Did the children who were playing outside see Sarah put the crackers in the 
box? 
 
   YES    NO 
 
Q3. What is really in the crayon box? 
 
CRAYONS  CRACKERS 
 
Story 4:  
Lenny is using the markers before recess over at the art table. Lenny goes 
outside to play and the teacher, Mr. Jones puts the markers in the cabinet.  
 
Q1. When Lenny comes back inside from recess, where will he look for the 
markers?  
[IF THE PARTICIPANT SAYS “EVERYWHERE,” ASK THEM WHERE LENNY 
WILL LOOK FIRST] 
 
               ART TABLE  CABINET 
 
Q2. Did Lenny see where Mr. Jones put the markers? 
  
                            YES  NO 
 
Q3. Where are the markers really located? 
 





Knowledge and Ownership of Toys  
Procedure. A picture of a toy is placed in front of the child and the interviewer 
administers 3 questions per toy. Randomly choose a toy and fill in which toy is 
presented. 
 
Now I’m going to show you pictures of different toys. I’ll ask you a few 
questions about them and I want you to tell me what you think.  
 
TOY 1: ________________ 
Q1. Who usually plays with this toy? 
   
BOY      GIRL     BOTH 
 
Q2. Who can play with this toy?   
 
BOY      GIRL     BOTH 
 
Q3.  How much would you like it if a boy wanted to play with this toy? 
 
1    2   3   4 
NOT AT ALL        A LOT 
 
TOY 2: ________________ 
Q1. Who usually plays with this toy? 
   
BOY      GIRL     BOTH 
 
Q2. Who can play with this toy?   
 
BOY      GIRL     BOTH 
 
Q3.  How much would you like it if a boy wanted to play with this toy? 
 
1    2   3   4 
NOT AT ALL        A LOT 
 
TOY 3: ________________ 
Q1. Who usually plays with this toy? 
   
BOY      GIRL     BOTH 
 
Q2. Who can play with this toy?   
 






Q3.  How much would you like it if a boy wanted to play with this toy? 
 
1    2   3   4 
NOT AT ALL        A LOT 
 
TOY 4: ________________ 
Q1. Who usually plays with this toy? 
   
BOY      GIRL     BOTH 
 
Q2. Who can play with this toy?   
 
BOY      GIRL     BOTH 
 
Q3.  How much would you like it if a boy wanted to play with this toy? 
 
1    2   3   4 
NOT AT ALL        A LOT 
 
TOY 5: ________________ 
Q1. Who usually plays with this toy? 
   
BOY      GIRL     BOTH 
 
Q2. Who can play with this toy?   
 
BOY      GIRL     BOTH 
 
Q3.  How much would you like it if a boy wanted to play with this toy? 
 
1    2   3   4 
NOT AT ALL        A LOT 
 
TOY 6: ________________ 
Q1. Who usually plays with this toy? 
   
BOY      GIRL     BOTH 
 
Q2. Who can play with this toy?   
 
BOY      GIRL     BOTH 
 
Q3.  How much would you like it if a boy wanted to play with this toy? 
 
1    2   3   4 





TOY 7: ________________ 
Q1. Who usually plays with this toy? 
   
BOY      GIRL     BOTH 
 
Q2. Who can play with this toy?   
 
BOY      GIRL     BOTH 
 
Q3.  How much would you like it if a boy wanted to play with this toy? 
 
1    2   3   4 
NOT AT ALL        A LOT 
 
TOY 8: ________________ 
Q1. Who usually plays with this toy? 
   
BOY      GIRL     BOTH 
 
Q2. Who can play with this toy?   
 
BOY      GIRL     BOTH 
 
Q3.  How much would you like it if a boy wanted to play with this toy? 
 
1    2   3   4 
NOT AT ALL        A LOT 
 
TOY 9: ________________ 
Q1. Who usually plays with this toy? 
   
BOY      GIRL     BOTH 
 
Q2. Who can play with this toy?   
 
BOY      GIRL     BOTH 
 
Q3.  How much would you like it if a boy wanted to play with this toy? 
 
1    2   3   4 
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